

# THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AYÂN FAMILY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ANATOLIA: THE CANIKLİZÂDES (1737-1808)

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## ABSTRACT

The Rise and Fall of an *Ayân* Family in Eighteenth Century Anatolia:  
the Caniklizâdes (1737-1808).

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This thesis examines the rise and fall of the Caniklizâdes within the context of the redistribution of political and economic resources between the center and the periphery in the second half of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. The introductory chapter looks at the long-term determinants behind the rise of local dynasties in the Empire. Chapter Two outlines the historical process of the Caniklizâdes' incorporation into the ruling class of the empire from a small notable background with an attention to their conflicts with the central government and the Çapanoğlus.

Chapter Three analyses the revenue sources, the tax-farms (*mukata'as*), controlled by the Caniklizâdes in northeastern Anatolia by emphasising the network of relationship between the central government and the family mediated by the *kapı kethüdas* and *sarrafs*.

The next chapter examines the family's leading household members (*kethüdas*), and lesser local notables within the context of the redistribution of administrative and tax-collection rights. The last chapter analyses the ways of the Caniklizâdes' enrichment and their investments as well as their religious endowments.

Key Words: Caniklizâde, *Ayân*, Local Dynasty, Tax-Farm.

## ÖZET

Onsekizinci Yüzyılda Anadolu’da Bir Ayan Ailesinin Yükselişı ve Düşüşü:  
Caniklizâdeler (1737-1808).

Şahin, Canay.

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü.

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Oktay Özel.

Bu tez, onsekizinci yüzyılın ikinci yarısında merkezle taşra arasındaki siyasi ve iktisadi kaynakların yeniden dağıtımı bağlamında Caniklizâdelerin yükselişı ve düşüşünü incelemektedir. Giriş bölümünde imparatorlukta yerel hanedanlıkların yükselmesinin ardındaki uzun dönemli etkenleri ele alınmaktadır. İkinci Bölüm, Caniklizâdelerin, merkezi hükümet ve Çapanoğulları ile olan çatışmalarına değinerek, yerel eşraf kökeninden imparatorluğun yönetici sınıfına dahil olma sürecini incelemektedir.

Üçüncü Bölüm’de, Caniklizâdelerin Kuzeydoğu Anadolu’da kontrol ve tasarruf ettikleri gelir kaynakları (*mukataalar*) incelenmekte ve özel olarak da kapı kethüdaları ve sarrafların aracılık ettikleri merkezi hükümet ile aile arasındaki ilişkiler ağı vurgulanmaktadır.

Bir sonraki bölümde, yönetsel ve vergi toplama haklarının bölüşümü bağlamında, ailenin kapı halkının ileri gelen üyeleriyle (kethüda) ikincil ya da alt ayanlar araştırılmaktadır. Son bölümde ise, Caniklizâdelerin zenginleşme yolları, yatırımları ve vakıfları değerlendirilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Caniklizâde, Ayân, Yerel Hanedanlık, Mukataa.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

This study aims to analyse the rise and fall of the Caniklizâdes, which was one of the powerful dynasties of the second half of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire with particular attention to their economic power. The Canikli dynasty as well as other local magnates in Ottoman Anatolia, such as the Karaosmanoğlus and Çapanoğlus, rose during the period of the transformation of the Ottoman social formation, the beginnings of which may be traced back to the closing decades of the sixteenth century. The empowerment of such families was the overall result of the seventeenth century transformation, which took a new shape in the following century. Therefore, in this introductory part, the conditions that enabled the upsurge of dynasties to become promoted into an imperial elite will be looked at.

The rise and fall of the Caniklizâdes can best be understood within the framework of the changing relationship between the center and periphery, the origin of which goes back to the sixteenth century. The long-term historical determinants, as discussed below (escalation of wars; the state's increasing need for cash, soldiers and provisions; the *mukataa*-ization and *malikâne*-ization of tax revenues), are relatively well known processes behind the strengthening of local forces. After briefly looking at the main parameters of this process in the following pages, I will analyse within this framework, the nature of the political

and economic relationship between the central government and local notables in the eighteenth century by a reading of existing literature on the subject. The emphasis will be on how a network of hierarchical economic relations was formed around the Ottoman practice of tax-farming during the period under examination.

## I. Post-Classical Age Transformation: An Overview

In order to analyse the changing relationship between the center and periphery, and the rise of local dynasties in the eighteenth century, it is imperative to start with a brief discussion of the transformation of the Ottoman economy, society and administration from the end of the sixteenth century onwards. This is necessary in understanding the long-term determinants behind the rise of provincial notables both at the local and imperial level. Among these, historians emphasize a number of historical factors that cumulatively paved the way to the seventeenth century transformation, which began with a severe financial crisis at the end of the sixteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

The first development to mention in this context was perhaps the population growth and the influx of American silver and gold, which caused serious inflation in the Ottoman Empire towards the end of the sixteenth century.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi calls the seventeenth century as a period of "crisis and change" in her recent works. See "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, eds. Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 411-623.

<sup>2</sup> The debate over the nature of the "seventeenth century crisis" and its implications for the long-term transformations became the concern of Ottoman historians. The inflation in the Ottoman prices could be due to the population pressure, or the Price Revolution or a combination of both.

The rise in prices reached an unprecedented level after the devaluation of the *akçe* first in 1585-86, then in 1600, 1618, 1624, and 1641,<sup>3</sup> thus seriously reducing the value of the fixed incomes of *timar* holders. Secondly, the period of long and costly wars, which began at the end of the sixteenth century and continued throughout the seventeenth century both on the Eastern and Western fronts, further contributed to the financial crisis. In other words, the most important reason for the destabilization of the old equilibrium in the Ottoman financial system appears to have been these long and costly wars.<sup>4</sup> The Ottoman financial structure, which had a reasonable degree of balance before the late sixteenth century, entered into a crisis because of increasing war expenses; the situation became more severe during the *Celali* rebellions of the early seventeenth century. Before the seventeenth century, wars were a significant means for the reproduction of the economy. Since the reason d'etre of the Ottoman Empire was the territorial expansion through conquests, wars were not considered a burden. On the contrary, wars were extremely significant in acquiring new economic sources in the form of new lands with new taxable population. However, the two assumptions that the Ottomans had, that wars would be won and the expenses would not be financed in cash, came to an end with the wars beginning in the second half the sixteenth century. Consequently, budget deficits became the

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Whatever the causes of the Ottoman price inflation, Ottoman financial system was adversely affected by the inflation. See Halil İnalcık, "Impact of the *Annales* School on Ottoman Studies and New Findings", *Review*, I, 1978, pp. 69-96; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında Türkiye'de Fiyat Hareketleri", *Belleten*, 34, 1970; Şevket Pamuk, "The Price Revolution In The Ottoman Empire Reconsidered", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 33, 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Paranın Tarihi*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999, p. 153. See also his "Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914 ", in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, pp. 947-974.

feature of Ottoman finance. This was closely related to the worldwide military changes generally known as the “military revolution” of the late sixteenth century.

The “military revolution” meant the change in military technology, tactics and organization of warfare, namely the adoption of firearms and development of infantry tactics.<sup>5</sup> The long and costly wars with Iran (1578-1590) and with Austria-Hungary (1593-1606) showed the changing military needs of the Ottoman state. With the shift in international military technology towards infantry armed with firearms, the traditional *sipahi* cavalry and the entire *timar* system on which the cavalry was based increasingly became useless and ineffective. The Ottoman mode of distribution of resources based on the *timar* system gradually became irrelevant in terms of the military needs of the state. As a result, the Ottoman administration was induced to respond in two ways.<sup>6</sup> First of all, the number of Janissaries<sup>7</sup> both in the capital and provinces of the whole empire was increased, and, secondly, more mercenary soldiers with firearms began to be recruited from among the peasants. In order to maintain the standing army, which gained further significance, the state needed the revenues that had traditionally been assigned to provincial cavalry. Some of these revenues were thus transferred to the central

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<sup>4</sup> Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi (XVIII. yy dan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih)*, İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986, pp. 27-32.

<sup>5</sup> Halil İncalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700”, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 6, 1980; Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700*, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999; Linda T. Darling, *Revenue-Raising And Legitimacy, Tax-Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996, pp. 8-16.

<sup>6</sup> İncalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”.

<sup>7</sup> The number of Janissaries rose from 13.000 in 1550 to 38.000 in 1600 and 50.000 between 1630 and 1670. İncalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, p. 300. Ariel Salzmann argues that in 1703, Janissaries were consisted of 96.727 men in the capital and around 70.000 men in provincial garrisons. See, her *Measures of Empire: Tax-Farmers and the Ottoman Ancient Regime, 1685-1807*, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Colombia University, 1995.

treasury to finance the recruitment of more Jannissary and the formation of *sekban* units. It meant a reorganization of state finances and resulted in the spread of tax-farming, which in turn led to significant changes in the relationship between the central state and the provinces. Since the members of *sekban* regiments with peasant origin were paid only during a campaign and left without a livelihood during times of peace, they were either forced to become brigands or entered into the entourage of provincial governors.<sup>8</sup>

These factors, long wars and changing military needs of the state, appear to have led to the destruction of the internal balances of the Empire. The struggle of peasant mercenaries to obtain the privileges and status enjoyed by the *kapıkulları*, the conflict between the *sekban* regiments and Janissaries, the civil war-like conditions in Anatolia under the *Celali* rebellions during the seventeenth century well illustrate the breakdown of socio-political order.<sup>9</sup> The initial stage of the growth of the power and influence of the local notables (*ayâns*) can be approached with such conditions in mind. As early as the later sixteenth century, the Ottoman state needed to employ local leaders to organize and lead the local militias to defend their towns and villages against both *celali* and *sekban* mercenaries and the Janissaries, who often imposed illegal levies upon peasants

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<sup>8</sup> For a detailed discussion of the military change, the employment of mercenaries by the Ottoman state and provincial administrators, the causes and the results of this overall change, see Halil İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration" in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, eds. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977, pp. 27-28; Halil İnalcık, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East" in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, eds. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, London: Oxford University Press, 1975. See also Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, İstanbul: Çelikkilt Matbası, 1965, pp. 144-169, 256-289.

<sup>9</sup> See Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman Decline and its Effects upon the Reaya" in *Aspects of the Balkans, Continuity and Change, Contribution to the International Balkan Conference, UCLA*

both in cash and in kind.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the provincial governors formed their own retinues (*kapıhalkı*) recruited from brigand or mercenary bands.<sup>11</sup> This practice of employment of *levends* in the household of provincial administrators continued throughout the eighteenth century and they constituted the backbone of the military force of the local magnates.<sup>12</sup> This process appears to have led to the shift of power from the center to the periphery. In addition, their financement resulted in further transformation of the fiscal system.

In order to finance the expenditures of mercenaries employed both by the state and provincial governors, several new taxes were introduced. First of all, the *avarız*, which had previously been collected as an extraordinary levy in times of war, became a regular and annual cash tax in the early seventeenth century.<sup>13</sup> Since the *sipahi* and the *timar* system increasingly lost its primary function, the surveys of *avarız* and *cizye* taxes gradually took the place of the traditional *tahrirs* from the second decade of the seventeenth century onwards.<sup>14</sup> At the same time,

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1969, eds. H. Birnbaum and S. Vryonis, The Hague: Mouton, 338-354. See also Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699", pp. 433-438.

<sup>10</sup> Mustafa Akdağ, *Celali İsyanları, 1550-1603*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1963.

<sup>11</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, pp. 256-289.

<sup>12</sup> Virginia Aksan, "Ottoman Military Recruitment Strategies in the Late Eighteenth Century" in *Arming The State*, ed. Erik J. Zürcher, London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999, pp. 21-28.

<sup>13</sup> *Avarız* probably became an annual tax during the war with Habsburgs (1593-1606). See İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation", pp. 314-315. According to Darling, the transformation of *avarız* into regular tax was essentially complete by 1620-21. Darling, *Revenue-Raising And Legitimacy*, 92-93; Oktay Özel, *Changes In Settlement Patterns, Population and Society In Rural Anatolia: A Case Study of Amasya (1576-1642)*, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Manchester, 1993.

<sup>14</sup> In the early seventeenth century, the *timar* system was replaced by a system of direct taxation based on *cizye* and *avarız* as the primary taxation of the empire. For *avarız* and poll-tax registers, see Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe, Taxation, Trade, and Struggle for Land (1600-1800)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Özel, *Changes In Settlement Patterns, Population and Society In Rural Anatolia: A Case Study of Amasya (1576-1642)*; Oktay Özel, "17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Demografi ve İskan Tarihi İçin Önemli Bir Kaynak: 'Mufassal' Avarız Defterleri", *XII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, 12-16 Eylül 1994, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler*, 3, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999; Linda Darling, "Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation?", *The Journal of European Economic History*, 26/1, 1997, pp. 157-179.

new taxes were levied to finance the *levend-sekban* regiments in times of war (*imdad-ı seferiye*) and to prevent illegal extractions during the peace times, which were attempted by provincial administrators to maintain their retinues (*imdad-ı hazeriye*).<sup>15</sup> The introduction of *imdadiye* taxes was closely related to the decrease in the revenues of *has*-holders. Indeed, emergency levies, especially *imdadiye*, was the legalized form of illegal extractions from the peasants (*tekalif-i şakka*) and it can be considered as compensation for the declining revenues of local governors, who now had to sustain their households/retinues from their own pockets.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, there was a close relationship between the emergence of *imdadiye* and the evolution of the *has* revenues assigned to local governors. *İmdadiye* became a regular and annual tax in 1717.<sup>17</sup> The basic reason behind this was the need for an additional income for governors to support their retinues recruited from peasants.

These emergency levies, as well as other extractions such as *ayâniye* or the household and soldier-recruitment expenditures of local administrators, were collected within the confines of *tevzi* registers, which were prepared at *kaza* level; the leading notables, along with a judge, also participated in the allocation of expenses, i.e., *tevzi*, among the population. This contributed to the rise of local notables as wealthy and influential people at local level.<sup>18</sup> Although the Ottoman government attempted to control the local financial system by a regulation in the second half of the eighteenth century that the expenditures of *vilâyet* or province

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<sup>15</sup> İnalçık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation", pp. 313-15.

<sup>16</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, pp. 54-57.

<sup>17</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, pp. 53-54 and İnalçık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation", p. 324.

should be sent to İstanbul twice a year after the distribution and approval of the judge, this did not work properly.<sup>19</sup>

The emergency levies collected within the context of *tevzi* registers (registers of expenditures and allocation) were unstable and speculative in character because both the quantity and time of their collection could not be predetermined. For that reason, the central government delegated the responsibility of the collection of these taxes to the local notables and incorporated them into the provincial fiscal apparatus. Yavuz Cezar argues that the amount of taxes collected within the context of *tevzi* registers reached the point where it was equal to the revenues of central treasury and therefore it can be considered as a third sector, in addition to the central treasury and *timar* revenues.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, the emergence of this practice called local expenditure (*vilayet masrafı*) in the eighteenth century, in which the center and the periphery struggled for the highest share from the surplus, was not a coincidence.<sup>21</sup> The local administrators, because of the loss of their old revenues, contributed to the emergence of a substitute revenue source and the state was forced to legitimize and regulate this practice.<sup>22</sup> The overall result was the monetarization of the economy since most of these emergency taxes were collected in cash. This in turn led to the development of credit relations and the active participation of local

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<sup>18</sup> İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation", p. 321.

<sup>19</sup> Christoph Neumann, "Selanik'te onsekizinci yüzyılın sonunda masarif-i vilayet defterleri, merkezi devlet, taşra idaresi ve şehir yönetimi üçgeninde mali işlemler", *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 16, 1998, pp. 1-5.

<sup>20</sup> Yavuz Cezar, "18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Taşrasında Oluşan Yeni Mali Sektörün Mahiyet ve Büyüklüğü Üzerine", *Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi*, 9, 1996, pp. 118-119.

<sup>21</sup> Neumann, "Selanik'te onsekizinci yüzyılın sonunda masarif-i vilayet defterleri, merkezi devlet, taşra idaresi ve şehir yönetimi üçgeninde mali işlemler", *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 16, 1998.

<sup>22</sup> Cezar, "18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Taşrasında", pp. 103-104.



notables into the local economy either as tax farmers or deputies of central government and governors or as moneylenders through which they gained wealth and influence among taxpayers.<sup>23</sup> In the long run, the practice of *tevzi* prepared the ground for reforms of *Tanzimat* such as the emergence of local councils and the new regulations about the principals of taxation.<sup>24</sup>

## II. Tax-Farming and the Rise of Local Notables.

Historians agree that the spread of tax-farming in Ottoman finance and then the shift from short-term to long-term tax-farming at the end of the seventeenth century was the major stimulus behind the rise of local forces. It is therefore imperative to have a brief look at the functioning of the *iltizam* system.

Tax-farming had in fact been used as complementary to the *timar* system from the fifteenth century onward for the collection of revenues deriving either from the *havass-ı hümayun* (imperial domains), that is the lands outside *timar* areas and whose income went directly to the central treasury, or from commercial taxes such as custom dues, market taxes or from the state monopolies such as

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<sup>23</sup> İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization".

<sup>24</sup> Yavuz Cezar, "Comments On The Financial History Of The Ottoman Provinces In The 18<sup>th</sup> Century: A Macro Analysis", *Essays on Ottoman Civilization Proceedings of the XIIth Congress of the Comité International d'Études Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes, Praha 1996*, Praha: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Oriental Institute, 1998, p. 92. For a study of local expenditures in the sub-province of Trabzon just before the Tanzimat era, see Abdullah Saydam, "Trabzon Sancağı'nın Tekalif-i Örfiye Yükümlülüğü (1830-1840)", *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları*, 127, 2002, pp. 69-102. For the content of local expenditures in Edirne, see M. E. Sarıcaoğlu, *Mali Tarih Açısından Osmanlı Devletinde Merkez Taşra İlişkileri (II. Mahmud Döneminde Edirne Örneği)*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2001, Ek 14, pp. 225-260.

mints, salt and fish production.<sup>25</sup> At the beginning of the sixteenth century, half of the revenues of the Ottoman central treasury were collected through tax-farming (*iltizam*)<sup>26</sup> which was used for the payment of salaries of soldiers and providing direct funds for local expenditures. Because of the limited opportunities for transportation, it was difficult to deliver the taxes collected in kind to the central treasury.<sup>27</sup>

The term *iltizam* refers to a method of collection, not a kind of revenue.<sup>28</sup> It meant “selling, by auction, a source of revenue for a specific period of time, usually for three years, to a private person”.<sup>29</sup> *Mukata’a* referred to “the division of state revenue sources into parts to be distributed in return for a mutually agreed-upon price”.<sup>30</sup> As already noted above, *mukata’a* revenues could either come from the land that was outside of the *timar* system or from commercial taxes<sup>31</sup> or irregular revenues such as fines and marriage taxes.<sup>32</sup>

Tax-farms (*mukata’as*) were farmed out through three methods.<sup>33</sup> First, the revenues were collected directly by the centrally appointed person called *emin* (*ber vech-i emanet*). Secondly, the right to collect the tax revenues was assigned to the bidder called *mültezim* who offered the highest price to undertake the

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<sup>25</sup> İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”; Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*; Halil Sahillioğlu, “Bir Mültezim Zimem Defterine Göre XV. Yüzyıl Sonunda Osmanlı Darphane Mukataaları”, *İ. Ü. İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 23, 1962.

<sup>26</sup> İnalçık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p. 65.

<sup>27</sup> Mehmet Genç, “Osmanlı Maliyesi’nde Malikâne Sistemi”, in *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri, Metinler/Tartışmalar, 8-10 Haziran 1973*, eds. Osman Okyar and Ünal Nalbantoğlu, Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975, p. 232.

<sup>28</sup> Mehmet Genç, “İltizam”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 22, İstanbul, 2000, pp. 154-158; J. E. Matuz, “Contributions To The Ottoman Institution Of The *İltizam*”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 11, 1991.

<sup>29</sup> İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, p. 327.

<sup>30</sup> Haim Gerber, “Mukata’a”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 508.

<sup>31</sup> İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, p. 330.

business and who was under the obligation to make payments regularly to the government. *Mültezim* had to present one or more guarantors for the lump sum and the normal term for holding a tax-farm (*tahvil*) was three years. This method was called “*ber vech-i iltizam*”. The third method was the combination of the two. The assigned person, *emin*, collected the revenues through tax-farming but took his salary from the tax revenue before making payments to the central treasury.

The status of a revenue source could be changed from *emanet* to *iltizam* or vice versa. Moreover, if a new tax-farmer offered more or an existing *mültezim* under the contract did not make payments on a regular basis according to the contract, the Ottoman government could change the tax-farmer.<sup>34</sup>

The most important transformation that led to the rise of local notables was perhaps the conversion of old *dirliks* or fiefs, which were assigned within the *timar* system to the members of the ruling class in return for a military or administrative service to the state, into revenue units called *mukataa*. While the revenues of the empire was distributed before the seventeenth century among the ruling elite (whether *devşirme* origin or not, but appointed by the sultan from among his household) in return for an administrative and military service, the revenue source of the ruling elites such as the governors (*beylerbeyis* and *sancakbeyis*) gradually became incorporated into the central treasury and then

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<sup>32</sup> Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, p. 126.

<sup>33</sup> Sahillioğlu, “Bir Mültezim Zimem Defterine Göre”, pp. 147-149.

<sup>34</sup> For a discussion of the relationship between the competition over tax-farms and the duration of the tax-farms see Genç, “İltizam”, pp. 156-157; Murat Çizakça, “Tax-Farming and Financial Decentralization in the Ottoman Economy, 1520-1697”, *Journal of Economic History*, 22, 1993.

redistributed as salary, stipends or pensions among them from the sixteenth century onwards.<sup>35</sup>

The *iltizam* system became a widespread form of tax collection used both by central treasury and provincial administrators from the end of the sixteenth century onward and throughout the seventeenth century. Because of the changes in military technology and the ineffectiveness of cavalry soldiers, the Ottoman government was forced to shift its financial organization from the one based on the *timar* system (the barter of services) to a cash system based on tax-farming. To offset the budget deficit caused by the expenses of long wars,<sup>36</sup> the central government applied short-term policies such as the devaluation of *akça*, borrowing from the treasury of the Sultan, and compulsory internal borrowing from wealthy state officials under the name of “*imdadiye*.”<sup>37</sup> In addition, the poll-tax was another means of raising funds for the payment of salaries of the Janissaries.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the government began to impose taxes on tobacco, coffee and wine as well as extracted tariffs on internal and external commerce and manufacturing.

The central treasury confiscated many revenue sources previously held under the *timar* system and farmed them out either to tax-farmers (*mültezim*) or to

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<sup>35</sup> Özer Ergenç, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Taşra Yönetiminin Mali Nitelikleri”, *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 10, 1986.

<sup>36</sup> Yavuz Cezar, “From Financial Crisis to the Structural Change: The Case Of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century”, in *The Ottoman Empire In The Eighteenth Century*, ed. Kate Fleet, Nuova Serie, Anno XVIII (LXXIX) Indice Del Volume 1, 1999, pp. 50-51.

<sup>37</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, pp. 30-33.

<sup>38</sup> Poll-tax, which was collected on a household basis, was increased from the end of the sixteenth century as the value of silver decreased. While it was equal to 100 *akça* in 1591-1592, in 1603-1617 period it increased to 200 and in 1640s to 250 *akça*. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, p. 110. With the 1691 reform of poll tax, it began to be collected on an individual

officers of *kapıkulu* origin for life-term in return for a regular annual payment to the treasury.<sup>39</sup> In addition, the provincial governors holding *has* and *zeamet* began to sell the right of the collection of their tax revenues to local tax farmers who had the titles such as *mütesellim*, *voyvoda*, *subaşı*.<sup>40</sup> When the need of the treasury for cash increased, more resources were converted into *mukataat*, i.e. sold in the market. Therefore, tax farming became the basis of a system of internal borrowing needed to overcome short-time crisis of the Ottoman finance. While the process of *mukataa*-ization started from the small revenue sources such as *timar* and *zeamet* in the pre-eighteenth century, then with the *malikâne* rescript (1695), the Ottoman state legalized the process of farming the *timar* and attempted to take a share from *mukataa*-ized revenue sources to offset the budget deficits.

In the eighteenth century, the *malikâne-mukataa* system was extended into revenues held by governors (*has*) and this led to significant changes in the military-administrative structure of the empire. The *malikâne*-ization of *has* meant that the former revenues of governors, who were absentees and delegated the tax-collection to sub-contractors, were incorporated into the state budget. Although the *has* holdings were sold as *malikâne* with a lump sum payment, the *has* status of the *malikâne* was maintained. While the *malikâne*-holder paid *muaccele* to the central treasury, the annual payment was transferred to the *has*-holder in four instalments as his salary.<sup>41</sup> So, it can be said that the former *timar* revenues were

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basis. Salzmann, *Measures of Empire*, pp. 134-136 and Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change 1590-1699", p. 532.

<sup>39</sup> Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesi'nde Malikâne Sistemi".

<sup>40</sup> İnalçık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation"; Eftal Ş. Batmaz, "İltizam Sisteminin XVIII. Yüzyıldaki Boyutları", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, XVIII/29, 1997.

<sup>41</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, pp. 42-45.

incorporated into the central treasury and then redistributed among the related parties.

As discussed above, the emergence of *imdadiye* was closely related with this process of the evolution of the governors' revenues. It emerged as an addition to the declining revenues of governors, who were given wide range of authority for the collection of war and peacetime emergency levies.<sup>42</sup> With the conversion of the former revenues of governors first into *mukataa*, then into *malikâne*, it lost former soldier-raising and *dirlik* function, instead it turned into a revenue unit which was sold on the market. Therefore, the financial change was closely related to the change in the military structure of the empire. In order to finance wars and an increasing number of central army and locally recruited-soldiers, the Ottoman government confiscated former revenues of *timar*-holders and then redistributed them according to needs. Although the center started to take a share from the revenue sources, the new forms of tax-collection enabled the provincial forces to be promoted to higher state posts. In other words, this led to the rise of local notables who were incorporated into the Ottoman ruling class as deputies or subcontractors of high-ranking officials. In order to understand the process of the integration of local forces into the Ottoman fiscal apparatus, it is necessary to have a closer look at the basic mechanism of the *malikâne* system.

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<sup>42</sup> Eftal Ş. Batmaz, *XVIII. Yüzyıldaki Mali Uygulamaların Osmanlı Taşra Yönetimi Üzerindeki Etkileri Hakkında Bir Araştırma*, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Ankara: Tarih Bölümü, 1995, pp. 201-203.

### III. The *Malikâne* as a System of Revenue Distribution

The *malikâne-mukataa* system can be considered as a reflection of the cumulative changes within the Ottoman state-society relationship over the seventeenth century. The shift from short-term tax-farming (*iltizam*) to life-time tax farming (*malikâne*) was the legalization of the process started in the seventeenth century. Military officials, bureaucrats and high-level judiciary members had long-term rights over revenue assignments in the form of salaries, pensions (*arpalık*).<sup>43</sup>

The increasing need for cash to finance the war against the Habsburgs and their allies (1683-1689) was the major force behind the introduction of the *malikâne* system. Secondly, the crisis of the short-term tax farming which resulted from subcontracting, destruction of the revenue source and over-exploitation of the taxpayers were other reasons for the shift to the life-time tax farming or the *malikâne* system, which was introduced in 1695.<sup>44</sup> The imperial decree outlining the new system discussed the reasons for the application of the *malikâne* contract as follows:<sup>45</sup> the short-term tax-farmers became absentees and assigned the collection of revenues to the secondary tax-farmers and they did not help to provide the necessary means of production such as seed for the peasants. Because of the frequent changes of tax-farmers and their overexploitation of the producers, peasants borrowed money from usurers with high interest rates to pay their taxes and, in the end, went into bankruptcy. Under these conditions, peasants abandoned their land, which in turn led to loss of revenue for the state. It was emphasized that

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<sup>43</sup> Ergenç, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Taşra Yönetiminin Mali Nitelikleri".

<sup>44</sup> Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesi'nde Malikâne Sistemi", p. 237.

if these lands had been assigned to tax-farmers for life-term, the excess exploitation of peasants could have been stopped and tax-farmers could have protected the tax sources. Therefore, the budget deficits and the protection of the tax source were the major forces that contributed to the general acceptance of the *malikâne* system at the end of the seventeenth century.

At the beginning, the *malikâne-mukataa* system was intended to be applied only to “*miri mukataat*” lands whose revenues were already collected by short-term tax farming such as Damascus, Aleppo, Diyarbekir, Mardin, Adana, Malatya, Gaziantep, Tokat.<sup>46</sup> However, it was soon extended to other types of revenues, such as market dues, custom duties and administrative offices such as *voyvodalık*.<sup>47</sup>

With the decree of 1695, the *malikâne-mukataa* auctions became open to both ‘*ricâl-i devlet*’ (men of the state) and ‘*ayân-ı vilayet*’ (local notables). It was the first document to allow the *ayân* to participate into the fiscal apparatus of the state on equal basis with the central officials.<sup>48</sup> While it brought an increasing central control over the tax revenues, the way in which the administration of the tax collection was realized led to administrative decentralization and the rise of local notables.

The *malikâne* contract was awarded to the highest bidder who paid an advance or *muaccele*, a sum which was officially estimated to correspond to two

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<sup>45</sup> For the original decree, see Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi", pp. 285-288.

<sup>46</sup> Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi", p. 239.

<sup>47</sup> Salzmänn, *Measures of Empire*, p. 402.

<sup>48</sup> Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi", p. 242.



to ten times annual profit but was actually higher than this.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, the *malikâne*-holder had to pay *mal-ı miri* or annual payments to the central treasury, in three instalments and *kalemiye* and other fees (5-20% of *mal-ı miri*).<sup>50</sup> As long as the *malikâne*-holder continued to pay the annual payments, he enjoyed an exclusive claim over the tax-revenues.

Beyond these contractual obligations, the *malikâne* holder was ‘free’ to exercise his authority without interference from provincial administrators.<sup>51</sup> In other words, *malikâne*-holders were responsible only to the central government and other provincial administrators could not interfere without an imperial rescript. Therefore, the *malikâne* system was distinguished from *timar* system because *malikâne* was based on cash, not on military service. As long as the *malikâne*-holder paid the state the *muaccele* in advance and the annuities regularly, he could enjoy all the benefits of the tax-source during his life-time.

Under the *malikâne* system, the right to collect taxes could be transferred by the state to other individuals provided that the new holder paid the transfer fee called *resm-i kasr-ı yed* which was about 10 % of the *muaccele*.<sup>52</sup> In this sense, the *malikâne* can be considered as a right closer to semi-property because it can be bought and sold by the holder. In the long run, the *malikâne* paved the way for the development of private property rights, which culminated in the abolishment of

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<sup>49</sup> Mehmet Genç, “18. Yüzyıla Ait Osmanlı Mali Verilerinin İktisadi Faaliyetin Göstergesi Olarak Kullanılabilirliği Üzerinde Bir Çalışma”, *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 10, 1981, pp. 37-39.

<sup>50</sup> Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi", pp. 240-241.

<sup>51</sup> “vüzerâ ve mirmirân ve mir-livâ ve mütesellimler ve sair ehl-i örf taifesi tarafından bilâ-ferman bir nesne mütalebe ve rencide olunmayub mefruzu'l-kalem maktu'l-kadem min külli'l-vücuuh serbestiyet üzere hayatta oldukça malikâne”. Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi", p. 287.

confiscation or *müsadere* in 1830 and emergence of private ownership of land with the 1858 Land Law.<sup>53</sup>

For the inheritance of the *malikâne* right by the sons or other male relatives of the holders, there was a requirement of the payment of a new *muaccele*. Although the Ottoman state annulled *malikâne* contracts in the provinces which were not under *miri mukataat* lands in 1715, these contracts were renewed with their old holders at the price of 50 % increase over and above the former *muaccele* with an arrangement of the yearly payment (*mal*).

The central government required from the *malikâne*-holders to pay enthronement taxes (*rüsum-ı cülus*) which corresponded to 25 % of *muaccele*, when there was a change in throne. It was collected between 1703 and 1754. Moreover, war-time levies (*cebelü bedeliyesi*, 10-15 % of *muaccele*) were demanded by the government for the campaign. This can be considered as indirect method for taxing the wealthiest people in the society.<sup>54</sup>

The *malikâne* system can be considered as a dominant mode of redistribution of tax revenues between the center and local notables in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. Those who emphasize the spread of life-term tax farming as a sign of decentralization and the decline of central control argue that it led to the rise of local magnates who began to appropriate most of the revenue deriving from taxation. They seem to parallel the tax-farming with the administrative decentralization and the decline of central authority in the

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<sup>52</sup> The transfer fee started to be taken after 1735. Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi", p. 240.

<sup>53</sup> Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships, The Islamic World and Europe With Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996, p. 163.

provinces. However, recent comparative approaches to early modern Ottoman history discuss this duality of centralization/decentralization from a different perspective and argue that the *malikâne* system enabled the state to have a control over tax revenues which were previously assigned in return for services.<sup>55</sup> In fact, the tax revenues were shared between the central state elites and local notables in different proportions. The center and periphery seemed to be connected in a hierarchical way with a layer in each division.<sup>56</sup> It can be argued that the hierarchy between levels of imperial formation [imperial elites/households of military and administrative central elites; regional elites/dynastic notables such as the Caniklizâdes, the Karaosmanoğlus; local elites/subcontractors or deputies of the above elites] overlapped with the political and administrative hierarchical division. In other words, the redistribution of economic and political resources went hand in hand, as will be shown below. The point is that the redistribution policies of the Ottoman state in the eighteenth century took place under the dominance of the *malikâne* system. One must therefore take into account the ties among different actors mainly, the *malikâne*-holder, the subcontractor (*mültezim*, mostly from among the local notables), the financier (money-changers or *sarrafs*) and the central treasury. The relationship among *sarrafs*, central treasury and *malikâne*-holders will be evaluated in Chapter Three.

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<sup>54</sup> Salzmann, *Measures of Empire*, p. 167.

<sup>55</sup> Salzmann, *Measures of Empire*; Dina R. Khoury, *State and provincial society in the Ottoman Empire, Mosul, 1540-1834*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Ariel Salzmann, "Toward a Comparative History of the Ottoman State, 1450-1850", *Essays on Ottoman Civilization*, Proceedings of the XIIth Congress of CIEPO, Praha 1996, in Archiv Orientalni, Supplementa VIII, 1998; Jane Hathaway, "Problems of Periodization in Ottoman History: The Fifteenth through the Eighteenth Centuries", *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 20/2, 1996; Rifa'at Ali Abou El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, Albany: State University of New York, 1991.

There is a consensus among the Ottoman historians that the chief beneficiaries of the life-term tax farming system were military and bureaucratic officials, high-level *ulema* and provincial military officials such as *beylerbeyis*.<sup>57</sup> Salzmänn argues that there is a correlation between the socio-economic background of the *malikâne*-holder and the regional, sectoral differences of *malikâne* contracts. On the one hand, the upper ranking state officials, who were mostly absentee tax farmers, took the most profitable and high cash valued tax farms such as the customs of İstanbul, silk stations in Bursa, excise taxes on tobacco and coffee, proto-industrial revenues in the Balkans and Western Anatolia, as well as poll tax, herd tax and *avarız* in many regions of the Empire. These kinds of tax farms were auctioned in İstanbul where the central state officials had close contacts with both state and credit institutions.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, there were provincially held auctions for the sale of rural and agricultural taxes composed of tithes of villages and fields. The participants of the provincial auctions were socially heterogeneous. The majority of new *malikâne* holders were Janissaries, former *sancakbeyis*, and other members of the military orders having the titles vizier, Paşa, and *ağa* as well as local notables who bore the title *-zâde*, the members of local *ulema* recognized by the title *seyyid*, *şeyh*, *müderris*, and lastly, the members of civil bureaucracy or *kalemiye*.<sup>59</sup>

As Salzmänn argues, between the İstanbul-based auctions, dominated by the vizieral and bureaucratic households, and provincial auctions dominated by the

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<sup>56</sup> Salzmänn, *Measures of Empire*, pp. 148-150.

<sup>57</sup> İnalçık, "Centralization and Decentralization"; Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi"; Salzmänn, *Measures of Empire*.

<sup>58</sup> Salzmänn, *Measures of Empire*, p. 149.

provincial gentry, the lowest stratum of *ayân* and *eşraf*, and provincial janissaries, there were medium-size tax farms belonging to the lower state officers such as *voyvoda* and *muhassıl*. The latter linked the central treasury and the provinces.<sup>60</sup> The Caniklizâdes as well as Karaosmanoğlus and Çapanoğlus rose to power from such positions and seem to represent this third level.

In sum, most of the *malikâne* holders were absentee tax farmers and transferred the collection of their tax revenues to subcontractors, *mütesellims* who in turn sub-farmed the revenues to lesser local notables. It is mostly through these subcontractual positions such as *voyvoda*, *mütesellim* and *mültezim* that the locally influential families rose to power and were incorporated into Ottoman ruling class by gaining the official titles, first *kapıcıbaşı*, *ağa* and then *bey*, pasha and vizier. As İnalcık reminds us<sup>61</sup>:

“The most significant development, which, with few exceptions in the seventeenth century, occurred in the eighteenth century, was the granting of the actual posts of bey and paşa to these aghas of reaya origin, that is, the direct delegation of the sultan’s authority. As a result, paşas of ayân origin and their families rose to prominence in the provinces, while the centralized Ottoman regime, based on the sultan’s absolute authority, was breaking down. But, in the situation of the eighteenth century, it is wrong to confuse these high officials of ayân origin with those ayân who represented the local population before the government. Though the rise of the ayân in the provinces paved the way for the entry of some into the ranks of officialdom, once ayân families acquired the positions of bey and paşa, they could no longer be specifically considered to be ayân and

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<sup>59</sup> Salzmänn, *Measures of Empire*, pp. 378-402.

<sup>60</sup> Ariel Salzmänn, “Privatization and “Public” Office: The *Voyvodalık* of Diyarbakir in the Eighteenth Century”, *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 16/2, 1992, pp. 203-205.

<sup>61</sup> İnalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization”, p. 40.

consequently they can not be studied in the same context. It is only because of the latter's origins that they are referred to as *ayân* in the literature. At the lower level official posts the distinction between *ayân* proper and officials of *ayân* origin is less clear and the confusion of the two is more common and widespread in the sources”.

It is important to note that most of the dynastic *ayân* families<sup>62</sup> rose to power through the posts of *mütesellim* and *voyvoda* and were later were appointed as governors (*sancakbeyi* or *vali*) in the second half of the eighteenth century. In this way, therefore, one can say that they became Ottomanized. This shift from semi-official and de facto power as *mütesellim* to direct and de jure power as governor with the title of vizier and paşa must be taken into account in the study of local notables.<sup>63</sup> This process resulted partly from the actual functioning of the life-time and hereditary tax-farming and partly from the administrative and military needs of the Ottoman state. It can be said that the Ottoman state enlarged the definition of the ruling class (status of military) and included the local notables who were integrated into local administration in several ways from the beginning of the seventeenth century onward.

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<sup>62</sup> Karaosmanoğulları in the Manisa region; Çapanoğulları in Bozok; the Caniklizâdes in Samsun, Amasya, Trabzon; Zennecizâdes, Emirağazâdes and Kalaycıoğlus in Kayseri; Müderriszâdes and Nakkaşzâdes in Ankara; Mühürzâdes and Gaffarzâdes in Konya all gained wealth and power by holding the office of *mütesellim*. For a discussion of a struggle over the post of *mütesellim*, see Yücel Özkaya, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Mütesellimlik Müessesesi”, *A.Ü. Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi*, XXVIII/3-4, 1970.

<sup>63</sup> İnalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization”, p. 32.

#### IV. The Study of Ayân

*Ayân* as a word means eyes (plural of *'ayn*). Literally, *ayân* meant the “wealthy, honorable and influential”<sup>64</sup> and implied notables and elders of one city, group or period.<sup>65</sup> The words such as *vücuḥ*, *amâsil*, *eşraf*, *erkân*, *ma'ruf*, and *ekâbir* were also used as synonymous to *ayân*.<sup>66</sup> Different names are used to denote locally influential persons and notables in the literature who dominated the Ottoman provinces. *Ayân* is the most common and confused one.<sup>67</sup> However, it is a broad term which denotes those notables who were from among the persons of wealth and influence in a town or district as well as those notables who were leading individuals appointed as a chief notable (*baş ayân* or *reis-i ayân*), who had the capacity to represent the other notables of a town, village or district. Moreover, the term *ayân* was also used for the powerful dynasties of the eighteenth century. This confusion over the term “ayân” is further compounded by “unconscious bias” of historians who did not make a distinction between those small notables who had a local power based on their wealth and influence independent from the state and those notables who derived some or a significant part of their authority from

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<sup>64</sup> Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayic ül-Vukuat, Kurumları ve Örgütleriyle Osmanlı Tarihi*, ed. Neşet Çâğatay, Ankara: TTK, 1979-1980, 2, p. 283.

<sup>65</sup> Mehmet Z. Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, I, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993, pp. 120-123.

<sup>66</sup> F. Köprülü and İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, “Ayan”, *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 2, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970, p. 40.

<sup>67</sup> Engin Akarlı, “Provincial Power Magnates In Ottoman Bilad Al-Sham and Egypt, 1740-1840”, in *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes a l'epoque ottomane*, 3, ed. Abdeljelil Temimi, Zaghuan, 1988.

the state and became “elite”.<sup>68</sup> However, the distinction between state elites and local elites seems to be superficial since they often overlapped. The confusion over the term *ayân* is partly the result of the fact that *ayân* as an institution did not constitute a legally defined category,<sup>69</sup> but a reluctantly recognized social position.<sup>70</sup>

This word gained a special administrative connotation in the second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Other terms which are used in the literature to denote locally influential persons and notables, who dominated the Ottoman provinces, are *mütegallibe* and *derebey*. The former, in its Ottoman usage has a derogatory connotation, close to ‘usurper’. *Derebey* (or *derre-bey*) is the term used to denote the Anatolian magnates.<sup>71</sup> Although usually translated as a “valley-lord,” the word originally seems to have meant “well-known bey”.<sup>72</sup>

There is a need to reevaluate the common assumptions in the existing literature about the local notables who were seen either as oppressors of the subject people or *reaya* or analysed in their relation to their conflict with the central authority. The equalization of the history of *ayân* with the Ottoman decline and decentralization was one of the problems of seventeenth and eighteenth

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<sup>68</sup> S. Hülya Canbakal, *‘Ayntāb at the End of the Seventeenth-Century: a Study of Notables and Urban Politics*, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1999, pp. 89-90.

<sup>69</sup> İnalçık, “Centralization and Decentralization”, pp. 49-50.

<sup>70</sup> Deena R. Sadat, “Rumeli Ayanları: The Eighteenth Century”, *Journal of Modern History*, 44, 1972, pp. 346-347.

<sup>71</sup> J. H. Mordtmann, “Derebey” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1983, p. 207.

<sup>72</sup> Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi Ocaklarından Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998, pp. 2-4. Sakaoğlu argues that as long as the local notables were loyal and helpful to the state, they were referred to as *ocakzâde*, *hanedan*, *vücu*. However, when they became so powerful and threatened the state authority, they were usually called *asi*, *derebeyi*,



century Ottoman historiography. It is perhaps more meaningful to see local notables as part of the “ruling class”, and there is a need for a closer look at the identification of the origins of local notables, their resources and their relationship with the state. As indicated above, recent studies reevaluate the “*ayân*” as a class within the context of Ottoman decentralization, paying attention to the comparison of Ottoman decentralization with their counterparts in European history. These studies emphasize the fact that the rise of local notables and their incorporation into the Ottoman military and administrative elite can not be seen equal to the decline of central authority.<sup>73</sup>

One of the problems of the *ayân* studies is their apparent lack of attention firstly, to their social origin (military or civilian) and secondly, to the political relationship between the Ottoman central state and the *ayân*. With regard to the identification of local notables, as Hülya Canbakal argues, there seem to be two processes in the interaction of the center and the periphery. Either the centrally appointed officials, already having *askeri* status, were settled in a locality and became the notable of an area (“*ayân*-ization” of the officials) or the local notables acquired posts and titles and, then, were absorbed into military status (“officialization” of the *ayân*).<sup>74</sup> For the study of *ayân*, one must be aware of the hierarchy of local notables as well as the nature of their relationship with the central administration in general in the eighteenth century

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*cebbare* and *müteğallibe*. In general, Ottoman sources used the titles “*ayan-ı vilayet*” and “*hanedan-ı belde*” to denote a local notable.

<sup>73</sup> See the note 55.

<sup>74</sup> Canbakal, ‘*Ayntab at the end of the Seventeenth-Century*.’

The relationship between the Ottoman administration and local notables can be approached from two dimensions: political and economic. In this relationship the central state was the dominant side in the sense that it determined and legitimized the redistribution of both political and economic resources between the center and periphery. By political resources, I mean the assignment of titles, offices, posts, and ranks. Economic resources, on the other hand, refer to the right to collect tax revenues. The central state can be seen as the redistributor of political and economic resources of the Empire. Most of the time, the assignment of political and economic resources overlapped. Although the state gave legitimacy to the rule of local notables and determined the degree of the delegation of power, the peripheral forces were strong enough to carry out negotiation with the center over surplus-sharing. Their power stemmed from the military forces they controlled and their accepted social influence and authority in the locality.

Military power was an important tool in the hands of the local notables in their relations with the center. For both internal and external conflicts, the state needed and depended on its soldiers. In fact, the central state delegated the monopolized legitimate use of force to them to repress banditry, which seems to have continued throughout the eighteenth century Anatolia.<sup>75</sup> Although the Ottoman government relied on them militarily, whenever they became powerful enough to threaten the center or ignored Sultanic decree or their duty to the Sultan, i.e. rebelled, these local notables were either eliminated or forced to

retreat.<sup>76</sup> The center had three alternatives in dealing with the rebelling local forces: 1) to sent central troops against them which seemed to be a difficult alternative because of the cost, 2) to make a compromise and incorporate them into the ruling establishment<sup>77</sup>, or 3) to replace the threatening notable with another competing local notable. It can be argued that the relationship between the central state and local notable depended largely on the relative power of each determined by the existing conditions. The state's demands for soldiers from the provincial notables was one of their means of checking their military power.<sup>78</sup> The second tool in the hands of the state to control the wealth of local notables or to eliminate them was confiscation.<sup>79</sup> If they did not send the troops demanded or failed to perform their duties, the state could deplete the resources of the notables.

The third dimension was the politics of this relationship between the two actors within the wider context of the eighteenth century environment. It should be stated that the ties between the state and local forces were very loose and, in fact, the redistribution of political and economic resources between the center and

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<sup>75</sup> İbrahim Güler, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Orta Karadeniz Bölgesinde Eşkiyalık Hareketleri", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 15, 1995; Çağatay Uluçay, *XVIII ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*, İstanbul, 1955.

<sup>76</sup> For a recent study about the concept of mutiny and rebellion in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman Empire, see *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 8/1-2, 2002. The articles are very useful for the study of rebellion in the provinces and the responses of the Ottoman State to different cases.

<sup>77</sup> Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats, The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994.

<sup>78</sup> For a list of local forces that were called to participate into the campaign between 1771 and 1774, see Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık Müessesesi*, Tokyo: Study of Languages & Cultures of Asia & Africa Monograph Series No:6, 1976, pp. 104-114. Faruk Sümer also gives the names of the local notables and the number of their soldiers in the Eastern Black Sea region who were ordered to send their troops to the war with Russia in the Caucasus in 1789. See *Tirebolu Tarihi*, İstanbul: Tirebolu Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği, 1992, pp. 104-105. These lists are an important source for local notables and their military strength at the *kaza* level.

periphery was dependent on several conditions: the historical incorporation of the region into the Ottoman rule, the existence of pre-Ottoman ruling elite, the dominant internal conditions of the time such as war, need of cash by the central treasury, the military need of the state and external dynamics such as commercial expansion or retraction. We are however far away from making generalizations about these complex relationships. Obviously, there is a need for more case studies for the different parts of the empire. One of the aims of the present study is to explore the changing relationships (political, economic and military) between the center and the periphery through a case study of one of the powerful dynastic families of the empire, the Caniklizâdes, who were integrated into the ruling class in the second half of the eighteenth century.

The institution of *ayân*ship has been examined by many scholars, among which the studies of Nagata, Özkaya and Yücel can be cited.<sup>80</sup> These studies generally analyse *ayâns* as a homogenous entity and ignore the distinction between the powerful notable families (*hanedan*) who were integrated into the ruling elite of the empire and a secondary rural group under their control who struggled for the posts of *mütesellim* and chief notable.<sup>81</sup> Those who emphasize the institutional role of *ayâns* in an urban setting argued that *ayâns* were composed of peoples with diverse backgrounds such as the wealthy merchants,

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<sup>79</sup> Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 63-64; Fatma Müge Göçek, "Musadara", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 7, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993, p. 653.

<sup>80</sup> Nagata, *Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa Ve Ayanlık Müessesesi*; Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994; Yaşar Yücel, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Desantralizasyona Dair Genel Gözlemler", *Belleten*, XXXVIII, 38/152, 1974, pp. 657-708.

janissaries stationed in the provinces, elders of guilds, and the *ulema*. Moreover, such an analysis tends to emphasize the role of the *ayâns* as mediators between the subject people and the central authority as well.<sup>82</sup>

The second approach for the study of local notables was developed by those who emphasized the long-term determinants behind the rise of local notables, and in this context, highlighted as the most important factor to the tax-farming system. The prominent representative of this approach is Halil İnalcık. The *ayân* that he portrayed essentially consisted of the local members of the administrative and military elite, men of religion, and the prominent townsmen, merchants in particular. He emphasizes more on the socio-economic unity of *ayân* and the long term historical determinants behind the rise of local notables in general.<sup>83</sup>

Since there was a confusion over the legal status of *ayân*ship (whether it was an official institution or a socially accepted position) and because of the assumption that there was a struggle over the position of a chief notable among the leading population of a city, a brief analysis of this institution becomes necessary here.

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<sup>81</sup> For a critical analysis, see Güçlü Tülüveli, *De-Mystification of the Contemporary Historiographical Paradigms: Ottoman Provincial Notables In Historical Perspective*, Unpublished M. A. thesis, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, 1993.

<sup>82</sup> Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables" in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, The Eighteenth Century*, eds. W. Polk and R. Chambers, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1969; İsmail H. Uzunçarşılı, "Ayan", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 2, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970, 41-42; İsmail H. Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail, Yılık Oğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1942, pp. 1-7; Özcan Mert, "Ayan", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 4, İstanbul, 1992, pp. 195-198.

<sup>83</sup> İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization".

Although the chief notable was not a state official, he was officially recognized and assigned certain governmental functions such as collecting taxes for the central state and supplying provisions, troops and livestock for the army. As the representative of a district, *kaza*, the election of *baş ayân* or *reis-i ayân* from among notables goes back to the 1680s.<sup>84</sup> During the Austro-Turkish war of 1683-99, the term *ayân* acquired specific connotations and was used to refer to certain wealthy and influential individuals, who were elected by other notables and acted as a mediator between the local population and the representatives of the central state. The leading notable who was elected as *ayân* of a *kaza* was given a document signed by all other *ayâns* and then recorded as such in the Kadı Court registers from the early eighteenth century onwards.<sup>85</sup>

Until 1765, governors had the power to confirm the election of chief notables with an order of appointment called *buyruldu*. When Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa became grand vizier in 1765, he introduced a change in the practice of approving the chief *ayân*. He decreed that every *ayân*, after having been elected by the population of their districts, had to be recognized by the Grand Vizier, not by the provincial governor. This decision was taken in order to strengthen the central control over the election of chief notables. However, on the eve of the Russian-Ottoman war, Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa was overthrown and the old practice of the confirmation of chief notables by the governor was restored

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<sup>84</sup> Nagata, *Muhsinzâde Mehmet Paşa ve Ayanlık Müessesesi*, pp. 31-38; Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık*, p. 118, 122.

<sup>85</sup> İnalçık, "Centralization and Decentralization", pp. 44-46.

because of the need for a conciliation towards *ayâns* to encourage them contribute to the war with troops and provisions.<sup>86</sup>

In 1779, the power to confirm the election of *reis-i ayân* was again shifted from governors to the grand vizier and Halil Hamid Paşa, by a decree of 1784, reconfirmed these changes. The aim was to establish governmental control over the election of provincial *ayân* and to end the disorders resulted from the struggle pertaining to this office.<sup>87</sup> However, this regulation was also unsuccessful and it did not change the appointment of *ayâns* by the governor's *buyruldu*. The last attempt was made by Koca Yusuf Paşa in 1786, who abolished *ayân*ship altogether by a decree.<sup>88</sup> Instead, the functions of *ayân* were assigned to *şehir kethüdası*. However, these measures did not diminish the power of local notables and the domination of them in provincial administration. With the outbreak of war with Russia in 1787, the resurrection of the *ayânlık* became unavoidable, because of the important services that they had the potential to provide for the central state.

The institution of chief notable as the representative of their locality was a significant because it provided the ground for their promotion to the higher official posts and titles. That is why there was a fierce struggle among the notables for the position of chief notable. One can see this struggle for the acquisition of higher offices at all levels. First of all, we can consider one locality as consisting of several local notables. They were in competition for the position of chief

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<sup>86</sup> Nagata, *Muhsin-zāde Mehmed Paşa ve Âyanlık Müessesesi*.

<sup>87</sup> İnalçık argues that contrary to the claim often made, this reform edict of 1784 did not transform *ayanship* into an official and public institution. See his "Centralization and Decentralization", pp. 49-50.

notable which could provide them a higher prestige and status among the others. So, only one or two of them distinguished themselves from among the pool of local notables. At this point came the struggle for the posts such as *mütesellim* (deputy governorship), *voyvoda*, *muhafız*, for the shares in *mukataas* as tax-farmer, and for the official titles such as *kapıcıbaşı* and pasha. From among these intermediate layer of local notables, only some of them were integrated into official circles. Their success dependent on several factors, but it can be said that granting of such titles and offices to local elites by the central government intensified during the periods of political crisis. In fact, during the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792, the transformation of local elites into state elites gained momentum. Despite the attempts by the central government to curb this shift in status, as indicated above, all leading notables were essential to the most elementary functions of the provincial administration.

One must make a distinction at this point between those *ayâns* of a small town and village notables who had a strong local power basis (military, social, administrative) and those who rose from that position to that of state official (governor or deputy governorship, *muhasıl*, *voyvoda*, etc.) and gradually transformed into a dynasty, passing their political and economic power from one generation to another.<sup>89</sup> In the literature, these two different types of local notables were generally referred to as *ayân*. The dynastic notables dominated and

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<sup>88</sup> İnalçık, "Centralization and Decentralization", pp. 49-50. Deena R. Sadat attributed this decree to Halil Hamid Paşa and the date of decree was 1785 in her article, "Rumeli Ayanları: The Eighteenth Century", pp. 358-9.

<sup>89</sup> For a recent study which is useful for the conceptualization of the distinction among imperial, regional and local elites, see Michael E. Meeker, *A Nation of Empire, The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, table 2, pp. 224-225.



controlled the petty notables either with collaboration or elimination. The dynastic notables easily distinguished themselves from among these petty *ayâns*. They can be considered as a class on the way to becoming a state elite. Therefore, they were not only in a position to increase their power and authority in their localities as primary notables but could also assume governorship, thus dominating other small notables.<sup>90</sup> On the other hand, the small town and village notables could retain their social power on the basis of relations of neighbourliness, friendship, paternalism and obedience even if the provincial governor used his own retinue members and relatives in the provincial administration and excluded them from the administration of local affairs.

Like the Ottoman state used one dynasty against another when one of them became too powerful and independent, in a similar way, the governor or *mütesellim* of a sub-province (*sancak*) could use the leading families within the area against one another.

Looking at the mechanism horizontally, the relationship among the neighbouring dynastic families was not so different from the relationship among petty notables who were either competitors or allies depending on the changing circumstances. For example, the relationship between the Caniklizâdes and the Çapanoğlus was more than a competition; it reached the point of open conflict, which continued over generations. What is observed in the relationship between

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<sup>90</sup> Deena R. Sadat, by pointing out the distinction between *hanedan* families and a much larger secondary group under their dominance, argues that both Tirsiniklioğlu İsmail Ağa of Ruschuk and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa not only led a regional coalition, but also had the right to appoint *ayân* in towns subordinate to their control. See “Rumeli Ayanları: The Eighteenth Century”, p. 350.

the dynasty of Köse Paşa of Divriği and the Caniklizâdes on the other hand was a kind of protection and patronage.

Another important point in the discussion of ayânship was that these dynastic local notable families rose to higher state offices under war conditions and became transformed into a class with a vested interest in the continuation of their privileges and persistence of their domination over their respective regions. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the first centralizing measures of Selim III came as a reaction to these notables and led to the famous *sened-i ittifak* in 1808. However, in the early stages of the rule of Mahmud II, neither tax-farming nor the dominance of local notables came to an end, mainly because of the absence of new institutions to replace them. It can be argued that the social influence and power of these secondary notables at intermediary level under the newly established local councils continued during following period of *Tanzimat*.<sup>91</sup> As it is known, on the other hand, after the war with Russia ended in 1812, the provincial magnates gradually began to be eliminated. Mahmud II used several methods for the reduction of the power of the dynasties ranging from exile and execution to the suspension of tax-collection contracts. Moreover, he used one dynasty against the other to subdue them. Waiting for the death of provincial magnates appeared at one time to be the best solution. Upon the death of powerful *ayân*, the central government did not renew his administrative and economic rights to be enjoyed by his descendants. It rather preferred to appoint to these posts governors from from the center who had no local connection.

Seen from this perspective, the aim of this study is to show similarities and differences of the Caniklizâdes from other provincial dynasties in Anatolia, mainly the Karaosmanoğlus and the Çapanoğlus. The present study in this respect is an attempt to explore how the Caniklizâde family evolved into a dynasty and became a state elite. Was their transformation from local to imperial elite similar in character to other notable families? Did the Caniklizâdes have a particular standing in imperial politics?

The study puts the Caniklizâdes in a vertical and horizontal setting of the relationships in the empire. Vertically, the relationship between the central state and the Caniklizâdes gained importance during wars with Russia. These wars seem to have been the main stimulant behind the rise also of other local notables, who saw the opportunity to ascend to the level of state elites by obtaining posts like deputy governorships or those who distinguished themselves from other petty notables and increased their power of negotiation with the Ottoman state. The Ottoman imperial politics, in the last decades of the eighteenth century, became an arena of competition to reach higher state posts and offices and to obtain highly profitable tax-farms for the provincial magnates (*hatt-ı hümayun* or registers of imperial orders are full of examples of such negotiations between the Ottoman government and provincial notables for the control over posts).

The relations in this competition were determined by the military power of the personal retinues of these provincials. The Ottoman administration considered the promotion of provincials as a temporary affair since it had several means to

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<sup>91</sup> Yonca Köksal, "Imperial Center and Local Groups: Tanzimat Reforms In The Provinces of

control, eliminate and even execute them. However, even though the legitimacy of the provincial magnates was dependent on the central state, their power reached a point where they began acting independently from the state. It was particularly so during the years of crisis under which provincial notables became indispensable to the state. The independent and autonomous actions of local magnates were largely dependent on their established relations in the locality, i.e. their local power bases. This can be considered as a horizontal type of relationship. Only through the formation of hegemony over the local elites of the region, one dynasty or provincial elite became dominant. However, their method of maintaining their dominance was different. If the provincial notable in question was powerful enough (military and retinue power) and his relatives were obedient, he could appoint his followers, as in the case of Caniklizâdes, to strategic positions. Canikli Ali Paşa for example, brought his sons to the positions such as *mütesellim* of Amasya, Canik, and Trabzon, while he was holding the office of the governorship of these regions. His sons, Battal Hüseyin and Tayyar Paşas, on the other hand appointed people from among their retinues, usually their stewards or *kethüdâs*.

If the provincial elite was not so strong militarily and had not many followers and obedient retinue members, they could ally with the existent local elites of the region by distributing shares from the surplus of tax-revenues in return for their military and administrative services in the performance of imperial duties.

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Edirne and Ankara”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 27, 2002, pp. 129-135; Kudret Emiroğlu, “Vilayet Salnamelerine Göre Trabzon’da Bürokrasi ve Eşraf”, *Kebikeç*, 14, 2002, pp.155-172.

Therefore, the capacity to collect soldiers and direct them to the battlefield or another target was an important means for the establishment of authority at local level. Those notables with considerable military force were treated and used by the higher provincial elite like a governor and were assigned important responsibilities. In this way, these provincial elites gained the opportunity for promotion to higher posts. Likewise, for the provincial elites like governors, the continuity of their privileges was based on their military success. As long as they were successful in campaigns (i.e. sent the demanded amount of soldiers to the campaign, maintained their discipline and kept their motivation high), they could continue as governors or commanders, maintaining their rights on tax-revenues. Even if their governorship changed from one area to another, they continued their titles, ranks, and offices. Because of the highly mobile character of the position of provincial governors (due to frequent wars and campaigns), they had to appoint deputies or agents (*mütesellim*) when they were away.

Another type of relationship that occurred at the horizontal level was the relationship among the provincial elites themselves. As noted earlier, their relationship was either in the form of competition or alliance. Most of the time, provincial elites and small notables used intermarriages to strengthen their relationship. These kinship ties were extremely important and relatives can be found at every level of the hierarchy of elites.

Moneylending was another tool used by the provincial elites; it tied lesser notables to provincial magnates. Several partnerships emerged around credit relations, and the obedience of lesser notables to higher ones was often maintained this way. Conflict often arose because of late payment or the neglect of debt, as

was the case between the Hazinedarzâdes and Tuzcuoğlu.<sup>92</sup> The problem of debt often provided the context for the struggle for elimination.

From the perspective of horizontal and vertical relationship outlined above, this study on the Caniklizâdes is an attempt to explore their place in the imperial structure. The emphasis will be on the redistributive mechanisms of tax-farming which vertically connected the Caniklizâdes to the central state on the one hand and to the small local notables on the other. While Chapter Two below outlines the political rise of the Caniklizâdes in this context, Chapter Three will focus on the economic aspect in the context of the mechanism of empire-wide revenue distribution.

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<sup>92</sup> For the struggle between them, see Michael E. Meeker, *A Nation of Empire, The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity*, pp. 215-220; Faruk Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, pp. 116-120.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CANIKLİZÂDES (1737-1808): A SHORT HISTORY

The subject of this part is the political history of the Caniklizâdes within the framework of the relationships between the Caniklizâdes, the Ottoman state and other dynastic families in the neighbouring region as well as the small local notables in their locality. This section shows the development of the Canikli dynasty, who became transformed into an imperial elite from a small notable background. As stated before, the relationship between the Caniklizâdes and the Ottoman state was based on the historical conjuncture of the time.

The history of the rise of the family was accompanied by fairly frequent punishment of executions by the state of the most prominent members of the family throughout successive generations. Firstly, some members of the family were executed by the state (except Canikli Ali Paşa, Süleyman Paşa and Battal Hüseyin Paşa). Secondly, they were declared by the Ottoman state as fugitive (*firari*) three times: Canikli Ali Paşa in 1779; Battal Hüseyin Paşa in 1790; Tayyar Mahmud Paşa in 1805). Thirdly, by 1808, the dynasty saw two confiscations due to military failure and political reasons. Moreover, the Caniklizâdes came into a serious conflict that resulted in an open war twice (1779 and 1805) with the other powerful dynasty of the neighboring region, the Çapanoğlus.

Mainly, the wars with Russia provided the context for the rise of the fortune of the family and their fall was also closely related with their conflict with the Ottoman state due to the military failure of the family during the wars engaged against Russian armies in the Northern Black Sea region.

Now, we can turn into the story of the family, starting from 1730's onward when the Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa became a *kapıcıbaşı* at the imperial palace. Afterwards, the fate of the family turned and his two sons (Süleyman Paşa and Canikli Ali Paşa) inherited from him the post of *muhassıl*, but started to rise up to the position of a governor and in the end just before the centralization policies of the Sultan Mahmud II, the Caniklizâdes fell forever. The last leading member of the family, the son of the grand-son of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa, Tayyar Mahmud Paşa, was executed in 1808. The story of rise of the Caniklizâdes was the story of the rise from *kapıcıbaşı* to *Sadaret Kaymakamlığı*, which is one of the most important positions after the grand vizierate. The Caniklizâdes can be considered as a dynasty who rose from banditry to the rank of Paşa and *sadaret kaymakamı*. The political history of the Caniklizâdes should be analysed in three periods. As will be clear below, the main characteristics of these periods were the shift from a small local notable to a provincial notable, then to the dynastic notable, and finally to imperial one.



## I. From a Small Local Notable to the Establishment of a Dynasty (1737-1765)

The Caniklizâdes descended from the line of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa (d.1748) who was one of the local elite of the district of Fatsa. Our knowledge of him is very limited.<sup>1</sup> He was known as “Çubukçuoğlu” Ahmed Ağa.<sup>2</sup> He established his authority in the region of Samsun through the repression of the banditry<sup>3</sup> with his military force. It is highly possible that he distinguished himself from other local notables with his powerful military following. He established his domination over the leaders of the bandits and as a result, he was promoted by the Ottoman state to the rank of *kapıcıbaşı*. As is known, in the eighteenth century, the assignment of a rank of a *kapıcıbaşı* to the local notables who performed certain significant services became common place in the promotion of peripheral forces into the military class, i.e. the ruling elite of the empire.<sup>4</sup> Through this appointment, Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa’s domination over petty notables and bandits was legitimized by the Ottoman state. However, he had to pass certain steps before obtaining the title *kapıcıbaşı*.

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<sup>1</sup> *Cevdet Bahriye* 9825 (1713) referred to someone called Ahmed Ağa as *muhassıl* of Canik, who indebted 9001 piaster to the treasury of navy from annual instalments (*mal*) of the *avarız* and *nüzul* of Canik. Whether he was the Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa or not should be supported with new findings. Moreover, in 1720, El-Hac Ahmed Ağa bearing the title of *kapıcıbaşı* was indebted to the state. *DBŞM-ZMT* 13773 (1720).

<sup>2</sup> Mazhar Derici, *Canikli Ali Paşa'nın Hayatı*, İ. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü, Unpublished M. A. thesis, 1966-1967, p. 10. Without any reference, he argues that Ahmed Ağa is the son of Süleyman Ağa, who is the son of Abdurrahman Ağa.

<sup>3</sup> For the raids and activities of militias and bandits in the region, see İbrahim Güler, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Orta Karadeniz Bölgesinde Eşkiyalık Hareketleri”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 15, 1995, pp. 187-219.

<sup>4</sup> Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, II, pp. 167-9.

First of all, in 1737, he obtained a one-third share in the tax revenues of the subprovince (*sancak*) of Canik, whose status became *muhasıllık*<sup>5</sup> as early as 1712.<sup>6</sup> Five years later, he increased his share of the *muhasıllık* of Canik from one-third to half.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa possessed the title of “El-Hac” which provided him further influence and authority over the population of the region. This seems to have encouraged him to extract excessive taxes from the peasants. As a result of the complaints sent by the population of Terme and Fatsa subdistricts about him, he was exiled to Ankara. A few years later, he was pardoned by the state and he became the *muhasıl* of Canik with the title of *kapıcıbaşı*. Although he had problems with the delivery of the required amount of fibre and hemp to the Imperial Navy<sup>8</sup>, which was one of the most important responsibilities of the *muhasıl* of Canik, he gained wealth to a certain extent and established a relationship of dependency by acting as a moneylender.<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile, Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa started to form his own household to run the tax-collection activities in the subdistricts of Canik and appointed certain Abdurrahman, who had formerly had duties in the fortress of Samsun, as his *mütesellim*.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> “Muhasıllık” in Ottoman system referred to an administrative division for the collection of the revenues of a province or subprovince. Before the eighteenth century, *muhasıl* was the collector of taxes of the imperial domains whose revenues belonged to the Sultan. Afterwards, *muhasıl* meant, like *mutasarrıf*, an administrator and a tax-collector of a province or subprovince at the level of a governor. See Musa Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri’nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997, p. 22.

<sup>6</sup> Orhan Kılıç, *18. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti’nin İdari Taksimatı, Eyalet ve Sancak Tercihati*, Elazığ, 1997, p. 129.

<sup>7</sup> *DBŞM-MLK 14115* (1742).

<sup>8</sup> *DBŞM 41058* (1748).

<sup>9</sup> See *DBŞM-MHF 39/42* (1748) for the debtors to Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa.

<sup>10</sup> *DBŞM-MHF 39/38*. The deputy of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa, Abdurrahman was killed together with him and died with a debt of 20.000 piaster to Ahmed Ağa. It was considered as a debt to the state since it was consisted of unpaid taxes to the *muhasıl* and to the state.

Since Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa used force in controlling the unsubordinate people of Canik<sup>11</sup>, his death was the result of a revenge attack by the villagers of Terme and Akçay, who lynched him together with his deputy Abdurrahman and thirty people from his retinue in 1748. As far as sources document, he had two sons (Süleyman and Ali) and a daughter (Rukiye).

In sum, the career of Fatsalı El-Hac Ahmed Ağa signifies two features of the establishment of the dynasty: first, his entry into the military class with the rank of *kapıcıbaşı*, and second perhaps most importantly, obtaining the right to collect the taxes of the subprovince of Canik as a *muhasıl*. He, therefore, left his sons a firm basis to establish themselves further.

His sons, Süleyman and Ali, in their struggle for the recognition by the Ottoman state, seem to have been rival competitors. Süleyman (d. 1770) was the elder son of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa. During his father's lifetime, we see him as the collector of the poll tax of Canik in 1744.<sup>12</sup> After the death of Ahmed Ağa, the tax-farm of Canik passed to his relatives. It was shared by his sons and his sister's husband Ali, each holding one-third share.<sup>13</sup>

Like his father, Süleyman seems to have established his hegemony over the bandits and other notables of the Western Black Sea region. In 1756, together with his brother Ali, he entered Giresun with a military force composed of 12.000 soldiers, plundered the city, expropriated goods from its inhabitants and carried

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<sup>11</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 11483*.

<sup>12</sup> *DBŞM 41058*.

<sup>13</sup> *MAD 9570*, p. 106.

them with a boat to Samsun in 1756.<sup>14</sup> Although the central government sent an order for the repression of bandits in Giresun, they themselves appear to have acted like bandits in the region.

Interestingly enough, in the same year, Süleyman was appointed as the governor Trabzon with the rank of *mirmiran*<sup>15</sup> to pacify the bandits of this region.<sup>16</sup> He was successful in the maintenance of the security and order and the elimination by his military force, of the leaders of disturbants in Trabzon. In return for his services, he was assigned the rank of vizier in 1759.<sup>17</sup> This was the turning point in the history of Canikli dynasty in the sense that the family took an important step towards integration into the imperial elite. In other words, the promotion of Süleyman to the rank of a Paşa-vizier signifies the incorporation of a local notable family into the Ottoman ruling establishment. It seems from the documentation that, this was the result of the Süleyman's policy to win over bandits in the western Black Sea region. This development in his career further confirmed the authority of Süleyman as a Paşa over the small notables at local level.

From this time onward Süleyman Paşa obtained new positions in the Ottoman provincial administration. We see him serving as the governor of Maraş in 1758-60, then of Trabzon in 1760.<sup>18</sup> However, it was not much later that he lost

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<sup>14</sup> İbrahim Güler, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Giresun'da Bazı Sosyal ve Ekonomik Meseleler", in *Giresun Kültür Sempozyumu* 30-31 Mayıs 1998, İstanbul: Giresun Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları No 2, 1998.

<sup>15</sup> Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 5, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları 30, 1996, pp. 1543-1544.

<sup>16</sup> Ömer Akbulut, *Trabzon, Cumhuriyetten Evvel Tarih ve Valiler*, I, Trabzon: İstiklal Matbaası, 1955, pp. 150-151.

<sup>17</sup> Mahmud Goloğlu, *Fetihten Kurtuluşa Kadar Trabzon Tarihi*, Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1975, pp. 108-109.

<sup>18</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 5, pp. 1543-1544.

his control over the region because of his oppression over the tax-payers. This was important in the sense that it shows the continuing of the control of the Ottoman state over the provinces. As result of increasing complaints about Süleyman Paşa's abusive rule, his share in the tax-farm of *muhasıllık* of Canik was taken back in 1765. This was independent from the competition between Süleyman Paşa and his brother Ali over the control of Canik as will be shown below.

Süleyman Paşa was later assigned posts far away from the Canik region. First, he was appointed as the governor of Kefe in 1768<sup>19</sup>, a year later, as the commander (*muhafız*) of Özü<sup>20</sup> and then as governor of Karaman. He finally served as the commander of Niğbolu and İbrail. In 1770, he caught the plague and died<sup>21</sup> by leaving four children: a daughter and three sons, namely Mehmed Paşa<sup>22</sup>, İbrahim<sup>23</sup> and Sadullah.

Before coming to the career of other son of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa, who was known as Canikli El-Hac Ali Paşa, it is necessary to briefly look at the rivalry between his sons. The competition over the tax-farm of Canik accelerated between Süleyman Paşa and Ali after the third share-holder of this tax-farm died in 1763. In order to prevent the success of his brother in the campaign of Georgia in 1765 where he was called to participate with a military force of 2000 soldiers,

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<sup>19</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 5, pp. 1543-1544.

<sup>20</sup> Virginia Aksan, "Manning a Black Sea Garrison in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century: Ochakov and Concepts of Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Context", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 8/1-2, 2002. She underlines the rebellion of Janissary recruits (*yamaks*) under the jurisdiction of Süleyman Paşa, who joined to the enemy, revolted, plundered and burned the nearby Ottoman fortresses and killed many of the residents.

<sup>21</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 5, pp. 1543-1544.

<sup>22</sup> *DBŞM* 5384, p. 17 refers to the expenditures of Canikli Süleyman Paşazâde Mehmed Paşa for the year 1786.

<sup>23</sup> Yücel Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa", *Belleten*, XXXVI/141-144, 1972, p. 512; Rıza Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Samsun: Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, 1998, p. 128.

Süleyman Paşa registered undisciplined forces composed of people from peasant origin for his brother. In that way, he sought to block the military success of Ali Bey in the side of the Ottoman government.<sup>24</sup> Süleyman Paşa was aware of the fact that the promotion to a higher rank was dependent mainly on military success in a campaign. Despite these attempts, Ali Bey distinguished himself as a good commander in the campaign, and as a reward, Ali Bey was assigned the *muhasıllık* of Canik as a life-term tax-farm alone in 1765. As stated before, the oppression of the Süleyman Paşa over the villagers of the subdistricts of Canik also contributed to his replacement by Ali Bey. From 1765 onwards, Ali Bey rose at the expense of Süleyman Paşa.

As regards to the historical relationship between Ali and Süleyman, the first significant point is that the descendants from the Ali Paşa's line formed their hegemony in the region of Canik and its environment until 1808. It is highly probable that Ali Paşa did not allow Süleyman's sons to become powerful in the region. However, he followed a strategy of containment of the sons of Süleyman Paşa within the dominance of his household. In other words, he balanced the distribution of power between the two competing households so that the line of Süleyman Paşa did not become powerful enough to threaten the hegemony of his own family.

From among the descendants of Süleyman Paşa, his son Mehmed was appointed in 1778 as the *mutasarrıf* of Çorum with the rank of Paşa when the Canikli Ali Paşa and his sons negotiated with the state and gained significant

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<sup>24</sup> Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Ayânlık Müessesesi*, pp. 25-26.

administrative and economic positions. But this must be seen as transitory. It is probable that Mehmed was not assigned important positions in Canik and its environment. In 1786, Mehmed Paşa was seen as a deputy for the governorship (*mütesellim*) of Kocaeli.<sup>25</sup> This indicates that he rose partly independently from the Canikli Ali Paşa, since Kocaeli was not included in the regions that Ali Paşa controlled.

The relationship between two households was based on the fine balance determined by Ali Paşa's power vis-a-vis the state. As stated before, Ali Paşa used different strategies to contain the members of his brother's sons. First of all, the marriages between the two lines were one of the ways in which the son of Süleyman Paşa could be made ineffective. Ali Paşa's daughter was married to Sadullah Bey, the son of Süleyman Paşa. In that way, Sadullah became the son-in-law of Ali Paşa<sup>26</sup> and obtained a right to hold the one-fourth share from the tax-farm of Canik between 1780 and 1785.<sup>27</sup> Secondly, the appointment to the posts outside the Canik region was another solution to prevent them competing for valuable positions. As far as the archival sources reveal, Mehmed Paşa was the only person from among the sons of Süleyman Paşa who held the rank of Paşa. His appointment as the *mutasarrıf* of Çorum in 1778 with this title, however, lasted only one year. Later on, we see him holding the revenues of Kocaeli with the post of deputy of governorship (*mütesellim*) of this region, while also

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<sup>25</sup> DBŞM 5384, p. 17.

<sup>26</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 128; Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa", p. 507, 512; *Cevdet Zaptiye* 1208.

<sup>27</sup> MAD 9570, p. 106.

undertaking some posts in İlbasan.<sup>28</sup> One of his sons, Ahmed Bey, was seen among the followers of Ali Paşa in his struggle against Çapanoğlu.<sup>29</sup>

In sum, until 1765, there occurred a shift from a local to regional and then to the imperial politics in the history of the Caniklizâdes. However, as discussed below, the establishment of a powerful dynasty came into being under the rule of Canikli El-Hac Ali Paşa (1720-1785).

## II. Caniklizâdes in Imperial Politics: Ali Paşa and His Sons, Mikdad Ahmed and Battal Hüseyin Paşas

It was under this period that Canikli Ali Paşa as well as his sons Battal Hüseyin and Mikdad Ahmed extended their political and economic resources from Samsun to regions as wide as Trabzon, Amasya, Sivas, Tokat, Gümüşhane, Kars and Erzurum. As such, they controlled the Western Black Sea and North-Eastern Anatolia at the level of governorships which became almost hereditary.<sup>30</sup> While this section outlines the expansion of their political power and the acquisition of posts, offices and ranks, the enlargement of their economic resources will be analysed in the next chapter. In fact, the acquisition of political and economic rights coincided with the time of the increasing needs of the Ottoman state for soldiers and provisions during the wars of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792.

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<sup>28</sup> *DBŞM* 5384, p. 17.

<sup>29</sup> Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa", p. 508.

<sup>30</sup> For the opposition of Sultan Abdülhamid I to the hereditary nature of offices, see Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, *Kendi Kaleminden Bir Padişahın Portresi Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774-1789)*, İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2001, pp. 129-130.



In the existent literature, Ali Paşa was regarded as the true founder of the dynasty.<sup>31</sup> He was born in İstanbul in 1720/21 and spent his childhood there.<sup>32</sup> Later he moved to Canik and because of his father's oppression in the region, they were exiled to Ankara in 1741. After the death of his father in 1748, he returned to Canik with his elder brother Süleyman Paşa.<sup>33</sup>

His career can be followed from the titles that he held during the following years. He was first referred to in the Ottoman archival sources as Ali "Ağa" before 1757.<sup>34</sup> Later, we also see him as Ali "Bey". Four years later, in 1761, he was referred to as "El-Hac".<sup>35</sup>

The main turning point his career appears to have been when he eliminated his brother and became the *muhasıl* of Canik alone in 1765.<sup>36</sup> In the following year, the *muhasıl* of Canik El-Hac Ali Bey was seen as the collector of the tax-revenues of the subprovince of Trabzon.<sup>37</sup> In 1767, he was assigned to collect the poll-tax of Trabzon with the title of the "*mutasarrıf*" of Trabzon.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, he was also entitled to collect the war-time (*seferiye*) and peace-time (*hazariye*)

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<sup>31</sup> For Canikli Ali Paşa, see Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa"; Özcan Mert, "Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 7, İstanbul, 1991; Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*; Bernard Lewis, "Djanikli Hadjdji Ali Paşa", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979.

<sup>32</sup> Ahmed Vasıf, *Mehasinü'l-Asar ve Hakaikü'l-Ahbar*, ed. Mücteba İlgürel, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994, p. 277.

<sup>33</sup> Mert, "Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi", p. 151.

<sup>34</sup> *MAD 9570; DBŞM-MLK 14129* referred to him as Ali "Ağa".

<sup>35</sup> In *Cevdet Maliye 7647*, he was referred as "El-Hac Ali Bey" and share-holder of *muhasıllık* of Canik.

<sup>36</sup> *MAD 9570*, p. 106.

<sup>37</sup> Ali Bey obtained the right to collect taxes which was referred to as *maktu'a-i bedel-i sancak-ı Trabzon* (taxes collected as a compensation for the old revenues of *sancakbeyi*). In this revenue, the emergency levies, *avarız* was included. See *MAD 3194*, p. 489.

<sup>38</sup> *Cevdet Askeriye 43391*.

contributions of Amasya. In other words, he became the *mutasarrıf*<sup>39</sup> of Amasya in 1768.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, contrary to the earliest assumptions, Ali Bey began to hold the revenues of Trabzon and Amasya as *mutasarrıf* much earlier than suggested by Yücel Özkaya.<sup>41</sup>

To follow his rise to the rank of a Paşa-vizier, a brief look at the military career of Ali Bey is needed. 1768-1774 Ottoman-Russian war seems to have provided a wide range of opportunities for Ali Bey to ascend. As early as 1765, he was ordered to participate in the campaign of Georgia with the governor of Çıldır, Hasan Paşa. At this time, Ali Bey was competing for the tax-farm of Canik with his brother Süleyman Paşa. It was during this time that the latter recruited inexperienced soldiers for his brother who was in need of soldiers during the campaign. There were also difficulties resulting from the recruitment of soldiers from Rumelia and with providing discipline among them. Despite these difficulties, Hasan Paşa and Ali Bey were partly successful.<sup>42</sup>

Ali's first military duty in the Russian war was in 1769. He participated into the war in Hotin with 3000 soldiers under the command of Abaza Mehmed

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<sup>39</sup> For a discussion of the change in the institution of *mutasarrıf*, see Carter Findley, "Mutasarrıf", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 7, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991, pp. 774-5; Rifat Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara*, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1986, p. 144; Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı*, p. 21.

<sup>40</sup> *MAD* 3194, p. 483; *MAD* 10219.

<sup>41</sup> Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa", p. 483. He based his discussion on the document dated 1772 (*Cevdet Dahiliye* 16775). The reasons behind the assignment of the subprovince of Amasya as life-time tax-farm (*malikâne*) to Ali Bey were stated in the document: to provide security in the region, to repress banditry of unemployed militias, to provide ships, to secure the Black Sea region against Russian attacks.

<sup>42</sup> Nagata, *Muhsin-zāde Mehmed Paşa ve Ayānlık Müessesesi*, pp. 25-26. He shows the internal chaos just before the campaign of 1768-1774. The most important problem was the inability of the *timar* and *zeamet*-holders to send soldiers and the presence of the banditry of unemployed militias.

Paşa and wounded in 1769 and saved by his commander.<sup>43</sup> After this, he returned to Canik. Apart from his active participation to the war itself, he performed significant functions throughout these turbulent years. He recruited soldiers from the Canik region for the preparation of the campaign of Crimea.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, he sent war materials and provisions for the sustainment of the army.<sup>45</sup> One year later, he fought in Kartal again under the command of Abaza Mehmed Paşa, who retreated under the Russians attacks. After the defeat of Kartal, Ali Bey once more returned to Canik and continued to make contributions for the campaign. He supplied ships, soldiers and provisions. Ali Bey seems to have gained wealth by these arrangements and can be considered as a war profiteer.<sup>46</sup>

In 1771, the war with Russians concentrated in Crimea. This time Ali Bey was assigned the duty of the execution of Abaza Mehmed Paşa, his former commander in Hotin, who returned from Crimea avoiding direct encounter with the Russian forces, despite the imperial orders. Ali Bey undertook his duty without hesitation and killed the person who saved his life two years ago.<sup>47</sup> This shows yet another dimension of the power struggle at local level. The Ottoman state utilized the competition among officials and used their ambition for promotion to higher posts. In this case, Ali Bey was rewarded with the assignment

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<sup>43</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, pp. 31-35.

<sup>44</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 35. He sent 1500 cavalry and 1500 infantry soldiers.

<sup>45</sup> *MAD 7596 (Ahkam)*, p. 99/2, 109. The *muhasıl* of Canik, Ali Bey was ordered by the government to forward fibre of Fatsa (*tel-i Fatsa*) and hemp (*kendir*) which was collected as a compensation (*bedel*) for the *sancak* of Canik. Other than the normal amount (*ocaklık*), he was also given the duty of purchasing these materials for the Imperial Navy and sending them to Georgia. He was also held responsible for the collection of provisions (*zahire*) and their delivery to Kefe by his own ships. See chapter 5, p. 186 for his ships.

<sup>46</sup> For a discussion of the provisioning of the army, see Virginia Aksan, "Feeding the Ottoman Troops in the 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish War", *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 18/1, 1994, pp. 27-28.

of the *sancak* of Amasya as life-time tax-farm (*malikâne*) in 1772. In the following year, Ali Bey became a Paşa-vizier. In 1773, he was appointed as the *Serasker* (Commander-in-Chief) for the Crimean campaign<sup>48</sup>. In the meantime, he continued to serve as the governor of Trabzon<sup>49</sup>, the *mutasarrıf* of Amasya and the *muhassıl* of Canik. The year 1773 therefore was the second turning point in the career of Ali Bey.

#### Canikli El-Hac Ali Paşa as the *Serasker* of Crimea

Ali Paşa spent the year establishing his authority in the region, especially in Trabzon, where there was a power vacuum. With the authority he was given and his responsibility for the Crimean campaign, he recruited soldiers from other parts of Anatolia and supplied ships. Taking into account that the war was continuing on two fronts (Rumelia and Crimea), there was an urgent need for soldiers.<sup>50</sup> Orders were given to the governors of other sub-provinces of Anatolia (Bolu, Kastamonu, Sivas, Tokad, Erzurum, Çorum, Ankara) for provisions, soldiers, and war materials. Under such conditions, Ali Paşa attempted to firmly establish his authority especially in Trabzon and Amasya. He took some precautions and eliminated local notables and bandits who did not comply with the orders given both by the state and himself.<sup>51</sup> Kalcıoğlu Ömer (notable of Trabzon), Ali Şir

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<sup>47</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 39.

<sup>48</sup> According to Karagöz, Ali Paşa was appointed as *Serasker* in the first months of 1773. Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 43.

<sup>49</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye* 575; Özkaya, “Canikli Ali Paşa”, p. 485.

<sup>50</sup> Özkaya, “Canikli Ali Paşa”, pp. 485-487; Virginia Aksan, “The 1768 to 1774 Russo-Turkish War: A Comparative Analysis of Russian and Ottoman Campaign Preparedness”, *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 16/1, 1992.

<sup>51</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 43. Özkaya gave the same information and he argued that the above persons were referred to as “derebeys”. “Canikli Ali Paşa”, p. 485.

(*voyvoda* of Bolu), Dizdaroğlu Ali and Abdullah (bandits of the Black Sea coasts), Seyyid Hacı Ali (notable of Amasya) were from among the local notables who were acting independently and not supplying the soldiers called by Ali Paşa. As a punishment, Ali Paşa revoked their *timars* and ranks. In addition, some parts of their wealth were confiscated. To meet his expenses during his commandership of Crimean campaign, Ali Paşa was also given the right to collect the revenues of the imperial domains (*has*) which were under the jurisdiction of Tokat *voyvodalıǵı*.<sup>52</sup> His commandership of Crimea lasted until the signing of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774.

Afterwards, because of the disorder in the Iranian border which continued until 1779, Ali Paşa was appointed as *Serasker* of Kars in 1776<sup>53</sup>. With this duty, he extended his area of influence. We see him as the governor of Erzurum between 1776 and 1777 and his elder son Battal Hüseyin became the *voyvoda* of the sub-province of Karahisar-ı Şarki.<sup>54</sup>

The second wave of promotions in the history of the Caniklizâdes came about with the appointment of Ali Paşa once more as the *Serasker* for the campaign of Crimea in 1777. On the one hand, he was entrusted with the governorship of Sivas and held the sub-province of Kastamonu as *malikâne* to compensate his expenditures for the campaign. In 1778, his younger son, Mikdad Ahmed became the *kaymakam* of the governor of Sivas in return for the defence of the fortress of Soğucak while his elder son Battal Hüseyin was assigned the

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<sup>52</sup> Özkaya, “Canikli Ali Paşa”, p. 485; Özcan Mert, *XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoǵulları*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1980, p. 40.

<sup>53</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 51. Ali Paşa served as *Serasker* of Kars between 1776 and 1777. Moreover, he became superintendant (*emin*) of Gümüşhane between 1775 and 1776.

rank of *kapıcıbaşı*. Moreover, the son of his brother, Mehmed Bey was appointed to the sub-province of Çorum with the title of *mirmiran*.<sup>55</sup> In the summer of the same year, Ali Paşa arrived first at Soğucak, then went to Kefe with his navy and 15.000 soldiers for a major offensive. He returned, however, in September, without fulfilling the imperial order to attack the Russians.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, his son Mikdad Paşa, who was ordered to stay in Soğucak, pulled back to Sinop. In the end, an opposition to Ali Paşa emerged in the center. Despite the peace treaty with the Russians, his opponents blamed him for enriching himself instead of trying hard for the campaign<sup>57</sup> and for allying himself with Şahin Giray who formed an alliance with the Russians.<sup>58</sup>

To sum up the career of Canikli Ali Paşa up to this point, we can speak of two turning points. When we look at the period between 1765, when Ali Paşa was assigned the post of the *muhassıl* of Canik alone, and 1779, when he was declared a rebel and was deprived of all of his titles and posts, it becomes clear that there was a close relationship between the increase in titles and posts of Canikli Ali Paşa and his sons and the urgent need of the state for soldiers in the campaigns against Russia and Iran. Conditions such as the military needs of the government during the 1768-1774 Russian-Ottoman war seem to have determined the range of negotiations and interactions between the Ottoman state and the Caniklizâdes. In other words, the war with Russia and the issue of Crimea provided the historical

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<sup>54</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 51.

<sup>55</sup> Mert, *XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoğulları*, p. 42.

<sup>56</sup> Virginia Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman In War and Peace, Ahmet Resmi Efendi (1700-1783)*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995, pp. 174-175.

<sup>57</sup> For this campaign, see Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, pp. 63-80.

<sup>58</sup> Özkaya, “Canikli Ali Paşa”, pp. 516-518.

context in which Canikli dynasty rose to power and extended their dominions in the North and Eastern Anatolia. As pointed out, Ali Paşa controlled the revenues of Canik, Trabzon, Amasya and, to a certain extent, Tokad at the beginning and he was given wide range of additional administrative responsibilities during his commandership for the Crimean war front. This rise in his career was followed by other positions and offices that are significant for such a vizier recruited from the periphery. The second wave of promotions for Ali Paşa and his sons began when he was appointed as *Serasker* of Kars in 1776 and that of Crimea in 1777. Until he was declared a rebel in 1779, he was also assigned governorships of Erzurum and Sivas. He (or his sons) started to control Kastamonu and Karahisar-ı Şarki as well. It can be said that after Ali Paşa died, the control over this region (Canik, Trabzon, Amasya, Sivas, Erzurum, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Kastamonu) was inherited by his sons and grandson until 1808.

#### The Rebellion of Ali Paşa: Struggle between the Caniklizâdes and the Çapanoğlus

A new stage in the history of the family began when the Çapanoğlus<sup>59</sup> felt threatened from the north and eastern part of Bozok by the Caniklizâdes who were enlarging their territory at the expense of their area of influence. The basic reason behind this conflict between them was the right to collect the tax revenues

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<sup>59</sup> Çapanoğulları dynasty was from a Turcoman origin and settled in Bozok province at the end of the seventeenth century and then rose to power in Central Anatolia by obtaining the offices of *voyvoda* and *mütesellim* of the *sancak* of Bozok and of Kayseri, Çankırı, Çorum, Niğde as a reward of their services such as the repression of bandits, providing security and order in the region. See Mert, *XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoğulları*; Özkaya, “XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Yerli Ailelerin Ayanlıkları Ele Geçirışleri ve Büyük Hanedanlıkların Kuruluşu”, *Belleten*, XLII/168, 1978, pp. 701-5; Yücel Özkaya, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Mütesellimlik Müessesesi”, *A. Ü. Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi*, XXVIII/3-4, 1970, pp. 373-374.

belonging to Amasya, Sivas and Tokat. The tension between two dynasties accelerated when Çapanoğlu Mustafa Bey did not send soldiers and provisions requested by the government for the campaign of Crimea.<sup>60</sup> It is possible that the failure of Ali Paşa in Crimea in 1778 was partly due to the efforts by Çapanoğlus to undermine the provisioning of soldiers and war materials that Ali Paşa desperately needed during the campaign.

It is in this context that Ali Paşa lost his authority among the people in his region and the support of the government.<sup>61</sup> In addition, the local notables of Amasya complained about the oppression of Mikdad Ahmed and sought protection by the Çapanoğlu family. For that reason, government discharged Mikdad Ahmed from the governorship and ordered him to return what he had appropriated from the local notables illegally. Çapanoğlu Mustafa, who had the rank of *mirahor-ı sani*, sent a letter to Mikdad Paşa, who had the title of vizier-Paşa, to obey the order of the government. So, the latter reacted to the formers' intervention by attacking his lands. Mustafa defeated Mikdad's forces at Zile in 1779 and entered Amasya.<sup>62</sup> Upon this incident, Ali Paşa started to collect soldiers and occupied some of the places which were under the control of the Çapanoğlus. Although Ali Paşa was ordered by the government to withdraw his forces, he replied with an uncompromising letter stating that "if you do not execute Çapanoğlu I will eliminate him".<sup>63</sup> Moreover, he openly declared his independence and autonomy by stating that "from now on, I do not have anything

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<sup>60</sup> Mert, *XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoğulları*, pp. 42-45.

<sup>61</sup> Yücel Özkaya, "Anadoludaki Büyük Hanedanlıklar", *Belleten*, LVI/217, 1992, pp. 813-4.

<sup>62</sup> Mert, *XVIII ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoğulları*, pp. 42-45.

<sup>63</sup> İsmail H. Uzunçarşılı, "Çapanoğulları", *Belleten*, 38/150, 1974, p. 222.



to do with state, I can do whatever I want and destruct any land I wish”<sup>64</sup>. In the end, Ali Paşa was declared as rebel and his rank of a vizier was withdrawn.

Although Canikli Ali Paşa and his son Battal Hüseyin escaped to Crimea in 1779, the conflict between two dynasties continued to be a big issue for the government until 1780. This can be followed from the *mühimme* registers, which contain orders sent to the governors and other administrative and judicial officials of the region to re-establish the authority of the center. It seems that the rivalry between these dynasties manifested the extent of the social support that Ali Paşa had in the Canik<sup>65</sup> and Trabzon region. His followers, composed of relatives and some adherents in Canik who hoped that Ali Paşa would return soon, attacked the Çapanoğlus and forced them to retreat from Canik. This attack was considered as a rebellion by the government since the Çapanoğlus were appointed from the center. Secondly, the supporters of Ali Paşa in Trabzon were composed of lesser ayâns, like the Şatırzâdes and some bandit leaders<sup>66</sup> who established fortresses in the region.

The central government appears to have developed two policies towards the rivalry between the two dynasties. First, the Çapanoğlus were assigned with the responsibility of catching and executing Canikli Ali Paşa, whose independent actions and non-compliance with the orders sent from the center were interpreted

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<sup>64</sup> “Benim fımabaad devlet ile işim yoktur, istediğimi işlerim ve nice memleket harap ederim”. Uzunçarşılı, “Çapanoğulları”, p. 222.

<sup>65</sup> After he became fugitive, an order was sent by the state to bring his son-in-law (*damad*) Sadullah to İstanbul. However, the inhabitants of Canik resisted this order. In the document, it is stated that this was the sign of their loyalty to Ali Paşa. *Cevdet Dahiliye* 3739 (1780).

<sup>66</sup> Guguoğlu Süleyman, Bahadıroğlu Mehmed, Sakaoğlu Ali, Güvenikoğlu Mehmed, Polathane serdarı Hasan were among the leaders of bandits who supported Ali Paşa. See Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, pp. 119-121.

as a rebellion.<sup>67</sup> In other words, the state sought a policy of keeping the balance among the powerful dynasties by using one dynasty against the other. While fostering competition among them, the central government resorted to its second tool, that of confiscation or *müsadere*. The Ottoman treasury seized the cash, valuables and military equipment such as weapons, animals and tents belonging to the Caniklizâdes. While the cash and valuables were sent to the Ottoman treasury by ship, the livestock, cereals, farms and property of the family were auctioned locally and the cash amount provided from it was also sent to the central treasury.<sup>68</sup>

In 1781, however, Ali Paşa was pardoned and reinstated his rank with the mediation of the Grand vizier İzzet Mehmet Paşa.<sup>69</sup> He once more established his influence in his old area of domination. This time he served as the *muhassıl* of Canik, governor of Trabzon and Erzurum until his death in 1785.

As far as we know, Ali Paşa had seven children; five sons (Battal Hüseyin, Mikdad Ahmed, Mehmed Emin<sup>70</sup>, Ali<sup>71</sup> and İshak Bey<sup>72</sup>) and two daughters.<sup>73</sup> We

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<sup>67</sup> Ali Paşa returned from Crimea without a war in 1778 in spite of the commands of the Sultan. Moreover, his son, Mikdad Ahmed did not apply the orders of the government that demanded the protection of the fortress of Soğucak. See Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, pp. 105-15.

<sup>68</sup> See chapter five for the confiscation.

<sup>69</sup> Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa", p. 515. After his grand vizierate, Yeğen Mehmed Paşa and Halil Paşa also supported Ali Paşa against Sultan Abdülhamid I, who blamed Ali Paşa and Şahin Giray for making alliance with the Russians. Moreover, it is claimed that Ali Paşa applied to the Russian Tsarina Catherine for protection and offered help against the Ottoman state. In the same way, his son, Battal Hüseyin suggested to Şahin Giray to command the army in his side. This information is taken by Karagöz from Alan W. Fischer who used Russian sources. See Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 143. For the same line of this argument, see Josef Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 9, İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1992, p. 25.

<sup>70</sup> He was seen as holder of tax-farm of Samsun and its dependents (*mukata'a-i Samsun and tevabiha*) between 1778 and 1782. See *DBŞM 3815* and *Cevdet Maliye 2241*.

<sup>71</sup> Süreyya claims that Ali Paşa had another son called Ali Bey who died in 1796/97 and he was interred in Tekke of Yahyazâde in Eyüp. *Sicill-i Osmani*, I, p. 286.

<sup>72</sup> *DBŞM-MHF 4932* was the register of confiscated goods of Canikli Ali Paşa. In this register, his son İshak Bey was referred to as "*müteveffa*" in 1779.

do not know much about his children except those who held important offices after Ali Paşa's death.

The dynasty of Canikli Ali Paşa was succeeded by his two sons Mikdad Ahmed Paşa (executed in 1792) and Battal Hüseyin Paşa (died in 1801). Below, some brief information about Mikdad Ahmed and Battal Hüseyin will be given to complete the picture of the spread of the political power of the Caniklizâdes.

#### Mikdad Ahmed Paşa

Although he lived only thirty-three years, he held significant posts in a life full of ups and downs. His title of a vizier was revoked by the State three times and granted again. His governorships and other significant posts ranged geographically from Sivas, Erzurum, Trabzon, Amasya to Karaman, Aleppo, Çorum and Diyarbakir.

According to the archival sources, his first official post was the *mütesellimlik* of Amasya in 1775. Two years later, he became *mutasarrıf* of Amasya.<sup>74</sup> As stated before, during his stay in this office as well as others before him, complaints by the population both to the center and to the Çapanoğlu Mustafa Bey increased. When the latter aimed to protect these people against Mikdad Ahmed Bey, the strife between the two families began. As referred to

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<sup>73</sup> After he escaped to Crimea, his relatives were sent to İstanbul. The document is revealing the fact that Mehmed Paşa (son of Süleyman Paşa), the wife of Süleyman Paşa, his *cariyes* and his son-in-law (Sadullah Bey) were sent to İstanbul and monthly, 75 *kuruş* was given them for their rent of house. *Cevdet Zaptiye 1208* (1781). Moreover, he had another son-in-law, İbrahim. Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa", p. 507 and Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 128.

<sup>74</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 22.

above, this struggle ended with Ali Paşa's escape to Russia and Mikdad Ahmed's imprisonment in the fortress of Seddülbahir in Çanakkale in 1779.<sup>75</sup>

He was made vizier when his big brother Battal Hüseyin was promoted to the rank of *kapıcıbaşı*, with their father's appointment to the post of the commandership of Crimea during the Russian-Ottoman war in 1778. He was appointed governor of Sivas in return for the defence of the fortress of Soğucak in this war with the title of vizierate when he was eighteen years of age. This contributed to the acceleration of the conflict between the Caniklizâdes and the Çapanoğlus who resented this appointment. In 1779, we see Mikdad Ahmed Paşa first as the governor of Trabzon, then that of Erzurum. With the declaration of his father as a rebel, all ranks held by the members of the family was taken back and the wealth of the family was confiscated by the state.

Mikdad Ahmed Paşa was made vizier for the second time when the family was pardoned. He was appointed as the governor of Erzurum and the subprovince of Amasya was given him as *arpalık* in 1781.<sup>76</sup> One year later, he was seen as the *mutasarrıf* of Çorum and then the governor of Karaman.<sup>77</sup> In 1784, he became the governor of Trabzon and a year later, he was appointed governor of *Trablusşam* with the responsibility to command the military forces to *Cerde*. In the same year, he was once more transferred to Sivas, then due to his strife with the Çapanoğlus, he was sent to Diyarbekir as governor. Finally, he was assigned the governorship of Konya (1786), Sivas (1786) and Aleppo (1787).<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 168.

<sup>76</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 59, p. 36.

<sup>77</sup> Mert, "Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi", p. 152.

<sup>78</sup> Mert, "Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi", p. 152.

During the 1787-1792 Ottoman-Russian war, Mikdad Ahmed Paşa held important military responsibilities in the Rumelian frontier. Upon his failure there, his rank of vizierate was taken back in 1787-8. Although in 1790 he was again appointed as *sürücü* (soldier-recruiter) for the campaign, because of his neglect and failure, he was exiled to Filibe. As stated above, his brother Battal Hüseyin Paşa also neglected his campaign to Anapa. When this place was lost to the Russians in 1791, the Ottoman administration decided to execute the Caniklizâdes who were assigned substantial revenue and many offices. In 1792, two members of the dynasty (Mikdad Ahmed and Hayreddin Ragıp, the son of Battal Hüseyin) were executed and their wealth was confiscated by the state. The son of Mikdad Ahmed Paşa, Hasan Bey was sent to Çanakkale. Mikdad Ahmed had a daughter (Safiye) and another son (Hüseyin).

#### Battal Hüseyin Paşa

He was born in Trabzon. His life can be evaluated in three parts; in the first part, before his father died in 1785, he functioned as *mütesellim*, *voyvoda* of his father's governorship areas.

He was first appointed by his father as the *mütesellim* of Amasya in 1774. Upon his arrival, he imprisoned and even killed some of the notables of Amasya. Furthermore, he expropriated the goods of these people. The Caniklizâdes seemed to have exploited their position as *mutasarrıf* (tax-collector) of Amasya to an

unbearable level. They used force<sup>79</sup> against the local notables and *ulema* of Amasya population.<sup>80</sup> As a result, the latter sent petitions about their oppression. The central government had no means other than revoking their life-time tax-farm of Amasya. At that time, the best solution was the change of *mütesellim* of Amasya. This time, the smaller son of Ali Paşa, Mikdad Ahmed Bey, was appointed as *mütesellim* in 1775. But the complaints from the local people increased. Although the state took the tax-farm back from Ali Paşa in the same year<sup>81</sup>, two years later Mikdad Ahmed Bey was appointed as *mutasarrıf* of Amasya. At that time, revoking the tax-farm did not seem to be a solution for the state since Ali Paşa, as *Serasker* of Kars, controlled a great number of soldiers and therefore had enough military power to threaten the state.<sup>82</sup>

Secondly, Battal Hüseyin Bey was appointed as *mütesellim* of the *sancak* of Canik in 1777<sup>83</sup>, when his father was in Erzurum as the military commander of Kars. He was given responsibilities such as the repression of the banditry, maintaining security and order in the region, punishment of disturbants. Thirdly, he functioned as the *voyvoda* of Karahisar-ı Şarki in 1776.<sup>84</sup> The documents dated 1777-1778 referred to him as Seyyid Battal Hüseyin Bey.<sup>85</sup> He was finally promoted to the rank of *kapıcıbaşı* in 1778 when his father was appointed as the

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<sup>79</sup> The use of force may have been the result of the difficulty of the tax collection. For example, they could not collect the *seferiye* and *hazeriye* taxes for two years (1772-1774). Another reason for their use of force could be about the strategic position of Amasya being a transit place to Anatolia. Amasya was the major contesting area between the Caniklizâdes and the Çapanoğlu.

<sup>80</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 21.

<sup>81</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 22.

<sup>82</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye 12500* : “Of kazasının üzerine gireceğim deyü başına hayli asker cem etmiş olduğu”.

<sup>83</sup> The office of “*mütesellim* of *sancak* of Canik” was used interchangeably with the *vekil* of muhassıllık of Canik. Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 18.

<sup>84</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 166.

commander of Crimea (second time).<sup>86</sup> As noted earlier, he escaped to Russia with his father who was declared a rebel.

After his father was pardoned, Battal Hüseyin Bey was reinstated the rank of *kapıcıbaşı*. A new page in his of life started in 1785 when his father died and he was promoted to the rank of vizierate. At the same time he was appointed as the *serasker* for the Eastern campaign and governor of Erzurum.<sup>87</sup> In 1787, the governorship of Trabzon was added to his offices.<sup>88</sup>

Battal Hüseyin Paşa was then assigned to carry out the service of “mir-el-Hac” as the governor of Damascus<sup>89</sup> and given the province of Aleppo in 1786.<sup>90</sup> In the following year, we see him as the governor of Trabzon (2<sup>nd</sup>).<sup>91</sup>

#### 1790 Campaign and the “Rebellion” in Canik

1787-1792 Ottoman-Russian war led to the second wave of dispersion, executions and confiscation in the history of the Caniklizâdes. In this war, Battal Hüseyin Paşa and his son Tayyar Mahmud Paşa were assigned to defend Caucasus and Anapa against the Russians but they disregarded their supporters as well as the

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<sup>85</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 27435.

<sup>86</sup> Mert, “Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi”, p. 151.

<sup>87</sup> Mert, “Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi”, p. 152 and Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 3, p. 719.

<sup>88</sup> Mert, “Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi”, p. 152.

<sup>89</sup> He was also assigned the revenues of the tax-farm of Trablusşam to compensate his services in 1786-1787. One year later, he demanded 1 *yük* 4597 *kuruş* plus 4400 *kuruş* from the central treasury and he argued that the population and *mütesellim* of this tax-farm owed to him that amount of debt. Moreover, his *hazinedar* Lütfullah was killed by the population and his goods were expropriated. In that amount of debt, the compensation for his goods was included. In the end, this money was not paid to him. The account was balanced with his debt amounted 384.123 *kuruş* for *bedel-i muhallefât* of his father. *Cevdet Maliye* 6239 (1201)

<sup>90</sup> Mert, “Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi”, p. 152.

<sup>91</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 166.

Sultan and entered into the service of the Russians in the end.<sup>92</sup> Although Battal Hüseyin Paşa was appointed as the commander of Anapa and Soğucak as early as March 1788, he did not reach the region until the summer of 1789.<sup>93</sup> Stanford Shaw argues that he arrived in Anapa in March 1790 and then successfully dispersed the Russian attack, but failed to help the rebellious Kabartay and Caucasian tribes as he was ordered to do. After the repeated orders from İstanbul, he left Anapa on August 1790 with a large army to aid Kabartay tribes against the Russians. He moved as slowly as possible and did not reach Koban River until 14 September. It is argued that in return for a substantial bribe from the Russian commander, Battal Paşa refused the participation of the Kabartay army of 30.000 men to join him. Instead, he sent a small force of his own men against the Russians, who were defeated and pushed back to Anapa. Battal Paşa was captured by the Russians allegedly in accordance with the secret agreement<sup>94</sup> and stayed in Russia until 1799.<sup>95</sup> In fact, the Russian government provided a residence in Bahçesaray and a yearly salary for Battal Paşa. He wrote a letter to his son Tayyar, who was able to escape from Russia and went to Giresun. In this letter, Battal Paşa requested his son to return to Russia and informed him about the opportunity of an official rank and a yearly salary of 6000 ruble.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New, The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 216.

<sup>93</sup> Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi Ocaklarından Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998, pp. 85-89.

<sup>94</sup> Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 58.

<sup>95</sup> Mert, "Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi", p. 152.

<sup>96</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 12583* (1783). For the reaction of Tayyar Bey to his father's letter, see p. 68 below.



After his defeat in 1790, the *kethüda* of Battal Paşa, Abdullah Paşa, was appointed as the governor of Erzurum and Trabzon with the responsibility of commanding the military force to take Anapa back from the Russians.<sup>97</sup> It was highly likely that there was a competition between Battal Paşa and Abdullah who was trained in the household of his father and served Ali Paşa as *kethüda*. Battal Paşa had been reluctant to go to Anapa because he did not want to leave the Canik region to Abdullah.<sup>98</sup> About ten years previously, when Ali Paşa escaped to Crimea, his retinue and *kethüda* Abdullah was sent to İstanbul for security reasons. In İstanbul, Abdullah lived in the retinue of Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa together with Yusuf Paşa who would later become Grand Vizier.<sup>99</sup> Therefore, Abdullah and Yusuf Paşa already knew each other. This was also a factor in the appointment of Abdullah as the *serasker* of Anapa with the title of *mir-mirân* in 1790, under the Grand Vizierate of Koca Yusuf Paşa.<sup>100</sup>

When Battal Paşa failed in the campaign of Anapa and was taken captive by the Russians, the Ottoman state stripped him of his ranks and offices. This time, his other son, Hayreddin Bey, was seen as suitable by the center to collect the taxes from Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki, taxes which were particularly important for the provisioning of the ongoing campaign. It was probably because of the significance of the provisions for the campaign and the raw material for the Imperial Navy that Hayreddin was chosen from among the Caniklizâdes to

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<sup>97</sup> Mert, “Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi”, p. 152.

<sup>98</sup> Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi Ocaklarından Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, p. 89.

<sup>99</sup> Şakir Şevket, prepared by İsmail Hacıfettahoğlu, *Trabzon Tarihi*, Trabzon Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, (Atlas Yayıncılık), 2001, p. 167.

<sup>100</sup> İsmail Hami Danişmend, *Osmanlı Devlet Erkânı*, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1971, p. 68.

continue the tax-collection. Hayreddin Bey was then appointed as the *muhasıl* of Canik for the security of the delivery of the provisions.

However, the period of 1790-1792 were turbulent years in the region. Following the escape of Battal Paşa, there emerged a power vacuum which led to a “rebellion” in Canik.<sup>101</sup> This was resulted from the struggle between Abdullah (*kethüda* of Battal Paşa) and Hayreddin Bey over what was left from Battal Paşa. Although Hayreddin Bey was named as the *muhasıl* of Canik in 1790-1, he was not promoted to the rank of Vizier. Instead, he remained *kapıcıbaşı* at the beginning since the primary concern of the state was the delivery of provisions for the campaign, not causing a new problem. In fact, Hayreddin Bey had his representative in İstanbul, who carried out negotiations with the government to obtain a vizierate for him.<sup>102</sup> Abdullah Paşa, the *kethüda* of Canikli Ali and Battal Paşas, attempted to make use of the power vacuum and chaos in Canik to his advantage. The competition between Hayreddin Bey and Abdullah Paşa eventually resulted in a revolt in the region of Canik.

After Hayreddin was appointed as the *muhasıl* of Canik, Abdullah Paşa ordered the local forces to attack him. These forces were led by the commander (*bölükbaşı*, Kara Mustafa) of fugitive Battal Paşa and other known local figures. Hayreddin Bey was now under attack by his father’s forces with the orders given by Abdullah Paşa. He was forced to escape to Sinop by ship. He stayed there under the protection of the commander of Sinop, Süleyman Feyzi Paşa, until a

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<sup>101</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 11253.*

<sup>102</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 7590.* The mediator with the government was İbiş Ağa, who served as *matbah emini* in the palace at that time. He offered to pay 1000 purses of piasters if Hayreddin was assigned the rank of Vizier.

new order arrived from the center.<sup>103</sup> Since Hayreddin was not able to return to Canik, he went to his mansion (*konak*) in the district of Çarşamba with a few people from his household by resigning from his office in Canik. When the Ottoman government assigned him the rank of *mirmirân*, he was on his way back to Sinop.<sup>104</sup> Abdullah Paşa eventually succeeded in preventing Hayreddin Bey from delivering provisions to the Anapa and was appointed as the governor of Trabzon and Erzurum to defend the fortress of Anapa against the Russians. However, he delayed his arrival in Anapa and he extended his stay in Trabzon, struggling against lesser notables and *derebeys* to consolidate his power and authority in the region.<sup>105</sup> In fact, these events were heard of in the official circles in İstanbul and led to the interpretation that Abdullah Paşa encouraged these events to delay his arrival in Anapa and to help the Russians.<sup>106</sup>

On the other hand, these struggles revealed the fact that Hayreddin Bey did not have the support of the Canik population. After these events in Canik, the people sent the government a petition and demanded the appointment of an official from the center as the *muhassıl* of Canik. They complained that “they had been the slaves of the family of Hacı Ali Paşa for fifty years” and requested that their next administrator would not be from this family.<sup>107</sup> The lack of local support especially for Hayreddin Bey and for the Canikli dynasty was significant. Moreover, the reports sent to the Ottoman government inform us firstly that

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<sup>103</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 11477.*

<sup>104</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 5251 (1792).*

<sup>105</sup> Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, p. 167.

<sup>106</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 11253.* “Canik ihtilaline sebep Abdullah olduğu ve bu kadar tekid olunmuş iken...Anapa’ya geçmediği ve bu ihtilalleri ancak Anapa’ya geçmemek için ihdas eylediği...”

<sup>107</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 5251.*

Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa established his authority over the “tribes” who were not easily subordinated and paid the taxes regularly. The reports also give us information about the serious conflict between Hayreddin Bey and his father Battal Paşa. It was claimed that Hayreddin Bey was always in opposition to his father and Battal Paşa was eager to execute his son. Apart from these negative characteristics of Hayreddin Bey, it was asserted that he was successful in serving the Ottoman state and remained loyal to the government.<sup>108</sup>

As a result, Battal Paşa’s abandonment of the campaign, the flight of the Ottoman army, and the deliberate failure of Abdullah Paşa in arriving in Anapa caused the Caucasian tribes to give up their struggle against the Russians. In the end, Anapa fell into the hands of the Russians in 1791, and the Ottoman state lost its chance of retaining their possessions in the North-Eeastern Black Sea.<sup>109</sup> This military defeat resulted in the execution of Abdullah Paşa, Hayreddin Ragıp Paşa and Mikdad Ahmed Paşa in 1792 by the order of Selim III.<sup>110</sup>

The Caniklizâdes held no posts or offices in the period of 1792-1799. Battal Hüseyin Paşa, with his son Tayyar Mahmud, was in exile in Russia and he was distraught to hear that his brother and son were executed in 1792. Both Battal Paşa and Tayyar Paşa were very mobile and active members of the Canikli dynasty. They were partly successful in playing Russia against the Ottoman government or vice versa according to the circumstances. Tayyar Mahmud entered into the service of Russian general Suvorov, but in 1793 he was imprisoned under the pretext that he had a secret agreement with the Porte and

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<sup>108</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 11483*, the report sent by Ömer Paşazâde Abdullah Bey.

was attempting to organize a rebellion of Crimean Tatars against the Russians.<sup>111</sup> However, Tayyar Paşa was able to escape from Russia within a year. Since he was also accused by the Ottoman government of conspiracy, he could not return to İstanbul.<sup>112</sup> Instead, he first moved to Giresun and then to Boğdan, where he was not let in to stay. Therefore, he went to his old friend İbrahim Efendi, who was at that time the *defterdar* of Özi.<sup>113</sup> İbrahim Efendi wrote a report about Tayyar Bey and informed the Ottoman government about Tayyar's challenge to his father, Battal Paşa. He stated that Tayyar Bey refused the Russian government's offer of a rank and a salary in his reply to his father's letter. Tayyar Bey, hoping to be pardoned by the Ottoman government and to obtain the tax-farms of Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki, rebelled against his father and blamed him to be on the side of the Russians. He declared his allegiance to the Ottoman government as the servant and the slave of the Sultan.<sup>114</sup>

İbrahim Efendi was influential in the palace because of his previous service as the *kethüda* of the Sultan's sister, Şah Sultan. He can be considered as the protector of Tayyar and Battal Paşas and the representative of their interests in the center. The mediation of İbrahim Efendi together with the changing conjuncture helped the father and the son to be pardoned by the Ottoman government. In 1799, the Ottoman state signed a peace treaty with Russia when

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<sup>109</sup> Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 59.

<sup>110</sup> Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, p. 169; Mert, "Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi", p. 152.

<sup>111</sup> Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 216.

<sup>112</sup> Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 216.

<sup>113</sup> İbrahim Efendi wrote a detailed report about Tayyar Bey to the central government. See *Hatt-ı Hümayun 12583*.

<sup>114</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 12583*.

France occupied Egypt. This was an important factor that contributed to their pardoning, one should of course not forget the mediation of Tsar Pavel I.<sup>115</sup>

Under these circumstances, Battal Hüseyin Paşa was reappointed by the government to the post of governorship of Trabzon in 1799.<sup>116</sup> He soon left the governorship of Trabzon to his son Tayyar Mahmud, and himself held the office of *muhassıllık* of Canik and governorship of Erzurum until his death in 1801.

As far as we know, Battal Hüseyin Paşa had a wife with the name Fatma<sup>117</sup> and three sons; Seyyid Hayreddin Ragıp Paşa, Tayyar Mahmud Paşa and Seyyid Ali Bey.<sup>118</sup>

### III. Last Generation in Power up to *Sened-i İttifak*: Tayyar Mahmud Paşa

Tayyar Mahmud was the last representative and perhaps the most colorful person among the Caniklizâdes; he attained the highest post in the family, the rank of deputy for Grand Vizierate (*sadaret kaymakamlığı*) just before his execution in 1808.

When his father died in 1801 with a debt of a thousand purses (1000 *kise*) to the treasury and the bankers, Tayyar Mahmud was fighting against bandits in Rumelia. The Ottoman government could not send an inspector for the inheritance

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<sup>115</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 168.

<sup>116</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 3, p. 719; Mert, “Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi”, p. 152.

<sup>117</sup> *DBŞM-MHF* 95/137.

<sup>118</sup> The only information about Seyyid Ali Bey is that he held shares of the tax-farms of Karahisar-ı Şarki and Tamzara in 1784. *Cevdet Maliye* 2241 and *DBŞM-MHF* 95/135.

of Battal Paşa in order not to antagonize with Tayyar Bey who were urgently needed in the repression of revolts in the Balkans.<sup>119</sup> Instead, he was assured that the possessions of the Canikli dynasty would be assigned to him. Tayyar Paşa returned to Anatolia to take over the family dominions, becoming the *muhassıl* of Canik and then the governor of Trabzon with a title Vizier.<sup>120</sup> He was also appointed temporarily as the governor of Diyarbakır (1801-2) and of Erzurum (September-October 1803) in order that he would be supplied by the revenue resources of these regions what was needed for his duty of pursuing and capturing Gürcü Osman Paşa, former governor of Rumelia, who had now come to Anatolia and revolted. Tayyar carried out this task within a year.<sup>121</sup>

After this accomplishment, he demanded the governorship of Sivas from the Ottoman government in 1803. Since Selim III was suspicious that he might have contacted the Russians, he did not wish to give offices in the inner areas of Anatolia. He limited Tayyar to the Black Sea coast. This was mainly because of the fact that the Çapanoğlu dynasty had persuaded the Sultan that the Caniklizâde family was becoming too powerful and their revolt was inevitable unless their power remained limited. The Çapanoğlus would also expand their territories at the expense of Tayyar Paşa. Struggle between the Caniklizâdes and the Çapanoğlus revived in the period of 1805-1808.<sup>122</sup> During the reign of Selim III, the government backed the Çapanoğlus in this rivalry because of their active support

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<sup>119</sup> Sakaoğlu, *Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, p. 122.

<sup>120</sup> Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, p. 175. He claimed that Tayyar was the governor of Trabzon until 1805. But there is no evidence supporting this statement. It is known that he was appointed once more as the governor of Trabzon before 1805. See Mert, "Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi", p. 153.

<sup>121</sup> Shaw, *Between Old and New*, pp. 284-285.

for the establishment of the new army called *Nizam-ı Cedid*. Çapanoğlu Süleyman Bey promised to apply the new system in Amasya where traditionally the Canikli family had established their influence and power. He was then given the tax-farm of Amasya in return for the establishment of this new army in 1805<sup>123</sup>, while his son, Celaleddin Bey was appointed as the governor to Sivas.

Çapanoğlu Süleyman began to represent reform (*Nizam-ı Cedid*), whereas the grandson of Canikli Ali Paşa, Tayyar Mahmud began a campaign for a reactionary policy. He received the support of soldiers in Samsun and encouraged them to ally with his cause of opposition to the New Order. He became the leader of the Janissaries, whom he convinced to be against the recruitment for the new Üsküdar regiment.<sup>124</sup> Tayyar Paşa used various means to prevent the levy of soldiers from the province of Sivas by the Çapanoğlus. His followers in Merzifon, at his order, gave money to a few messengers from his retinue to spread the news of the dissolution of New Treasury (*İrad-ı Cedid*) in the region of Amasya-Tokad-Sivas. His ultimate aim was to invade Amasya and Kastamonu with his military force.<sup>125</sup>

As a result of Tayyar's reaction to the expansion of the Çapanoğlu's influence, the central government took Amasya from the Çapanoğlus back to

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<sup>122</sup> For the details of this conflict between the two families, see Uzunçarşılı, "Çapanoğulları", Mert, "XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoğulları", and Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*.

<sup>123</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun* 4079 (1805).

<sup>124</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun* 4048-G. It reads: "Samsun'da cem eylediği askere divan edüb 'sizin Üsküdar ocağına rabıt olmanızı ve fena elbise giymenizi reva görmediğimden cevap verdim. Siz ocağ-ı mezkura rabıt ve asker tahrir olunub fena elbise giymeye razı mısınız' deyü şedid ile dua-i İslam ederek hakkında hitab ve anlar dahi mümaşat edüb razı değil ve kabul etmeyiz deyü cevap verdiklerinde fımabad 'sizi ocağ-ı mezkura rabıt ettirib asker yazdırmam benimle ittıfak edermisiniz' dedikde ederiz demişler. Benimle ittıfak ettkden sonra ben dahi bildiğimi işlerim deyü..."

<sup>125</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun* 4048-G.



prevent a new conflict in Anatolia.<sup>126</sup> Moreover, Sultan Selim III ordered the Çapanoğlus not to intervene in Sivas-Amasya region which Tayyar Paşa had controlled.

Yet such a policy did not appease Tayyar Mahmud Paşa. He had many supporters and followers in Samsun, Trabzon, Amasya, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Gümüşhane and Tokat. A report written by Cihanzâde Hüseyin Bey, the former superintendant of Gümüşhane, gives information about the quality and quantity of Tayyar Paşa's military force.<sup>127</sup> First of all, it reveals the fact that Tayyar Paşa established his hegemony much more through force than consent. He bound some of the “*derebeys*” of the Gümüşhane region by appointing them as a commander (*buğ*) for himself and who were forced to accept his power and comply with his orders. Although both the residents and the “*derebeys*” of the region were discontent with his rule, they could not challenge Tayyar's administration, because his legitimacy depended on the central government's assignment of a rank.

According to Hüseyin's report, Tayyar Paşa's military force consisted mostly of *kazas*' soldiers (*kazalar askeri*), the infantry bands of the *kazas* of the sub-provinces of Trabzon, Amasya and Karahisar-ı Şarki, from a peasant background.<sup>128</sup> He succeeded in collecting 20.000 people from Trabzon and Canik under his flag.<sup>129</sup> The reporter argues that the obedience to Tayyar Paşa and the participation of these militias into his military retinue depended specifically on the

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<sup>126</sup> Mert, “Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi”, p. 153.

<sup>127</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 4051-D.*

<sup>128</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 4051-D.*

order of the central government and fear of his revenge. He informs the government that Tayyar Paşa also had some cavalry forces, which he refers to as “*Osmanlı atlısı*”, whose number did not exceed 2000. These cavalry forces were composed of some *delilbaşı* and *tüfenkçibaşı* such as Danabaş, Okyadmazoğlu, Çeçenoğlu, and Kadiçırağı, who were appointed like *ayan* to the subdistricts (*kazas*) by Tayyar Paşa.<sup>130</sup>

Tayyar Paşa had strong allies in Tokat as well. He got the support of those local notables in Tokat whose interests had been jeopardized by Çapanoğlu’s influence. Among these were Genç Ağa and Kasımağazâde El-Hac Mehmed. He also sought the support of Janissary notables of Tokat whose status had been threatened by Çapanoğlu Süleyman and the reforms of Selim III.<sup>131</sup> Lastly, Tayyar Paşa gathered the vagabonds and discontents of Kars, Van, Amasya, Sivas and Erzurum.<sup>132</sup>

Thus, Tayyar Paşa became entirely independent in his own provinces and destroyed the lands nearby to such an extent that he came to be known as the “chief of thieves” among Europeans living in İstanbul.<sup>133</sup> He continued to collect forces as political and ideological support from those who were against the New

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<sup>129</sup> A. F. Miller, *Mustapha Pacha Bayraktar*, Bucarest: Association Internationale D’études Du Sud-Est Européen, 1975, p. 110.

<sup>130</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 4051-D*. Hüseyin Bey also gives information about Tayyar Paşa’s opponents. He argues that Öküzogulları, one of the well-known dynasties of Sinop, had a revenge for Tayyar. Moreover, he informs that Tayyar and Tuzcuzâde Memiş Ağa had no friendly relationship. Although Tayyar Paşa nominated his steward’s (*kethüda*) daughter to the Tuzcuzâde’s son for a marriage to get Memiş Ağa’s support, the latter did not accept this rapprochement. This information is in conflict with other archival sources. For an argument about the Tuzcuzâde Memiş Ağa’s support to Tayyar Paşa, see *Hatt-ı Hümayun 4072*, *Hatt-ı Hümayun 4045-A* and Miller, *Mustafa Pacha Bayraktar*, p. 111.

<sup>131</sup> Duman, *Notables, Textiles and Copper In Ottoman Tokat, 1750-1840*, pp. 77-78.

<sup>132</sup> Miller, *Mustafa Pacha Bayraktar*, p. 110. See *Hatt-ı Hümayun 4072*, *Hatt-ı Hümayun 4072-A* for his followers in Erzurum.

Order including Şehzâde Mustafa as well as Yusuf Ağa and İbrahim Nesim Efendi, who were the powerful leaders of the secret opposition among the ministers.<sup>134</sup> In addition, he strengthened his forces and followers by declaring that his movement was in favour of the dissolution of the New Order with a *fetva* from the *Şeyhülislam*, promising to bring justice and the elimination of the Çapanoğlus. He attacked and took control of Tokad and Zile, where the Çapanoğlus were influential. In May 1805, all posts and titles that Tayyar Paşa held were suspended by the state and he was declared a rebel since the Sultan had a suspicion that he was also in contact with the Russians. Yusuf Ziya Paşa<sup>135</sup>, who had recently retired and now was nominated as the governor of Trabzon and Erzurum, was given the duty to eliminate Tayyar Paşa.<sup>136</sup>

First, the forces of Tayyar Paşa, under the commandership of Hasan Bey (son of Mikdad Ahmed Paşa) and that of the Çapanoğlus clashed and the former fled. The second clash occurred in Çorum and resulted once more in the defeat of Tayyar's forces. The third one was personally led by Yusuf Ziya Paşa and Hazinedarzâde Emin Bey, who were the opponents of the Caniklizâdes around Karahisar-ı Şarki and Canik.<sup>137</sup>

Under these circumstances, in July 1805, Tayyar Paşa asked for a pardon from the Sultan and promised to raise soldiers for the New Army if he was given

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<sup>133</sup> Shaw, *Between Old and New*, pp. 284-5.

<sup>134</sup> Shaw, *Between Old and New*, pp. 284-5.

<sup>135</sup> Shaw argues that Yusuf Ziya Paşa was sent to negotiate with Tayyar Paşa, offering a pardon if he would stop the rebellion. However, the opponents of Yusuf Ziya in İstanbul sent their messengers to Tayyar to undermine Yusuf Ziya Paşa by telling him that if the revolt continued long enough, the Sultan would be forced to give Tayyar large sums of money and his old posts. *Between Old and New*, p. 285.

<sup>136</sup> Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 153.

Trabzon, Sivas and Kastamonu provinces. The Sultan declined the request and Tayyar Paşa's forces were finally defeated by the forces of Yusuf Ziya Paşa. Tayyar escaped to the fortress of Sohum and then to the Crimea.<sup>138</sup>

This troubles did not end after his escape. He maintained his relations with his partisans in the regions of Trabzon and Canik. From among them, the Tuzcuzâde Memiş Ağa and the Şatırzâdes were the most influential ones. The Russian consular of Sinop reported that in February 1806, some of the followers of Tayyar in Canik region armed themselves against Yusuf Ziya Paşa. Under these conditions of brewing trouble in the region, the central government ordered the destruction of the buildings and institutions constructed by Tayyar Paşa, including even a mosque. Another order was sent to exile the inhabitants, who were the partisans and followers of Tayyar Paşa and had rebelled against the central authority. They were to be replaced by Kurdish tribes, if they refused to live under the central authority.<sup>139</sup>

Tayyar Paşa's attempt to organize a rebellion against the central forces in Canik was unsuccessful. At that time, his nephew Hasan Bey (son of Mikdad Ahmed) was executed.<sup>140</sup>

According to one account<sup>141</sup>, Tayyar Paşa later came to Trabzon on a Russian ship together with his steward Emin Ağa and a Russian commander and

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<sup>137</sup> Uzunçarşılı, "Çapanoğulları", pp. 239-244.

<sup>138</sup> Tayyar Paşa took refuge with Gülşen Bey in the fortress of Sohum. Afterwards, two notables, Kalcioğlu and Tuzcuzâdes together supplied a large merchant ship (weighted 1500 *kile*) with experienced non-muslim seamen and sent them to Tayyar Paşa, who was waiting in the fortress of Sohum. He, with his seven servants, moved to the Crimea. *Hatt-ı Hümayun 4045-A*. He arrived the Crimea in the autumn of 1805 and he was welcomed by the Russian authorities, who thought to profit from his influence later on. See Miller, *Mustafa Pacha Bayraktar*, p. 110.

<sup>139</sup> Miller, *Mustafa Pacha Bayraktar*, p. 111.

<sup>140</sup> Mert, "Canikli Hacı Ali Paşa Ailesi", p. 153.

threatened Trabzon by firing a canon. At that time, the notables of the city gathered and the steward of Tayyar Paşa came with a letter stating that he had been pardoned by the state upon the demand by the population for Tayyar Paşa to return. However, the steward was killed.

Şakir Şevket claimed that Tayyar Paşa had written a letter to the governor of Baghdad, Ali Paşa, after he escaped to Russia. In this letter, he demanded amnesty from the state, explaining why he had escaped to Russia, while at the same time using Islamic discourse to explain why he was against the New Order. In this letter, he had cited the followers of the New Order as his enemy calling them “bandits”: steward of Valide Sultan Yusuf Ağa, Hacı İbrahim Efendi, Köse Kethüda (steward of Alemdar Mustafa Paşa) as well as high members of *ulema* and his major opponent Yusuf Ziya Paşa.<sup>142</sup>

With the rebellion of Kabakçı Mustafa in May 1807, the New Order was abolished and Sultan Selim III was dethroned. When Mustafa IV came to power, Tayyar Paşa was pardoned and returned to İstanbul by a Russian ship in October 1807.<sup>143</sup> He was granted the governorship of Trabzon by the government and his control over Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki continued. In the last month of the same year, he was appointed as the deputy Grand Vizier (*Sadaret Kaymakamı*) and he stayed in this post only for thirty days.<sup>144</sup> Then in march 1808, he was dismissed

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<sup>141</sup> Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, p. 181-2. The author received this information from the notable of Trabzon, Kalcızâde Hacı Ömer Bey’s father Memiş Ağa, who was alive when he wrote his history of Trabzon.

<sup>142</sup> Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, pp. 178-179; Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, 4, İstanbul: Üçdal Yayınları, 1984, pp. 1976-1978.

<sup>143</sup> Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, pp. 180-181.

<sup>144</sup> Kemal Beydilli, *Osmanlı Döneminde İmamlar ve Bir İmanın Günlüğü*, İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2001, p. 182.

from this post and Hacı Mustafa Efendi, who was the former steward of a vizier, replaced Tayyar Paşa.

His conflict with Şeyhülislam Mehmed Ataullah Efendi as well as his competition with Grand Vizier Çelebi Mustafa Paşa led to his fall from power. His last rank was conceived as a direct threat to the interests of many parties and it was feared that if he stay in this office, he would promote into the Grand Vizierate.<sup>145</sup> A coalition of Tayyar Paşa's opponents, consisted of *Rusçuk yaranı* (who were the followers of the New Order and tried to prevent the execution of Selim III), Grand Vizier, Çapanoğlu and Yusuf Ziya Paşa, led to the exile of Tayyar Paşa to Dimetoka with his retinue in March 1808.<sup>146</sup> A few days later, his rank of vizierate was taken back and he was sent to Hacı Pazarı, this time without his retinue. Tayyar Paşa got in touch with Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, who was in opposition to the Grand Vizier and managed the appointment of Tayyar Paşa to the commandership of Varna.<sup>147</sup>

Alemdar Mustafa Paşa came to İstanbul in July 1808 for the purpose of reinstating Selim III, but Selim was killed before his arrival. As a result, Mahmud II became the Sultan and Tayyar Paşa was executed in August 1808.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Ahmed Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, 2, pp. 140-142, 162, 174-175.

<sup>146</sup> Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, 2, pp. 140-142, 162, 174-175.

<sup>147</sup> Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, 2, p. 166; Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, pp. 180-181; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail, Yılıkoğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbası, 1942, p. 93.

As already seen above, the Caniklizâdes' official posts were concentrated on the regions of Canik, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Trabzon, Erzurum, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, Kastamonu, Gümüşhane. Their control over these regions was closely related with their military duties. The governorship of these regions as well as the collection of taxes was transferred to the Caniklizâdes by the Ottoman state for the financement of campaigns. The ongoing conflicts and wars with Russia provided the ground for the rise of the Caniklizâdes as well as other local notables such as Köse Paşa, who were recruited from the periphery with the rank of Paşa-vizier. In other words, these intensive war years in the last quarter of the eighteenth century led to the emergence of a new Paşa-vizier type, who were integrated into the ruling establishment of the Ottoman state from the periphery. Therefore, this proves the tie between the military need of the central state and the distribution of official posts and offices, especially in the case of the Caniklizâdes. They were the key figures in the defense of the empire in the eastern Anatolia and northern Black Sea.

Like the other dynastic notables in Ottoman Anatolia such as Karaosmanoğlus and Çapanoğlus, the Caniklizâdes rose from a small local notable family into a dynastic and imperial elite of the empire. This can be followed from their appointment from one high offices such as governorships to the another and their highly mobile character, which was the distinguishing characteristics of the imperial elites. The Caniklizâdes had a high degree of mobility because of the major responsibility of the members of the Caniklizâdes

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<sup>148</sup> As far as the archives document, Tayyar Paşa had sons who lived in Amasya. *Hatt-ı Hümayun*

in the Russian-Ottoman wars of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792, not only as contributors of soldiers, provisions, animals and other supplies to the war front, but also as military commanders in the wars.

Except for the *muhasıllık* of Canik and governorship of Trabzon, it seems that the Caniklizâdes' control over Sivas and Erzurum at the governor level was a loose one. It depended on the conjuncture and the balance of power between the center and periphery. The assignment of the administration of these places by the state to Caniklizâdes was mostly through negotiation. It can be said that their presence in these provinces was often subject to changes that they could not penetrate into the local level.

The real center for the Caniklizâdes was Samsun, especially Bafra and the *muhasıllık* of Canik was in the hands of the family irrespective of the negotiation or exchange between the center and the dynasty. Amasya, on the one hand, was a major area contested between the Çapanoğlus and the Caniklizâdes. Moreover, because of this competition, the Canikli dynasty tried to implement a more forceful policy towards the small local notables and population to counteract the influence of the Çapanoğlus. The inhabitants of Amasya were divided between the two dynasties. The coercion of one dynasty often resulted in the protection of the other. The Caniklizâdes seemed to legitimize their rule over the population by means of both force and consensus. Mikdad Ahmed Paşa and Tayyar Mahmud Paşa attempted to determine and even change the appointment of *müfti* and other



*ulema* positions in their regions. This shows their presence at local level other than the tax-collection activities.



## CHAPTER THREE

### THE ECONOMIC POWER OF THE CANIKLİZÂDES

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the economic rise of the Caniklizâdes as one of the Anatolian provincial dynasties in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. The Caniklizâdes owed their status to the administrative and military posts they held during the second half of this century as seen in the previous chapter. The assignment of these state offices was closely related with their economic rise. Caniklizâde's standing in the empire as governors, commanders, etc. became the tool for the extension of economic power and resulted in the consolidation and diversification of their revenue sources. In the first part of this chapter, how the Caniklizâdes as one of the provincial households established contact with the central government with regards to the office-holding and tax collection rights will be explored. The role of the *kapı kethüdas* and *sarrafs* will also be analysed in relation to their standing in the Empire as office-holders and tax-farmers. The second part outlines the revenue sources, mainly tax-farms (*mukata'as*), controlled by the Caniklizâdes in the North-Eastern part of the Empire with particular emphasis on the family's monopoly on the tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik. It shows the parallelism between the political manifestation of the Caniklizâde's political rise and the expansion of their economic power, especially in the 1770s and 1780s. The conflict and the rivalry between the Caniklizâdes and the Çapanoğlus over the tax-farms of the province of Amasya is also analysed in

this part, paying particular attention to the role of the *reaya*, who took active part in this struggle by showing their discontent with the abuses of power of both families in the region.

### I. The Network: The *Kapı Kethüdası*, the *Sarrafs* and the Caniklizâdes

As pointed out at the beginning, the life-term tax-farming system (*malikâne* system) was the dominant form of redistribution of revenues in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. This system brought about a new type of relations between the center and periphery through the share of tax revenues between the *malikâne*-holders and the *mültezims* (sub-contractors, usually the local notables).

The life-term hereditary tax-farming system involves a very complex network of relationships among different parties. It also necessitated the involvement of two actors, the *kapı kethüdası* and the *sarrafs*, in the redistribution of revenues among the central treasury, the *malikâne*-holder and the *mültezim*. These two actors occupied a central place in the new financial structure of the empire especially in the second half of the eighteenth century due to the need for cash and a sophisticated system of credits and cash transfers.

Both members of the high military elite and provincial elite needed the support of *kapı kethüdas* and *sarrafs* for political and financial reasons. The competition among the higher households of the central elite<sup>1</sup> as well as the

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<sup>1</sup> From the seventeenth century onwards, there was a change in the composition of the ruling elite in the center. With the decline in the recruitment and training of slaves by the palace schools, the

rivalry among themselves and provincial households of local notables over the posts and the lucrative tax revenues reached such a point that a group of “men of confidence” emerged in İstanbul who were making a business of these offices.<sup>2</sup> In order to be appointed to a high office, one needed to have a large household. However, to maintain such a household was dependent on the offices and revenues obtained.<sup>3</sup> Appointment to a high office and obtaining a share from a tax-farm required from the members of the military class to engage in social networks. As such, patronage ties, gift exchange, marriage and trade alliances were the major means for the reproduction of social power.<sup>4</sup> The non-economic factors, most importantly personal connections, were important in taking a tax-farm and a state office. Therefore, access to the center of decision-making in İstanbul was vital for the provincial governors. In addition, to maintain posts, officials had to bid for posts and pay large amounts of cash (*câize*)<sup>5</sup> in return for

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vizier and Paşa households became important elements for the Ottoman bureaucracy and surpassed the palace graduates in acquiring important central and provincial appointments. As Abou El-Haj argues, in the eighteenth century about half of the appointments for the highest posts in central and provincial level were filled by men who had been either raised or attached to the vizier and Paşa households. The increase in the household’s power may have led to the rise of provincial notables in this century. Rifa’at Ali Abou El-Haj, “The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households, 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report”, *Journal of American Oriental Society*, 94, 1974, pp. 438-447.

<sup>2</sup> Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Metin Kunt, “Derviş Mehmed Paşa, vezir and entrepreneur: a study in Ottoman political-economic theory”, *Turcica*, 9/1, 1977.

<sup>4</sup> Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, pp. 54-55.

<sup>5</sup> For example, Canikli Ali Paşa had paid 22.500 *kuruş* in return for his appointment as the governor Trabzon with the title of vizier. This was referred to as *tuğ-ı hümayun caizesi* in the court records of Trabzon. *Trabzon Şer’iyye Sicili 1932*, p. 55/1. For the sale of the office of governor of Mosul, see Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and provincial society in the Ottoman Empire, Mosul, 1540-1834*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 114-120.

the offices they were appointed to. Besides, the office-holders had to offer valuable presents to each other.<sup>6</sup>

Therefore, the provincial governors needed a representative who provided communication, established ties with the center and informed them about new offices and resources. Under these circumstances, the *kapı kethüdas* gained a central place in the social and economic system of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire partly because of the commercialization and sale of offices. The other reasons will be analysed in detail below.

In the same way, the role of the Ottoman *sarrafs* as financial agents became pivotal for the functioning of the *malikâne-mukata'a* market. In fact, the *kapı kethüdas* and the *sarrafs* were mutually interacting agents. While the former carried out mostly the bureaucratic transactions, the latter was the financier of the *malikâne-mukata'a* system. Both of them seems to have realized vital shares from the system and can be considered as the sleeping partners. We have some clues about the functioning of the three-sided relationship among the provincial governor, the *kapı kethüdası*, and the *sarraf*. In fact, an account-book that I found during my research in the archives among the *Başmuhasebe* classification led me to notice this tri-part relationship.<sup>7</sup> This account-book seems to be the register of the transactions between two Armenian *sarrafs* (Ohannes and his brother Arakil) and a *kapı kethüdası*. Most importantly, nearly half of the account-book is directly

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<sup>6</sup> Muzaffer Doğan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Makam Vergisi: Caize”, *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 7, 2002, pp. 35-71; Mustafa Uzun, “Câize”, in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 7, İstanbul, 1993, pp. 28-29.

<sup>7</sup> *DBŞM 4043* includes registers belonging to the period of 1769-1779.

related with Canikli El-Hac Ali Paşa and his son Battal Bey. It sheds light on the relationship between the Caniklizâdes and their *sarrafs* and *kapı kethüdas*.

Yavuz Cezar appears to be the only scholar who has paid attention to the relationship among the trio of vizier-*kapı kethüdası*-*sarraf*. He points out that this relationship became institutionalized in 1813 with an imperial decree which required from the provincial administrators (*mutasarrıf* of *eyalet* and *liva*) to have a *kapı kethüdası* to carry out the transactions about the tax-farms and to have a *sarraf* as a guarantor providing credit for the payment of the lump sum expenditures.<sup>8</sup> This three-sided network had already been established in the second half of the eighteenth century onwards and became so common that the central government felt the need to institutionalize it with a decree in accordance with its centralizing measures.<sup>9</sup>

Before the analysis of the relationship among these three actors, a brief information about the wide range functions of the *kapı kethüdas* and the role of *sarrafs* in the Ottoman financial system is imperative.

### The Kapı Kethüdas

Although there has been little study of the role of the *kapı kethüdas*<sup>10</sup> in the administrative and financial bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire, they should be

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<sup>8</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, p. 242, 307.

<sup>9</sup> Cezar also emphasize that the leasing out the provincial tax-farms only to governors (thus leaving the sub-contractors out of the system) was possible through the alliance of these three actors following the succession of Selim III. Although viziers seem to be the primary profiteers of the system, the *kapı kethüdası* as accountants and bankers as creditors controlled the system and emerged as significant agents of the central treasury. *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, p. 307.

<sup>10</sup> Hence, *kapı kethüdası* will be used as *kethüda*.

taken into account in studying the ties between the center and periphery in the eighteenth century. As noted earlier, *kethüdas* served as a mediator between the provincial governors and the central government (*Bâb-ı Âli*).<sup>11</sup> They can be considered as the deputies of the provincial administrators of the Ottoman Empire such as the governor (*vali*), tax-collectors (*mutasarrıf*, *voyvoda*), superintendant (*emin*) at the center.<sup>12</sup> They were a kind of entrepreneur who played an active role in getting the significant posts and tax-revenues for those whom they represented.<sup>13</sup> Apart from their role as negotiator between the center and periphery (this depended on the conjuncture, on the position of the governor in question in the eyes of the state and on the relative power and trustability of *kethüda*), they were integrated into the economic network of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire along with the life-term or short-term tax-farmer and the banker (*sarrafb*).

What did *kethüdas* represent in İstanbul? The functions of *kethüdas* can be divided into two with regard to their being the representatives of the administrators. First of all, they had significant political functions. In other words, *kethüdas* were the representative of the political interests of the *eyalet* or *sancak* governors whose ranks attained the level of vizier-Paşa.<sup>14</sup> Usually they had

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<sup>11</sup> M. Zeki Pakalın, "Kapı Kethüdası" in *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, II, pp. 172-173. He argues that *kethüda* made requests and undertakings in the name of a vizier he represented. He was appointed and could be dismissed by the governor-vizier. It was only after 1863 that the appointment and dismissal of the *kethüda* by the order of the government became a rule. The office of *kapı kethüdası* of provinces was abolished in 1908.

<sup>12</sup> Cengiz Orhonlu, "Kethüda", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Leiden: E. J. Brill, p. 894.

<sup>13</sup> Edhem Eldem, "İstanbul" in *The Ottoman City between East and West*, eds. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffmann and Bruce Masters, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 177.

<sup>14</sup> Cengiz Orhonlu, "Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatına Aid Küçük Bir Risâle, 'Risâle-i Terceme' ", *Belgeler*, 4/7-8, 1967. The writer of this *Risâle*, probably discussed the conditions in the period of 1768-1774, emphasized the declining revenues of the viziers. He paid particular attention to the relationship between the provincial viziers and the *kapı kethüdas* in İstanbul, who arranged offices (*mansıb*) in return for a share. This in turn led to further decline of incomes of the former.



access, informal or formal, to the central government and brought before the grand vizier the demands of the administrators of the periphery either in the form of a report (*takrir*) or a petition (*arzuhal*).<sup>15</sup> These demands varied in content from promotion to higher rank and appointment to vacant offices (*mahlul*), to change in the offices and payment of *caizes*, etc. In sum, the *kethüdas* represented the political and economic interests of governors whose access to the central authority was provided through the contact of these *kethüdas*.

Secondly, while pursuing political interests of the viziers and Paşas, the *kethüdas* were also the mediators on economic matters. They were active in the negotiations with the central government about the grant of tax-farms and revenues. Here their functions went beyond the delivery of demands of the periphery to the center, serving as accountants in the Ottoman finance. Their role in tax-farming system can be understood within a broader perspective and a tri-part relationship between the *kapı kethüdası*, the banker and the provincial governor.

With regard to the socio-economic background of the *kethüdas*, it can be said that they belonged to the high bureaucratic circle, either retired from a state office<sup>16</sup> or later on appointed to prominent posts.<sup>17</sup> This can be followed from

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<sup>15</sup> See *Cevdet Maliye 21490* (1805) for the report (*takrir*) to *Bab-ı Ali* written by Mustafa Bey, the *kethüda* of Çapanoğlu Süleyman Ağa. He requested to be pardoned from the payment of annual instalments of the tax-farms that Cabbarzâde held, since the latter paid 100.000 *kuruş* to Yusuf Ziya Paşa.

<sup>16</sup> Süleyman Bey was the treasurer of the former Grand Vizier, Hasan Paşa. Upon the dismissal from this post in 1789, he became a *kethüda*. *DBŞM-ZMT 13874*, p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Çelebi Mehmet Efendi served the vizier Hasan Paşa from Livadiye as deputy (*kapı kethüdası*) before he appointed as *ruznâmçe-i evvel* (senior accountant), the director of the register of daily transactions at the Imperial Treasury. After the death of Hasan Paşa, he claimed a debt owed to him amounted 4480 *kuruş* in 1785. This would be paid from the inheritance of Hasan Paşa by the state. *DBŞB 3/71*.

their titles and ranks as well. They either bore titles such as Agha, Bey and Efendi<sup>18</sup> which reveal their original line of career as the men of sword or of pen. Most of them also bore the title of a *kapıcıbaşı* (imperial gate-keeper).<sup>19</sup>

We have no information about the number of them in the eighteenth and the first years of the nineteenth century. However, it was highly likely that their number was fixed after the reform of the New Order (*Nizam-ı Cedid*). The law concerning the position of the viziers, dated 1793-4 limited the number of viziers and aimed to regulate the shares of the *kethüdas* who obtained most part of the revenues of viziers.<sup>20</sup>

The death of a *kethüda* became a matter in the finance of the government as in the death of a big *sarraḡ* (banker) since it involved a lucrative amount of money either as debts owed by the deceased or to him. Since the payments of tax-farms (lump sum, instalments, fees) usually were prepaid through *kethüdas* who gave *temessüks* (documents) sealed by themselves in lieu of the actual *malikâne*-holder or tax-farmer by taking credits from the bankers, their accounts were the major tool to determine the debtors and owings of *kethüdas*. It was a normal procedure to search their debts and debts owed to them<sup>21</sup> by the central treasury

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<sup>18</sup> For example, the superintendent of the Imperial Navy (*tersane emini*), Selim Sırrı Efendi carried out the works of eight provinces (Damascus, Trablusşam, Baghdad, Basra, Cidde, Aydın, Erzurum and Rumelia) as a *kethüda* during the Grand Vizierate of Yeğen Mehmet Paşa in 1782. Ahmet Cevdet, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, II, İstanbul: Matba'a-i Osmaniye, 1309, pp. 180-181.

<sup>19</sup> The only exception was a certain Ahmed, who was referred to as from among the local notables and served the governor of Trabzon as the *kethüda*. *Trabzon Ahkam Defteri* 2, p. 227/1 (1779).

<sup>20</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, p. 65, 344. A document dated 1846-7 gives the list of eighteen *kapı kethüdas* and the provincial governors whom they represented. *Cevdet Dahiliye* 11755.

<sup>21</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 2884 (1790). It reads: “..hacegan-ı divan-ı hümayundan sabıkan Mısır kapı kethüdası müteveffa Mehmet Emin Efendi'nin bilcümle muhallelatı ve zimematı canib-i hazine-i hümayundan zabt olunub zuhur eden temessükatı derununda hala vali-i Mısır İsmail Paşa

by looking into their accounts (*kapı kethüdası hesabı*). The inspection of the accounts was significant since the debts to them were also considered as a debt to the central treasury, which confiscated unpaid loans for future use.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, when a provincial governor died with a debt to his *kethüda*, the latter brought the case to the central treasury to claim his money back.<sup>23</sup>

Usually the debts and the account book of the *kethüda* was investigated with the participation of other deputies under the leadership of *kethüda-Agha* (probably the *kethüda* of the grand vizier) and *Reisülküttab*.<sup>24</sup> Then the case was brought to the Sultan by the grand vizier. The last step in the procedure, according to examples collected in the archives, was an order of the Sultan to the *defterdar* about what could be done.

These deputies employed scribes (*katip*) who kept records of the debts and assets in an account-book as well as the interest (*güzeşte*) taken from the expenditures made for the governors.<sup>25</sup> However, it is difficult to determine the

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*hazretlerinin umur ve hususları için.....bir kıt'a tahvil mucebince 118.037,5 kuruş müşarun-ileyh hazretleri tarafından matlub iktiza eylediğine binaen".*

<sup>22</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 18617* (1802). It reads: "Süfyan Ağa'nın zimematı zabt ile mesarifat-ı mühimme ve seferiyeye ve düyununa tahsis olunduğundan"

<sup>23</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye 10543* (1798). For instance, the governor of Çıldır, Süleyman Paşa died with a debt of 49.354 *kuruş* to his deputy, who brought the case to the central treasury. The latter stated that according to the regulations of the New Order, when a vizier died, first his debts to deputies should be paid. Afterwards, the remaining amount could be seized by the state. It reads: "nizam-ı cedid müstahsene şürutu vechiyle evvel-be-evvel kapı kethüdaları matlubları ita' ve badehu canib-i miriden ahz olundukları şürutuyla".

<sup>24</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 18617* (1802). This is seen in the case of the debt owed to *kapı kethüdası* Süfyan Ağa by Şerif Mehmet Paşa, the governor of Çıldır province. The latter indebted 186.475 *kuruş* to the former. It is stated that "bu makule vefat eden veyahud ma'zul olan kapı kethüdalarının hesapları vüzera-i 'izam kapı kethüdaları muvacehesinde kethüdamız azimetli Ağa huzurunda faide-i devlet üzere rü'yet olunmak verilen nizam-ı şürut müstehaseneden olmağla.....ve azimetli reisülküttab huzurlarında tarafeynin yedlerinde olan senedat ve defterlere imrar-ı nazar ve her bir maddeleri yegan yegan bir kaç meclis lede'l sual".

<sup>25</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 18617*. Süfyan Ağa had two scribes, Abdi Efendi and Osman Efendi.

range of profit of the *kethüdas*, who were both part of the administrative bureaucracy and the financial bureaucracy.

The *Kapı Kethüdas* of the Caniklizâdes in İstanbul

The Caniklizâdes also had their *kapı kethüdas* in the center. These imperial servants mediated the interests of their patrons in both political and economic matters. The political requests, such as the appointments and promotions to state offices, are mostly found in the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* collections while the transactions related with the tax-farms and debts to the central treasury are in *Maliyeden Müdevver* and *Cevdet Maliye* classifications.

**Table 1. Caniklizâdes' *Kapı Kethüdas* (1774-1808)**

<u>Names of the <i>Kapı Kethüdas</i></u>	<u>Their Patrons</u>	<u>Years</u>
İbrahim Ağa	Canikli Ali Paşa	1774
İbrahim Efendi	Canikli Ali Paşa	1781
Vani Esseyid Ahmed Ağa	Battal Hüseyin Paşa	
Vani Esseyid Ahmed Ağa	Hayreddin Bey	1787-1789
İbiş Ağa	Battal Hüseyin Paşa	
İbiş Ağa	Tayyar Mahmud Paşa	1800-1801
Ömer Ağa	Tayyar Mahmud Paşa	1808

Sources: *MAD* 9555, *MAD* 9582, *CM* 6146, *CM* 2415, *CM* 6003, *HH* 3448, *HH* 8286, *HH* 7590, *DBŞM-MHF* 87/101, *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 54, p. 34, Şakir Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, p. 179, Ahmed Cevdet, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, 2, p. 18.

İbrahim Efendi had an active role in the pardoning of Canikli Ali Paşa and later on gave strong support to him in the ruling circles. He provided communication between the men of state such as İzzet Mehmet Paşa and grand vizier Yeğen Mehmet Paşa and Canikli Ali Paşa about his appointment as a Commander-in-Chief (*Serasker*) for the Crimea. He informed Ali Paşa about the intention of the central government to appoint him as a commander if he did not demand a financial support for this post.<sup>26</sup>

Vâni Esseyid Ahmet Ağa, who was referred to as being from among the '*hassa silahşörlerinden*'<sup>27</sup>, served as the *kapı kethüdası* of Battal Hüseyin Paşa and his son Hayreddin Bey. He was seen as the contractor and purveyor (*müteahhid*) of Battal Paşa for the debts owed to the central treasury due to the inheritance of the wealth of his father (confiscation tax or *bedel-i muhallefât*) and auction price for the grant of tax-farms. Esseyid Ahmet Ağa sent his detailed account-book to the central treasury to settle the debt and payments of Battal Paşa.<sup>28</sup> In addition, he also carried out negotiations with the central government for the promotion of Hayreddin Bey to the rank of *mirahor-ı evvel* and of Tayyar Bey to the rank of imperial gate-keeper. He promised on behalf of Battal Paşa (commander of Anapa) that if Battal's sons were granted these ranks, then Battal Paşa would recruit soldiers and finance them from his own pocket as well as would provide equipment such as guns, powders for defence. However, this request was partly realized since the Sultan granted the promotion of Tayyar

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<sup>26</sup> Cevdet, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, II, p. 18 and Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, pp. 148-149.

<sup>27</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 6003* (1787).

<sup>28</sup> *DBŞM-MHF 87/101* (1789).

which was accompanied by the delivery of the necessary equipment.<sup>29</sup> Besides, Ahmed Ağa prepaid the necessary auction price of the tax-farm, the poll-tax of Canik held by Hayreddin Bey, to the state treasury in 1787.<sup>30</sup>

İbiş Ağa was another significant actor who served the interests of the three members of the Canikli dynasty as well as Abdullah Paşa, the steward of Battal Paşa. He became a part of the imperial elite first by marrying the daughter of İbrahim Efendi,<sup>31</sup> who was the superintendant of the imperial kitchen and promoted to the rank of the *kethüda* of the Sultan in 1787. İbiş Ağa was appointed as the *matbah emini* in 1788 with the favour of his father-in-law.<sup>32</sup> The complex and chaotic circumstances in Canik after the flight of Battal Paşa in 1790 to Russia was also reflected in the ruling circles of the empire. İbiş Ağa played the interest of Hayreddin Bey against Abdullah Paşa, who was the steward of Battal Paşa and appointed as the commander of Anapa with the governorship of Trabzon and Erzurum. On the one hand, İbiş Ağa pretended to be in favor of Hayreddin Bey by recommending him to the Imperial Council and even tried to get the support of the central government for the grant of Canik and Sivas with the title of vizier by offering up to 1000 purse (500.000 *kuruş*) in return. On the other hand, İbiş Ağa also served the interests of Abdullah Paşa as a *kapı kethüdası*, the enemy of Hayreddin Bey. He encouraged the advisor (*lala*) of Hayreddin, who came to İstanbul, to take shelter of Abdullah Paşa.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun* 8286 (1788).

<sup>30</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 6003 (1787).

<sup>31</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 3, p. 759.

<sup>32</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 3, p. 734.

<sup>33</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun* 7590 (1790). The grand vizier was in a difficult position. Before, the imperial council decided that the Caniklizâdes were not trustable and Hayreddin will not be assigned any

Although he behaved deceitfully in the events of 1790 against Hayreddin, he continued to serve as the *kapı kethüdası* of Battal and Tayyar Paşas in 1800-2 period when they returned from Russia. İbiş Ağa was very active in the struggle for providing favours for Battal Paşa, such as the control of the tax-farm of Tirebolu<sup>34</sup> as well as for the members of his household.<sup>35</sup> He played the role of guarantor of Tayyar Paşa for the delivery of a lucrative amount of money to the treasury.<sup>36</sup>

### The Sarrafs

*Sarrafs* had been the integral part of the Ottoman finance as moneylenders, accountants, and bankers. They were the financiers of both the prominent members of the central elites and the local provincial administrators and most of them came from among the non-muslim subjects of the empire. Their financial activities go back to the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The first *sarrafs* were mostly from the Jewish population who were seen as the tax-farmers<sup>37</sup> (*mültezim*), managers, superintendant (*emin* or *nâzır*) of the Ottoman mint (*darbhane*) and accumulated

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state post. After the grant of the tax-farms of Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki to Abdullah Paşa with a secret Sultan order, İbiş Ağa mediated for Hayreddin Bey with a significant amount of payment to the treasury to inherit his father's area of influence. In addition, another official who just came from Canik reported that Hayreddin had support in the region and he deserved to be appointed as the administrator of Canik with the title of vizier.

<sup>34</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun* 3448 (1800).

<sup>35</sup> He mediated for the inheritance of the tax-farm revenues of the *kethüda* and relative of Battal Paşa (Miralayzâde İbrahim Ağa) by İbrahim's son. MAD 9555.

<sup>36</sup> İbiş Ağa sealed the documents of debt (*deyn temessükleri*) of Tayyar Paşa, who had to pay 1125 purses to the treasury in instalments to prevent the confiscation of his father's wealth. MAD 9582, pp. 112-113 and *Cevdet Maliye* 6146 (1801).

<sup>37</sup> Haim Gerber, "Jewish Tax-Farmers In The Ottoman Empire In The 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Centuries", *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 10, 1986.

significant amounts of capital and wealth through these positions and offices.<sup>38</sup> In addition, they were very close to Sultans, princes and high officials of the Palace and they performed the function of private accountants by arranging their expenditures and revenues much before the eighteenth century.<sup>39</sup>

While the Jewish financiers were active in financing the expenditures of the Palace and high functionaries, it was mostly the Armenian *sarrafs* who financed the *malikâne*-holders<sup>40</sup> and became dominant in the financial activities of both center and the periphery as bankers<sup>41</sup>, managers and accountants. These financial agents or *sarrafs* can be considered as one of the parties involved in the *malikâne* system apart from the central treasury, the *malikâneci*, the *mültezim* (mostly local notables).<sup>42</sup>

The bankers were indispensable actors for the functioning of life-time tax-farming.<sup>43</sup> First of all, *sarrafs* loaned money to the *malikâne*-holder to enable him to pay the lump sum payment (*muaccele*) to the treasury and paid the annual

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<sup>38</sup> Halil İnalcık, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire", *The Journal of Economic History*, 19, 1969.

<sup>39</sup> Sevgen has studied the role of *sarrafs* in Ottoman financial system in her articles published in series. See Necibe Sevgen, "Nasıl sömürüldük? Sarraflar", *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 3, 13, 1968/69, pp. 46-59; 14, 1968/69, pp. 66-68; 15, 1968/69, pp. 59-65; 16, 1968/69, pp. 54-61; 17, 1968/69, pp. 62-66; 18, 1968/69, pp. 76-78; 19, 1969, pp. 66-69; 20, 1969, pp. 69-70; 21, 1969, pp. 67-69; 22, 1969, pp. 66-67; 23, 1969, pp. 54-55; 24, 1969, pp. 54-60; 25, 1969/70, pp. 73-74.

<sup>40</sup> Hagop Barsoumian, "The Dual Role of the Armenian *Amira* Class within Ottoman Government and the Armenian *Millet* (1750-1850)" in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982, pp. 171-184; Haydar Kazgan, *Galata Bankerleri*, İstanbul: Türk Ekonomi Bankası A.Ş. Yayınları, 1991, p. 17.

<sup>41</sup> *Sarrafs* Serpos served as the banker of six Grand Viziers in the first half of the eighteenth century. See Onnik Jamgocyan, "Une famille de financiers arméniens au XVIII siècle: les Serpos", in *Les Villes Dans L'Empire Ottoman: Activités Et Sociétés*, ed. Daniel Panzac, Paris: Centre Nationale De La Recherche Scientifique, 1991.

<sup>42</sup> Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships, The Islamic World and Europe, With Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996, p. 165.

<sup>43</sup> Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi", p. 234.



instalments (*mal*) to the treasury.<sup>44</sup> In return, they gained from the interest rate called “*güzeşte*” in the private account books of the eighteenth century, ranging from 12 to 24 %.<sup>45</sup> Secondly, we have evidence that as manager and agent, the *sarraf* often paid the “*cebelü bedeliyesi*” or war-time contributions to the treasury which ranged between 10 % and 15 % of the value of *muaccele* collected in times of war from the *malikâne*-holders.

In addition, since important offices became a source of wealth in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, to secure an office, the office-holder paid money called *caize* to the treasury in sum or in instalments and sometimes offered presents (*hediye*, *avaidat*) to the high officials related to the post they were assigned. For that reason, the office-holders usually made payments through their *sarrafs*.

Moreover, the capital of the bankers was essential for the functioning of the Ottoman financial structure as they also played a significant role as

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<sup>44</sup> For *muaccele* and *mal* see Genç, “Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi” and Mehmet Genç, “18.Yüzyıla Ait Osmanlı Mali Verilerinin İktisadi Faaliyetin Göstergesi Olarak Kullanılabilirliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma”, *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 10, 1981.

<sup>45</sup> Salzmann, *Measures of Empire*, p. 201. Genç argues that the *sarraf* earned 20 % of the annuities, *mal*, plus profit from the *mültezim*. He assumes that the *mültezim* obtained 20 % and the taxation expenses amounted to 15 %, then “the tax revenue was probably distributed among the four parties as follows:

100 *kuruş* total tax revenue

15 expenses

85 *mültezim*’s revenue

17 *mültezim*’s profit

68 *sarraf*’s revenue

14 *sarraf*’s profit

54 amount left for the *malikâneci* and the state

30 to the *malikâneci*

24 to the state”.

See M. Genç’s contribution in M. Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships*, pp. 166-68.

moneylenders during times of need of the state at the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>46</sup>

In sum, the bankers constituted a central place as financial agents in the tax-farming system in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire by providing credit to the high state elites. Although we know little about the ties between İstanbul-based *sarrafs* and local administrators in the periphery, it is clear that high officials such as governors, *mültezims*, *mutasarrıfs*<sup>47</sup> and *voyvodas* had financial contacts with the *sarrafs* for the same reasons, mainly the need of cash for the office and for the tax-farm.<sup>48</sup> While the bankers supported the *malikâne*-holders by making payments to the central treasury, they also financed the sub-contractors (*mültezims*) by paying the *malikâne*-holder the annual instalments in advance.

Below, the functioning of the relationship among the governor, the *kapı kethüdası* and the *sarrafa* will be analysed within the limits of the preliminary existing archival sources. This will provide some insight to the financial ties between the center and periphery.

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<sup>46</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişme Dönemi*, p. 125, 136.

<sup>47</sup> It seems that the provincial governors usually carried out their financial works through the mediation of their representatives (*kapı kethüdası*) despite the actual financier was the bankers. For example, the *mutasarrıf* of Kayseri ordered his representative, Abdüselam to spend 4510 *kuruş* for his works. However, Abdüselam borrowed from Muradzâde Kaspar, who was from among the bankers community (*sarrafa taifesi*) in İstanbul, to finance the governor's work. After the death of the *kapı kethüdası* Abdüselam in 1777, his accounts were inspected and the debt of the governor to the treasury was found unpaid. Since the governor was living in Amasya at that date, the financment of the debt was requested to Canikli Ali Paşa and the local judge. *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 56, p. 17.

<sup>48</sup> Yuzo Nagata, *Tarihte Ayanlar: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde Bir İnceleme*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, especially Appendix II for the accounts of Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Hüseyin Ağa (the *mütesellim* of Saruhan) with the *Sarrafa* Artin.

The Network: the Caniklizâdes, Ağa-Efendi, and the Sarrafs.

As stated at the beginning of this part, an account-book classified as DBŞM 4043 shows us a complex network of the dominant political and economic relationships in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire.<sup>49</sup> The account-book seems to be the register of transactions between *sarraḡ* Ohannes and Arakil and certain *Ağa-Efendi*. Nearly half of the register is about the expenses made for Canikli Ali Paşa and his son, Battal Hüseyin Bey.<sup>50</sup> There are mainly three sides in this account-book. First of all, there is a reference to Canikli El-Hac Ali Paşa as the *muḥassıl* of Canik and governor of Trabzon and his son, Battal Hüseyin Bey as the *mütesellim* of Canik as well as to other provincial governors<sup>51</sup> and a member of the central ruling elite.<sup>52</sup> The second side is *sarraḡ* Ohannes and his brother Arakil<sup>53</sup>. And the third is the “*Ağa Efendimiz Hazretleri*”. The fourth side may be an accountant of the Ağa Efendi who registered the transactions between the Ağa Efendi and Ohannes.

*The Ağa Efendi* seemed to have had a central place in this network. Who was he? There are two possibilities at this stage of our knowledge. He may have

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<sup>49</sup> I would like to thank my advisor, Oktay Özel, for his help for the transcription of this account-book, which turned out to be a common project to be published in the future. Özer Ergenç provided his aid during the evaluation and transliteration of the text.

<sup>50</sup> The account book consists of eighty pages. At the top of each page, there is a title. When looked at these titles, one can see that nearly half of the transactions in the register was between Sarraf Ohannes via Ağa Efendi and the Canikli dynasty. Out of 41 titles as such, 18 are directly related with them (7 include the name of Ali Paşa/Bey, while only 3 of them refer to his son Battal Hüseyin Bey and the rest 8 titles refer to the “side of Canik”, “*canib-i Canik*”).

<sup>51</sup> These provincial administrators are as follows: Rişvanzâde Ömer Paşa, the *mutasarrıf* of Malatya; Karşılızâde Hasan Paşa, the *mutasarrıf* of Adana; Halil Paşa, the *beylerbeyi* of Rakka. See p. 38, 54, 56, 57, 60, 80.

<sup>52</sup> Page 60 is the register of expenses made for Grand Admiral Cafer Paşa.

<sup>53</sup> *Sarraḡ* Ohannes and Arakil were from among the big bankers of İstanbul. They were the *sarraḡs* of Halil Ağa, who was referred to as the *kapı kethüdası* of Grand Vizier İvazzâde Halil Paşa in 1769-1770. They resided in one of the big *hans*, Sorgucular, in İstanbul. So, it is highly possible

been either a Grand Vizier's *kethüda*<sup>54</sup> or the *kapı kethüdası* of Canikli Ali Paşa and/or other provincial governors<sup>55</sup>. As noted before, tax-farmers had to have a *kethüda* in İstanbul who performed the transactions related to the tax-farms and to have a banker as a guarantor who provided credits for the payment of the lump sum expenditures.<sup>56</sup>

Whoever he was, whether a *kethüda* of Grand Vizier or *kapı kethüdası* of the Caniklizâdes and other provincial notables, Ağa Efendi was probably a significant political actor, who was close to the centre of decision-making and arranged all the transactions related with the purchase of tax-farms and offices in the name of Canikli El-Hac Ali Paşa and other prominent dignitaries (both central and local members of the ruling class). He seems to have played a central role in the financial bureaucracy as an accountant. He acted in İstanbul as the representative of the provincial members of the ruling class and mediated the relationship between them and *Bâb-ı Âli*. According to the register, all the payments, whether in cash or in the form of *poliçe*<sup>57</sup> (letter of credit) and related

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that Halil Ağa was the deputy of the Caniklizâdes and other provincial governors. See *DBŞM* 4070.

<sup>54</sup> The title of the register on page 17 is "*Mesarif-i Umur-ı Ağa-i Kethüda-i Bâb*". H. Bowen states that the *kahya* (*kethüda*) of the Grand Vizier was entitled Ağa although his duties were entirely administrative and secretarial. However, the word *Efendi* was usually added to his title and he was called Ağa Efendimiz. H. Bowen, "Ağa", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I, Leiden: E. J. Brill, p. 246. Pakalın argues that "Ağa Efendimiz is used synonymously for the deputy of the grand vizier, and his rank became significant in the second half of the eighteenth century. "Kethüda-i Sadr-ı Âli" in *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, II, pp. 253-4.

<sup>55</sup> See notes 6, 7.

<sup>56</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim*, p. 242, 307. See also Edhem Eldem, "İstanbul", in *The Ottoman City between East and West*, eds. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman and Bruce Masters, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 177. Eldem also emphasizes that most of the functions operated through the mediation of *sarrafs* and *kapı kethüdas* gravitating around the ruling class and the palace.

<sup>57</sup> For the extensive use of letters of exchange by tax-farmers within the empire and by the merchants abroad, see Edhem Eldem, *French Trade In Istanbul In The Eighteenth Century*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999.

with the tax-farms and the payments called *caize* for office-purchases, would come into the hand of a *kapı kethüdası* who then transferred these revenues to their proper places. He seems to have had direct access to the state officials.

In this tri-part relationship of provincial/central members of the ruling elite, the Ağa Efendi and Sarraf Ohannes, the latter seems to have performed all financial functions related with the former and the Ağa Efendi himself and functioned as a creditor, financier and banker. The mechanism seems to have functioned as follows; Ağa Efendi, as a mediator between the palace and local/central members of ruling elite, was the collector of all the revenues coming from the peripheries of the empire. Therefore, this was a direct relationship. However, the relationship between central/local members of the ruling class and *sarraf* Ohannes was an indirect one in the sense that the Ağa Efendi functioned also as the mediator between the two. This book in this context seems to be the register of the transactions between Ohannes and the Ağa Efendi.

There are mainly two broad categories when one looks at the record-keeping of the register. The first category is the record of revenues (cash or *poliçe*) coming from different parts of the empire and concentrated in the hands of the Ağa to be transferred to *Sarraf* Ohannes<sup>58</sup> to settle the account. The second category is the record of expenditures made by Ohannes (not directly, but as a financier, providing cash which was scarce in the hands of ruling elite) in the name of both the central and provincial members of the ruling class and Ağa

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<sup>58</sup> For example, see p. 2, “Devletlü Ağa Efendimiz hazretlerinin Sarraf Hoca Ohannes ve Karındaşı Arakil’e teslim buyurdıkları akçanın defteridir beyan olunur” or p. 4 “Devletlü Ağa Efendimiz tarafından Sarraf Arakil ve Hoca Ohannes’e teslim olunan beyan olunur”.

Efendi.<sup>59</sup> This “expenditure” should be understood as the loans paid by Ohannes for tax-farms<sup>60</sup> and household expenditures of these elites. Therefore, it can be said that Sarraf Ohannes represented the side of the capital-owner in this tri-part relationship. While Ağa Efendi, representing the provincial elite in the center was regulating the political side of the transactions, Sarraf Ohannes, although not directly related with the notables and the imperial treasury, had connections with the tax-farmers and office holders as the guarantor of the regular payments.

The account-book includes records belonging to the period of 1769-1779 (1183-1193). The existence of this register in the archives may be the result of the confiscation of the wealth of one of the three parties. It is highly possible that the central treasury inspected the debts and expenditure of Canikli Ali Paşa, whose wealth was seized by the state in 1779. So, it is not a coincidence that there is a parallel between the confiscation of the wealth of the Caniklizâdes during this period and the date of the last register in the account-book.

In sum, this account-book constitutes only one example among many others. It provides valuable information about the tax-farms held by Canikli Ali Paşa and his son, Battal Hüseyin Bey between 1769-1779 when their power was at its peak. In fact, through this knowledge, the construction of the relationship between the Caniklizâdes and the central elites became possible. The expenditures of Ohannes for the Canikli’s tax-farms consist of lump sum payments (*muaccele* or *peşin*), annual instalments (*mal*), and several other payments such as war-time

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<sup>59</sup> See p. 3, “Devletlû Ağa Efendimiz taraflarına Sarraf Hoca Ohannes ve Karındaşı Arakil’in teslim eyledikleri defter beyanındadır”.

<sup>60</sup> See p. 24, “Bedelat-ı Mesarifat-ı Umur-ı Devletlû El-Hac Ali Paşa Vali-i Trabzon an Yed-i Sarraf Ohannes”.

contributions (*cebelü bedeliyesi*), diploma payment (*harc-ı berat*), transfer payment (*resm-i kasr-ı yed*), profit (*faiz*), instalments (*taksit*), and the remains (*küsur*). Although it is difficult to arrive at the exact value of the above payments, these records give us a general idea about the *malikâne*-holders at the center, the Caniklizâde's shares in the tax-revenues as well as the possible subcontractors of the Caniklizâdes. Therefore, in the next part, the findings from this account-book will be used extensively.

## II. Revenue Administration of the Caniklizâdes

### The Tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik: A Story of Monopoly

The sub-province of Canik was the core area for the economic rise of the Caniklizâdes. The extraction of taxes from Canik became the hereditary tenure of the Canikli family. They held the tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik as a life-time tax-farm (*malikâne*) for sixty years from 1737 to 1808 although there was a break of eleven years under which the *sancak* of Canik was administrated by officials appointed from the center when the Caniklizâdes were in exile in Russia. The tax-farm of Canik was significant in the history of the Canikli dynasty in the sense that it provided the initial ground for the members of the family to enlarge their domination to the neighbouring regions. To obtain tax-collectorship (*muhasıllık*) meant also an increase in the administrative power and authority in the region. Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa was the founder of the dynasty in the sense that he was the first person in the family to have a share in the tax-collection of Canik.

Later on, he obtained the whole tax-farm and became the *muhasıl* of Canik alone with the rank *kapıcıbaşı*.<sup>61</sup> He was the first member of the family who became incorporated into the Ottoman ruling class as the administrator of Canik.

Before the analysis of the historical evolution of the tax-farm of Canik in the hands of the members of the dynasty, it is imperative to have a closer look at composition of the *mukata'a-i muhasıllık-ı Canik*.

#### *Mukata'a-i Muhasıllık-ı Canik*

The sub-province of Canik specialized in the production of hemp (*kendir*) which was used in the manufacturing of ropes required by the Ottoman arsenal.<sup>62</sup> The nine districts (*kazas*) tied to the sub-province of Canik (Arım, Terme, Ünye, Hisarcık, Ayvacık, Ökse, Fenari, İfraz-ı Fenari and Akçay) were integrated into the Ottoman financial system as “*ocaklık*” by producing hemp for the Imperial Shipyard in the seventeenth century.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, the sub-province of Canik was incorporated into the Ottoman treasury as *muhasıllık* (tax-collectorship) and the local population produced hemp and fibre for the Imperial Navy. In that sense, it can be argued that the administration of the province of Canik was dependent on the continuation of the forced-production of peasants of these raw materials. For the second half of the seventeenth century, İdris Bostan gives several examples

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<sup>61</sup> In the eighteenth century, the rank of *kapıcıbaşı* began to be assigned by the central government to local notables, who performed certain significant services. With this rank, the authority and power of local notables was legitimized by the central state and they were distinguished from the tax-payers with the status as a member of military class. For the rank of *kapıcıbaşılık*, see Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, 2, p. 167-169.

<sup>62</sup> Besim Darkot, “Samsun” in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 10, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1966, p. 175.



for the existence of *kendir eminis* (superintendent responsible for hemp delivery) who were appointed by the state to transfer the regular amounts of raw material by way of *emanet* and short-term tax-farm. When Imperial Navy needed more than the usual amount of hemp, the Ottoman government appointed agents (*mübaşir*) from among the imperial-gatekeepers from the center.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, it is highly likely that the delivery of hemp and fibre had previously been provided by the *sancakbeyis*, *muhassıls* and centrally appointed officials such as the *kendir emini* and *mübaşirs*. However, the state often came into conflict with merchants who were making profit out of the trade of hemp and fibre. Since the centrally appointed officials enforced a fixed price for hemp which was less than market value, they faced the opposition of merchants who had the support of the local notables and *sefine reisleri*.<sup>65</sup>

The status of *muhassıllık* of Canik was made *malikâne* as early as 1712.<sup>66</sup> Afterwards, the Ottoman state took a down payment from the new *malikâne*-holder who ensured the transfer of raw material regularly. As for the Caniklizâdes, they began to be appointed from 1737 onwards as the *muhassıl*, i.e. the collector of hemp and fibre.

The tax-farm of the *muhassıllık* of Canik (*mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı liva-i Canik*) was composed of three items in the eighteenth

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<sup>63</sup> İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992, p. 137. For the production of hemp and fibre in the sixteenth century, see Mehmet Öz, *XV-XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999, pp. 93-98.

<sup>64</sup> Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı*, pp. 137-141. He argues that the amount of hemp demanded by the Ottoman government was about 5000 *kantar* in the second half of the seventeenth century.

<sup>65</sup> For an example of the conflict between the state officials and the local inhabitants at the end of the seventeenth century, see *Cevdet Bahriye 9920* (1698) and Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı*, p. 139.

century.<sup>67</sup> First, the extra-ordinary taxes (*avarız and niżul*) of Canik were included in the tax-farm of *muhasıllık*. The annual payment (*mal*) for the extra-ordinary taxes was 23.787,5 *kuruş*.<sup>68</sup> In lieu of this amount, the population of the province of Canik were producing 5597 *kantar*<sup>69</sup> fibre of Fatsa (*tel-i Fatsa*) within a year. In other words, the members of the Canikli dynasty, who served as the *muhasıls*, had to deliver 5597 *kantar* of fibre to the Imperial Navy annually. The amount did not change between 1741 and 1795. Afterwards, the fibre demanded by the Imperial Navy rose to 5611,5 *kantar*.<sup>70</sup> The second item that was included in the tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik was called *bedel-i sancak-ı Canik* (compensation for the Canik sub-province) which was equal to 400 *kantar* hemp in product annually. In other words, as a compensation for Canik, the population had to produce and send 400 *kantar* hemp to the Imperial Navy.<sup>71</sup> In fact, these two items were previously organized as a *hass* (imperial domain)<sup>72</sup> and historically the sub-province of Canik was integrated into the Ottoman financial system as the producer of hemp and fibre which were used for the manufacturing of shipping. The revenues of this province were assigned to the Imperial Navy for the production of important material used in shipping.

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<sup>66</sup> Orhan Kılıç, *18. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti'nin İdari Taksimatı, Eyalet ve Sancak Tercihati*, Elazığ, 1997, p. 129.

<sup>67</sup> *MAD 9570*, p. 106-107 is a register of *mukata'a-i muhasıllık-ı Liva-i Canik ma'a avarız-ı liva-i mezbur* from 1748 to 1792. It shows us the tax-farm holders, the annual and lump sum payments as well as the transfers and retractions of this tax-farm. *MAD 9543* also contains records of the tax-farm of Canik. Unfortunately, it is ruined and some parts of the register are illegible.

<sup>68</sup> The Ottoman *kuruş* (piaster) was equal to 40 *paras* or 120 *akçes* after the establishment of a new system around newly minted *kuruş* in 1690. See, Şevket Pamuk, "Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1914*, p. 966.

<sup>69</sup> 1 *kantar*=44 *okka*=56.449 kg. in Ottoman standards. Halil İnalcık, "Weights and Measures" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 989.

<sup>70</sup> *MAD 9582*, p. 109.

<sup>71</sup> *MAD 9570*, p. 106.

The third item in this tax-farm was referred to as *rüsumat-ı toprak basdı-i kaza-i Bafra ve gayriha*. The status of this tax-farm before 1760 was a life-term tax-farm (*malikâne*) in its own. After Süleyman Paşa (older brother of Canikli Ali Paşa) wrote a petition to the superintendant of the customs (*gümrük emini*) of İstanbul for the tax-farm called *toprak basdı* in 1760, its status as a separate unit was withdrawn. This tax was added to the boundary of the *muhasıllık* of Canik and an extra 500 *kuruş* addition (*zam*) was added to the old annual instalment price (*mal*) of 500 *kuruş*.<sup>73</sup> The annual instalment of 1000 *kuruş* remained unchanged until 1806. Afterwards, it rose to 5500 *kuruş* with a new addition (*zam*) of 4500 *kuruş*.<sup>74</sup> It seems that the tax-farm of *toprak basdı*, as the word implies, consisted of taxes extracted from the merchants who brought their goods to the customs of Bafra and its dependents (Ünye, Terme, Fatsa, Çarşamba). The *malikâne*-ization of this tax-farm<sup>75</sup> constitutes a good example of the fiscalist political economy of the Ottoman state in the sense that this tax-farm was expropriated by the *timar*-holders and petty notables of these subdistricts (Fatsa, Ünye, Terme, Çarşamba, Bafra). With the realization that if this tax-farm was *malikâne*-ized, the Ottoman state would take a *muaccele* (lump sum payment for a *malikâne*), the state decided to include the tax-farm of *toprakbasdı* in the *muhasıllık* of Canik to prevent the loss of treasury due to the non-intervention.

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<sup>72</sup> DBŞM-MLK 14115 (1742) refers to this tax-farm as “*hasha-i kendir be-mukabil-i avarız ve bedel-i nüzul kazaha-i liva-i Canik ve muhasıllık*”.

<sup>73</sup> MAD 9536, p. 26/2 (1760) “*zıkr olunan mahallerin taife-i tüccaran emtia ve eşyalarından gümrük-i toprak basdı namıyla hariç-ez-defter ahz olunagelen rüsumat canib-i miri için alınmak üzere 1175 senesi martı ibtidasından senevi 500 kuruş mal ile müceddeden miri mukata’a kayd ve 1000 kuruş muaccele ile malikâne tevcih olunub Canik muhasıllığına dahil*”.

<sup>74</sup> MAD 9582, p. 125.

<sup>75</sup> MAD 9536, p. 1.

Although “*toprak basdı*” was added to the tax-farm of the *muhassılık* of Canik in 1760, the old practice of farming out the tax-collection to the lesser notables seems to have continued. An imperial order dated 1800 urged the *muhassıl* of Canik and *kadıs* of the districts that the *muhassıls* should not delegate the collection of this tax to ‘*derebeys*’, since the sub-contractors had collected illegal levies and had disturbed the population of Bafra, Arım, Ünye and Fatsa sub-districts.<sup>76</sup>

In sum, the *muhassıls* of Canik had to deliver 5597 *kantar* fibre, 400 *kantar* hemp to the Navy and 1000 *kuruş* annually to the central treasury. This tax-farm was held by the Caniklizâdes in the second half of the eighteenth century as a life-time hereditary tax-farm. Below, I will examine in some detail how members of the Canikli dynasty held control over this lucrative tax-farm. (For the table showing the share-holders in this tax-farm see Appendix IV).

#### Caniklizâdes’ Hereditary Control over the *Muhassılık*-ı Canik

As stated earlier, Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa, a small local notable, had the chance to obtain a one-third share in the *sancak* of Canik which was assigned to three persons as a life-term tax-farm in 1737.<sup>77</sup> Four years later, he became the holder of the half share in this tax-farm.<sup>78</sup> However, Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa had difficulty in delivering fibre of Fatsa (*tel-i Fatsa*) to the Imperial Navy. In addition, complaints

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<sup>76</sup> MAD 9582, p. 110.

<sup>77</sup> Kılıç, 18. *Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti'nin İdari Taksimatı, Eyalet ve Sancak Tevcihatı*, p. 129. The other share-holders in the tax-farm of the *muhassılık* of Canik were Mehmet Bey and Üçüncüzâde Ömer Bey.

<sup>78</sup> DBŞM-MLK 14115 (1742) Üçüncüzâde Ömer Paşa and his brother Osman Bey was holding the other half in 1741-1742.

about him increased due to the over-extraction of taxes in the regions of Terme and Fatsa. As a result, he was exiled to Ankara in 1742. A few years later, he was pardoned and became the *muhasıl* of Canik with the title of *kapıcıbaşı*, however, he was lynched by the villagers in 1748. Apart from this tax-farm he also controlled the collection of the poll tax of Canik and Kefe in 1744.<sup>79</sup> So, the emergence of the Caniklizâdes, according to the available documents, started in 1737 with the progress of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa to the position of the share-holder in the *muhasıllık* of Canik. Then his sons continued as the *muhasıl* of Canik in the future years.

After the death of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa in 1748, the tax-farm of Canik (*mukata'a-i muhasıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik*) was passed to his sons (Süleyman and Ali Ağas) and his sister's husband Ali Ağa. While Süleyman Ağa held the half share, each Ali Ağa shared a one-fourth of this tax-farm between 1748 and 1763.<sup>80</sup> The other Ali Ağa died in 1763 and from then on, the two brothers shared it equally. However, there was competition over this tax-farm between them for the full control until 1765. In this year, the Ottoman state revoked the share of Süleyman Paşa because of his oppressive attitude towards the peasants. Ali Bey became the single holder of the entire tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik in 1765.<sup>81</sup> Afterwards, he gradually extended his control over the neighbouring areas. Below, I will have a closer look at this process. But

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<sup>79</sup> *DBŞM 41058* (1748) referred to him as *müteveffa*. His son Süleyman was seen as the collector of the poll tax of Canik and had a debt to the treasury.

<sup>80</sup> *MAD 9570*, pp. 106-107.

<sup>81</sup> *MAD 9570*, pp. 106-107.

before that, I will briefly outline the overall development of the control of the members of the Caniklizâdes over this tax-farm until 1808.

From 1765 to 1779, Ali Paşa served as the *muhasıl* of Canik alone and ensured the transfer of hemp and fibre to the Imperial Navy. His son Battal Hüseyin held a one-fourth share in the tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik in 1776.<sup>82</sup> Two years later, he increased his share to one-half when he acquired the rank of *kapıcıbaşı*.<sup>83</sup> Ali Paşa and his son, Battal Hüseyin, continued to hold this tax-farm until 1779, when they were declared rebels. As it is known, in 1779 all the tax-farms that were held by the Caniklizâdes were seized by the Ottoman state. They fled to the Crimea and lived there for two years. As a result, the tax-farm was assigned to the Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa, who was one of the leading members of the central state elites.<sup>84</sup> Hasan Paşa appointed his *mühürdar*<sup>85</sup> as the *muhasıl* of Canik.<sup>86</sup>

In 1781, Canikli Ali Paşa returned back to Canik and his ranks and titles were reinstated. So were his tax-farms. This time, the tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik was shared among Ali Paşa (1/2 share), Battal Hüseyin (1/4 share), and

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<sup>82</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 2241. Battal Hüseyin paid a lump sum payment (*muaccele*) amounted to 27.500 *kuruş* for the one-fourth share of the *muhasıllık* of Canik.

<sup>83</sup> *MAD* 9570. He paid 34.625 *kuruş muaccele* for the half share.

<sup>84</sup> *MAD* 9570. Gazi Hasan Paşa paid 110.000 *kuruş muaccele* for the whole tax-farm. This meant a significant rise in the amount of the *muaccele*, from 70.000 *kuruş* to 110.000 *kuruş*. Whenever there was a change over the holder of the *malikâne*, the government increased the amount of *muaccele* and benefited from the transfer.

<sup>85</sup> *Mühürdar* means “keeper of the seal”, private secretary of higher officials entrusted with notarizing their employers’ correspondence. Gustav Bayerle, *Paşas, Begs, and Efendis: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire*, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1997, p. 115.

<sup>86</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 25514. Gazi Hasan Paşa was also held responsible for the collection of the poll tax of Canik, which was previously assigned to Canikli Ali Paşa for the year of 1780 with a *peşin* of 3030 *kuruş* and left as uncollected after Ali Paşa’s escape.

Sadullah Bey, who was the son of Süleyman Paşa and, at the same time, was the son-in-law (*damad*) of Ali Paşa, (1/4 share) in 1780-81.

After the death of Ali Paşa in 1785, Battal Paşa and Sadullah Bey retained their one-fourth share and Ali Paşa's share passed to the Hayreddin Bey, the son of Battal Paşa.<sup>87</sup> In the same year, Sadullah Bey died and again the Ottoman state had a chance to take a lump sum payment (*muaccele*) from Battal Hüseyin for the transfer of the one-fourth share of Sadullah to him.<sup>88</sup> As it is seen, the *malikâne* system enabled the central treasury to increase revenues from the transfers of the shares of the *malikâne*. It provided the local notables with legitimate ground for inheriting their sources of revenues and passing them down from one generation to the next without a break.

When Battal Hüseyin Paşa failed in the campaign of Anapa and fled once more to Russia, this time with his son Tayyar Bey, the central government rendered void all the tax-farms held by Battal Paşa. Afterwards, his three-fourth share in the *muhassılık* of Canik and half-share in the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki passed to his other son Hayreddin Paşa in 1791.<sup>89</sup>

Although Hayreddin Paşa was seen as the most suitable person by the center to collect the taxes, which were especially important for the provisioning of the ongoing campaign from Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki, the rivalry between him and Abdullah Paşa, the former *kethüda* of his father as well as the lack of support from the population led him to fall from power.

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<sup>87</sup> *MAD 9570*, p. 106-7. Hayreddin Bey paid 55.000 *kuruş muaccele* for the half share.

<sup>88</sup> *MAD 9570*, pp. 106-7. Battal Hüseyin Paşa paid 35.000 *kuruş* for the one-fourth share.

<sup>89</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 2241* (1791-2).

Hayreddin Paşa appears not to have had the support among the population of Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki. Instead, the inhabitants of Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki promised to collect an amount of 600 purse (*kise*), which was the *muaccele* demanded by the state for the two regions from Hayreddin, and to transfer it to the center on condition that someone else from the center should be appointed as the *muhasıl*.<sup>90</sup> Accordingly, a certain Osman Ağa from the center was appointed to the position for the year 1792-3. Nevertheless, he collected several taxes (*salaria akçesi*) under the name of *tevzi*’ from the population seven times and did not transmit them to the center. He was soon replaced by a certain Hafız Mehmed for the following year.<sup>91</sup>

It is observed that until 1798<sup>92</sup>, there was still the problem of the debt of the population of Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki who could not pay the above amount. In other words, the center was not able to extract the surplus from the population properly by appointing the *muhasıl* from the center. During the periods of political turmoil and disorder (1779-1781, 1790-1799, 1805-1807), the regular delivery of hemp and fibre to the Imperial Navy was interrupted and an arrear (*bakaya*) problem emerged due to the delay of these materials. It is clear that hemp and fibre manufacture necessitated an organization of production under the intendant and also ships through which the products could be transferred to İstanbul. However, the role of the Caniklizâdes as the *muhasıls* of Canik in the organization of hemp production and the ways they dealt with the producers and

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<sup>90</sup> *Cevdet Darbhane* 67 (1792).

<sup>91</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 18843* (1793).

<sup>92</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 6051* (1798).



merchants are not reflected in the tax-farm registers.<sup>93</sup> Due to the absence of the court records of Samsun covering these periods, these matters remained unexplored.

The execution of Hayreddin Paşa and Mikdad Ahmed Paşa (brother of Battal Paşa) in 1792 coincided with the emergence of new economic policies at the center. The aim of the newly established treasury, *irad-ı cedit hazinesi*, was a step forward in the gradual removal of the *malikâne* and *esham* system and in the creation of a fund for the increasing military expenditures.<sup>94</sup> Under such circumstances, the tax-farms held by the Caniklizâdes such as the tax-farm of *muhasıllık* of Canik and the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki fell vacant (*mahlul*) and were first confiscated by the central treasury (*darbhane-i amire*) and then their surplus (*faiz*) was reserved to *irad-ı cedit* treasury.<sup>95</sup> The tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik was administrated by the *muhasıls*, between 1792 and 1799, appointed from among the central elites as short-term tax farmers. In 1792, *kapıcıbaşı* Osman Ağa was designated as the *muhasıl* of Canik for one year and he was followed by other officials, who had no relations with the region.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Canikli Ali Paşa inspected the looms of fibre producers in Ünye and sent a report to the center about how to increase the production by the extension of the working place. *Cevdet İktisat* 949.

<sup>94</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişme Dönemi*, pp. 156-7.

<sup>95</sup> *MAD* 4567, p. 24/2.

<sup>96</sup> Osman Ağa collected the revenues as a short-term tax-farmer. See *MAD* 9570. In 1793, the revenues of Canik *muhasıllığı* was sold to Hafız Mehmed Emin Ağa. *DBŞM* 6192. Then Ahmed Efendi became the *muhasıl* of Canik in 1795 with a *faiz* of 40.000 *kuruş* to *irad-ı cedit*. One year later, this time a local notable of Canik, Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa, was appointed as the *muhasıl* of Canik. In 1797 Yusuf Ziya Paşa and in 1798 Mustafa Ağa were seen as the *muhasıls*. See *MAD* 9582, p. 111.

**Table 2. *Muhassıls* of Canik (1761-1826)**

Year	
1761-1765	*Süleyman Paşa
1765-1779	*Canikli El Hac Ali Paşa
1780-1785	*Canikli El Hac Ali Paşa
1785-1789	*Battal Hüseyin Paşa
1791	*Seyyid Hayreddin Ragıp Bey
1792-3	Osman Ağa
1793-4	Hafız Mehmed Emin Ağa
1795	Ahmed Efendi
1796	Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa
1797	El-Hac Yusuf Ziya Paşa
1798	Mustafa Ağa
1799-1801	*Battal El-Hac Hüseyin Paşa
1801	Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa
1801-1805	*Esseyyid Tayyar Mahmud Paşa
1806	Ali Ağa
1807	Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa
1808	*Tayyar Mahmud Paşa
1809	Yusuf Ziya Paşa (kapıcıbaşı İsmail Efendi, <i>ber vech-i emanet</i> )
1810	Yusuf Ziya Paşa (Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa, <i>ber vech-i emanet</i> )
1811	Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa
1812-1818	Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Paşa
1818-1820	Mehmed Hüsrev Paşa
1820-1821	İbrahim Paşa
1821-1822	El-Hac Salih Paşa

1822-1823	Hafız Ali Paşa
1823-1824	Hafız Ali Paşa
1824-1826	El-Hac Hüseyin Paşa

\*The Members of the Canikli Dynasty

Sources: *MAD 9582*, *MAD 4597*, *CM 6003*, *CM 2241*, *MAD 9543*, *MAD 9570*.

In 1799, when the Ottoman state signed a peace treaty with the Russians, Battal Hüseyin and Tayyar were pardoned by the Ottoman state with the mediation of Tsar Pavel I himself. Battal Hüseyin Paşa once more served as the *muhasıl* of Canik until his death in 1801. The last representatives of the dynasty of the Caniklizâdes, Battal Paşa and his son, reactivated their influence over Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki. The status of the tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik turned again into a *malikâne* but remained tied to the treasury of *irad-ı cedit*.<sup>97</sup> Tayyar Mahmud Paşa inherited the *muhasıllık* of Canik (serving as the *muhasıl* of Canik in 1801-5 and 1807) together with the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki and Tirebolu in 1801 when his father died.<sup>98</sup>

In 1805, the tax-farm of Canik was tied to the *Tersane-i Amire Hazinesi* (the treasury of Imperial Navy), which was established for the management of the finances of the arsenal. After the execution of the last Caniklizâde, Tayyar Paşa, in 1808, Hazine-darzâde Süleyman Paşa was elected by the central government to administer Canik.

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<sup>97</sup> *MAD 9582*, p. 111. The lump sum payment (*muaccele*) of this tax-farm was 50.000 *kuruş* and apart from that the entire *bedel* of the tax-farm was 58.216 *kuruş* 42.500 *kuruş* was referred to as *faiz* (profit) assigned to *irad-ı cedit*. The remaining amount left (15.716 *kuruş*) consisted of the annual payment (*mal-ı miri*) and the other payments such as *kalemiye* and *harc-ı aklam*.

**Table 3. *Muaccele* and Estimated Annual Profit of the Tax-farm of *Muhassılık* of Canik in *kuruş* (1748-1791)**

Year	Total <i>muaccele</i>	Annual Profit
1748	47.500	16.625 - 19.000
1755	47.500	14.250 - 16.625
1757	69.466	20.839 - 24.313
1763-1764	130.000	32.500 - 39.000
1765-1766	50.000	12.500 - 15.000
1776	110.000	19.800 - 24.200
1778	69.250	12.465 - 15.235
1780	110.000	19.800 - 24.200
1785	110.000	16.500 - 22.000
1785	110.000 - 140.000	21.000 - 28.000
1791	120.000	18.000 - 24.000

In sum the members of the Canikli dynasty held the tax revenues of Canik successively as a *malikâne*. By looking at the *muaccele*s paid by them for this tax-farm, it is possible to reach some tentative conclusions about the annual profits owned by the Caniklizâdes (see Table 3 above). As previously discussed, the *malikâne*-holder had to remit two kinds of payments to the central treasury in return for the right to the tax-source during his life-time, that is, the *mal* (yearly payment) and the *muaccele*, lump sum payment, which was estimated to

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<sup>98</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 6146* and *MAD 9582*, p. 112. Tayyar Paşa obtained the tax-farm of Canik, 1/2 of the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki and 1/3 of the tax-farm of Tirebolu.

correspond to two to ten times the annual profit.<sup>99</sup> In the case of the tax-farm of the *muhassillık* of Canik, the annual payment remained 23.787 *kuruş*.<sup>100</sup> However, the *mal* of this tax-farm was paid in kind. In other words, the Caniklizâdes as the life-time and hereditary holder of the revenues of this tax-farm had to deliver 5597 *kantar* fibre (*tel-i Fatsa*) instead of 23.787 *kuruş*, plus 400 *kantar* hemp (*kendir-i ham*) and 1000 *kuruş* for the *toprak basdı* as the yearly payment.

While the annual payment remained unchanged, the amount of *muaccele*<sup>101</sup> increased more than two-fold from 1748 to 1791, that is from 47.500 *kuruş* to 120.000 *kuruş*. While the *muaccele* remained 47.500 *kuruş* between 1748 and 1755, it increased to 69.466 *kuruş* in 1757 and reached 130.000 *kuruş* in 1763. This increase in 1763 was probably due to the death of Ali Ağa, who was the brother-in-law (*kayınbirader*) of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa. The latter's sons did not want to loose the one-fourth share to person outside the Canikli family. In 1765, due to the oppression of Süleyman Paşa of tax-payers, his half-share was retracted by the government. This shows the intervention of the Ottoman state in favour of

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<sup>99</sup> Genç, "18. Yüzyıla Ait Osmanlı Mali Verilerinin İktisadi Faaliyetin Göstergesi Olarak Kullanılabilirliği Üzerinde Bir Çalışma" in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, pp. 156-157.

<sup>100</sup> As Genç argues, the yearly payment of the life-time tax-farms remained "frozen" in the eighteenth century. The annual payment was determined by the central government and could not be changed by the auction as opposed to the *muaccele*, which was given to the highest bidder. Genç, "18. Yüzyıla Ait Osmanlı Mali Verilerinin İktisadi Faaliyetin Göstergesi Olarak Kullanılabilirliği Üzerinde Bir Çalışma" in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, pp. 156-157.

<sup>101</sup> "The share-holders" in the table refers to the members of the Canikli dynasty and the successive changes in the shares (*hisse*) held by them. The *muaccele* paid for the each share is given in paranthesis in the column of "*muaccele* paid for shares". The total amount of the *muaccele* is assessed through the value of these shares in the absence of information for the total value of the *muaccele*. However, there is no consistency among the value of the equal shares even in the same year. For example, in 1785, for a one-fourth share in this tax-farm was bought by Battal Paşa in return for 35.000 *kuruş* and in the same year, his son Hayreddin paid 27.500 *kuruş* for a one-fourth share. Therefore, it is difficult to find out the exact value of the *muaccele*.


the tax-payers when there was an abusement by the *malikâne*-holder. In addition, it also indicates the shortcomings of the relatively autonomous rule of the *malikâne*-holder, who was responsible not only for the tax-collection but also the administration. The half share of Süleyman was sold to his brother Ali Bey who provided significant services to the government in the campaign. Therefore, it is highly likely that the decrease in *muaccele* from 130.000 in 1763 to 50.000 in 1765 was due to the dispersion of population by the previous over-taxation. Ten years later, Ali Paşa' son Battal Hüseyin bought one- fourth share in 1776 and another one-fourth share in 1778. It is interesting that there was a requirement of the payment of a new *muaccele* for the transfer of the shares within the family members. In that way, the central treasury increased its revenues.

While the amount of *muaccele* increased more than two-fold from 47.500 *kuruş* to 120.000 *kuruş*, the annual profit<sup>102</sup> obtained by the Caniklizâdes from 1748 to 1791 did not increase so much. It rose from a range of 16.625-19.000 *kuruş* to the range of 18.000-24.000 *kuruş*. I will deal with this in the next chapter while examining the formation of personal wealth of the Caniklizâde family.

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<sup>102</sup> The range of annual profit is based on the calculations of Genç, who reached a general rate of annual profit/*muaccele* for the eighteenth century tax-farms. See “18. Yüzyıla Ait Osmanlı Mali Verilerinin”, in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, graph on p. 172 for a trend of the profit of the *muaccele*s invested in life-term tax-farms and see his “Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi” in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, the table of profit rates on p. 120. Basing it on this profit rates, I calculated the range of the possible net annual profits gained by the Caniklizâdes. However, it is better to consider the amount of the profit only as an indication of the actual profit.

**Figure 1. Changes in the down-payments (*muaccele* in *kuruş*) of the tax-farm of the *muhassılık* of Canik (1748-1791)**



As a conclusion, except for the years of crises in the region, the members of the Canikli dynasty controlled the *muhassılık* of Canik in the second half of the century, and profited from the tax-revenues. As far as the archival material reveals, they did not administer a variety of tax-farms in Samsun region except the followings.

The tax-farm of Samsun and its dependants (*mukata'a-i Samsun ve tevabiha*) was held by Mehmet Emin Bey, Ali Paşa's son, from 1771 onwards as a life-time tax-farm. It was tied to the tax-farms of the two Holy cities (*mukata'a-i Haremeyn-i Şerifeyn*). It can be considered as one of the medium size tax-farms of the family.<sup>103</sup> Although Mehmet Emin Bey was seen as the holder of this tax-farm

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<sup>103</sup> The annual payment (*mal*) of the tax-farm of Samsun stayed as 3612,5 *kuruş* for the years of 1771, 1773, 1776, 1777 and the lump sum payment (*muaccele*) was equal to 5600 *kuruş* in 1771. It

in 1778-9 and 1781, he indebted to the central treasury for all of the annual payments throughout these years.<sup>104</sup> As late as 1791, his debt remained unpaid and then it was delegated to the centrally appointed official in return for the payment of the debts owed to the central treasury.<sup>105</sup>

Secondly, the Caniklizâdes began to have an influence over the rice production areas around Samsun. They controlled the tax-farm of the rice of Bafra and *bennak-ı Köprü* from 1771 onwards as a life-time tax-farm<sup>106</sup>.

Thirdly, the tax-farm of the *zeamet-i kebir* (or *büyük zeamet*) was added to the list of the Caniklizâdes. It was within the border of the *sancak* of Canik and held by the family as a short-term tax-farm. Battal Bey, as the elder son in the family, was responsible for its administration. It seems that there was no *malikâne*-holder at the center who was interested in this tax-farm.<sup>107</sup>

However, the Caniklizâdes could not enter into the auction for the tax-farms such as the customs and sheep taxes, which seem to have been under the monopoly of the central elites. For example, the tax-farm of the customs of Samsun, Sinop and İnebolu (*mukata'a-i gümrük-i iskele-i Samsun ve Sinop ve İnebolu*) was usually held by the superintendant of the customs (*gümrük emini*) of

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was very likely that in 1771, the right over this tax-farm passed from Musa Ağa to Mehmed Bey. Both of these payments were transferred to the *darbhane*. *DBŞM 4043*, p. 24-5, 37-8, 44.

<sup>104</sup> His debt (*bakaya*) for the years 1778-9 and 1781-2 totalled to 15.575,5 *kuruş*. This means that, every year he owed 3600 *kuruş*. See *DBŞM 3815*.

<sup>105</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 2241*. As stated before, in 1791, all the tax-farms under the control of the Caniklizâdes were seized by the Ottoman state and Osman Ağa was appointed as the *muhasıl* of Canik. The tax-farm of Samsun was delivered to him in return for the payment of a debt totalled 16.330 *kuruş*.

<sup>106</sup> "*bedel-i iltizam-ı mukata'a-i çeltük-i enhar-ı Bafra ve bennak-ı Köprü*" remained as 2760 *kuruş* between 1771-1779. *DBŞM 4043*, p. 25-6, 33, 37-8, 43, 47. Although there is a reference to the *voyvoda* of Köprü, Mehmed Ağa, it is not clear whether he was appointed by the center as a *voyvoda* or he was simply an agent of the Caniklizâdes.



İstanbul.<sup>108</sup> Likewise, the tax-farm of the sheep of Canik, Sivas, Amasya, Çorum, Bozok, Arapgir (*mukata'a-i adet-i agnam ve resm-i ağıl-ı müselmanan ve gebran*) was combined under one tax-farm and prominent members of the central elite such as the *reisülküttab* and grand vizier held the revenues of this highly profitable tax-farm in return for a high amount of down payment.<sup>109</sup>

#### Tax-farm of Amasya: Caniklizâde - Çapanoğlu Rivalry

The rule of the Caniklizâdes over Amasya was based on more coercion than consensus. This can be followed from the imperial orders sent to the members of the dynasty as well as the petitions of complaint forwarded to the center by the population of the subprovince of Amasya in different times under their rule. On the one hand, the central government needed to delegate the administration of Amasya to a strong hand to ensure the delivery of necessary provisions and soldiers during campaign of 1768-1774 and to prevent the banditry of unemployed soldiers during the peace time. On the other hand, the state had to maintain the legitimacy in the eyes of the tax-payers to continue the tax-collection and had to prevent the oppression by governors who were the representative of the Sultan. This balance did not seem to work in Amasya during the rule of the Caniklizâdes. The financement of the war and the attempts of the family to accumulate wealth by using the means of being a state official led to the use of

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<sup>107</sup> The total annual payment (referred to as *bedel* in the register) of this tax-farm varied between 1500 and 2000 *kuruş* for the period of 1771-1774. *DBŞM 4043*, p. 7, 37-38, 43-44.

<sup>108</sup> Mehmet Emin Ağa, the *gümrük emini* of İstanbul, held the customs of Samsun and its dependents as a *malikâne* between 1765-6. Likewise, İsmail Ağa possessed these revenues as life-time tax-farm in 1775-6. See *DBRM 24388*, *MAD 4113*, *MAD 4008*, *DBŞM-HMH 21703*.

<sup>109</sup> *MAD 9570*.

force and this in turn led to the dispersion of the tax-payers of Amasya. Therefore, the central state intervened using the Çapanoğlus against the Caniklizâdes. As already discussed in Chapter Two, Amasya was the major region contested between the two dynasties and the competition between them resulted in war twice (first in 1779 and then in 1805).

The Canikli's involvement in Amasya began in 1768 when Canikli El-Hac Ali Bey was entitled to collect the war-time (*seferiye*) and peace-time (*hazeriye*) contributions of Amasya.<sup>110</sup> In other words, Ali Bey started to hold the revenues of Amasya as *mutasarrıf*. The revenues in question were referred to as the *mukata'a-i bedel-i sancak-ı Amasya*. The revenues of the tax-farm of the subprovince of Amasya consisted of *hazeriye* and *seferiye*, which were granted to the *mutasarrıfs* of Amasya. The former was equal to 3000 *kuruş* and the latter amounted to 8250 *kuruş*. The amount of war-time and peace-time taxes remained unchanged from 1768 to the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>111</sup> This tax-farm is a revealing example of the main developments of the century, that is, the *mukataaization* of the *sancak* revenues.

The Canikli's relationship with the tax-payers, the Çapanoğlus and the Ottoman state entered a new phase of conflict when the *sancak* of Amasya was assigned to Canikli Ali Bey as a life-term tax-farm (*malikâne*) in 1772.<sup>112</sup> Afterwards, Amasya was governed by the Caniklizâdes like a family firm. His

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<sup>110</sup> MAD 3194, p. 483.

<sup>111</sup> MAD 3194, MAD 10219, *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 54 (1774), pp. 40-41, *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 54 (1772), p. 33, *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 62 (1786), p. 18, *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 60 (1783), p. 57.

<sup>112</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye* 16775 (1772). Amasya was assigned to Ali Bey by the Ottoman government in return for providing security in the region, repression of the banditry of unemployed *levendat* and protecting the Black Sea coasts against Russian attacks.

sons, Battal Hüseyin and Mikdad Ahmet served as deputies (*mütesellim*) of Ali Paşa in the 1770s. As seen below, not only his sons but also his retinue members began to take shares from the ever increasing revenues coming from the tax-farms controlled by the Caniklizâdes in the subprovince of Amasya and neighbouring regions in the 1770s and 1780s.

There seems to have been a correlation between the enlargement of dominions and the escalation of abuses, especially in the case of Amasya. The Caniklizâdes often abused their position as *mutasarrıf* and their abuses escalated as their power increased in Amasya region. When Battal Hüseyin was appointed the *mütesellim* of Amasya by his father in 1774, he took harsh measures against the notables and the ulema of the districts of Köprü, Ladik, Gümüş who opposed their rule. Some of them were executed and their properties were seized. Similarly, the local notables either submitted to the authority of the dynasty or left Amasya.<sup>113</sup>

This tyrannical rule of Ali Paşa and his son Battal Hüseyin reached the point that the people of Amasya sent a petition of complaint to the central government through the mediation of the *müfti* of Amasya.<sup>114</sup> The government dealt with the injustice of the Caniklizâdes in two ways. First, in order to sustain the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the people, a rescript of justice (*adaletname*) was directly sent to the name of Canikli Ali Paşa in 1775 to end the oppression.<sup>115</sup> Secondly, the government ordered him to replace his deputy. As a result, Ali Paşa transferred the half-share of the tax-farm of Amasya to his other

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<sup>113</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 21.

son Mikdad Ahmet and entitled him to rule Amasya in the same year.<sup>116</sup> However, in the following year, the complaints about Canikli's oppression continued and the central government wavered between revoking Amasya from them and risking Ali Paşa's threat of a large military force.<sup>117</sup>

The continuation of the Caniklizâdes' coercion led the notables of Amasya to take shelter under Çapanoğlu Mustafa Bey in 1778, who took this opportunity to increase the tension between the two dynasties. Çapanoğlu Mustafa Bey already felt under pressure by the empowerment of the Caniklizâdes in the 1770s with the governorship of five regions (Canik, Trabzon, Amasya, and then Erzurum, Sivas as well as Kastamonu and Tokat). As discussed in the second chapter, the two dynasties moved into open conflict and at the end of the resulting war the Caniklizâdes were defeated in 1779. The central government favored the Çapanoğlus against the Caniklizâdes and decided to execute Canikli Ali Paşa. The reasons were cited as the oppression of the tax-payers, abuses in the finance and provisioning of the campaign of 1778, the autonomous behaviour of Canikli Ali Paşa, his criticism of the ruling elite of İstanbul and the involuntary action in the Crimean campaign.<sup>118</sup> By declaring Canikli Ali Paşa as rebel and revoking his title of vizierate, the Ottoman state attempted to end the rule of the Caniklizâdes who became so powerful that they could act against the imperial orders. However,

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<sup>114</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 21.

<sup>115</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 54, pp. 94-96.

<sup>116</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 54, p. 134a/1.

<sup>117</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye 12500* (1776). The imperial council discussed this matter and decided that it was not proper to withdraw Amasya from Ali Paşa, who was serving as the Commander-in-Chief (*Serasker*) of Kars in the campaign against İran. It was stated that he controlled an extensive military force and could rebel against this decision.

<sup>118</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, pp. 101-106 and Mert, *XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoğulları*, pp. 42-43.

Canikli Ali Paşa was not arrested by the Çapanoğlus and other provincial governors. He succeeded in escaping to Russia and lived there for two years until 1781.

Between 1779 and 1781, the tax-farm of Amasya was dispensed as *ber vech-i arpalık* to high state officials as an additional income. Since it was not so profitable and the tax-farm revenue was nearly equal to expenses of a tax-collector, it was granted without a lump sum payment. When Ali Paşa was pardoned in 1781, he paid 15.000 *kuruş muaccele* (lump sum) to hold the tax-farm of Amasya with his son Mikdad Ahmet as a life-term tax-farm.<sup>119</sup> After his death in 1785, Mikdad Ahmet and his other son Mehmet Bey inherited the revenues of Amasya as *malikâne*.

Mikdad Paşa's administration of Amasya in these years was no better in terms of over exploitation and oppression of the inhabitants. Most of the complaints about him consisted of injustices such as the illegal extraction of taxes, seizure of the farms and livestock of the peasants, financing the expenses of his retinue from the tax-payers, etc. In 1786, Mikdad Ahmet included the population of Ladik in the distribution of *vilayet* expenditures and collected illegal taxes from the population, despite the fact that the district of Ladik was exempted from these extra-ordinary taxes. In addition, the private expenditures of Canikli Ali Paşa such as the expenses of his mansion were added as tax-burdens over the population.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 59, p. 36. The peace-time and war-time contributions were 3000 *kuruş* and 8250 *kuruş* respectively.

<sup>120</sup> In 1770s, there are several examples of the extraction of the household expenses of the Canikli Ali Paşa as the *mutasarrıf* of Amasya. *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 54, pp. 82-83 is the register of the *salyane defteri*, that is, the expenditures made by Ali Paşa within 57 days for the maintenance of

Moreover, the inhabitants of Ladik claimed that the commanders (*bölükbaşı*) of Mikdad Ahmet extracted fine dues (*ceraim*) by force. Under these circumstances, the people of Ladik became exhausted and dispersed (*perakende ve perişan olup*) and an official from the center was appointed to take the illegal taxes back.<sup>121</sup>

In another case, the artisans of Amasya, composed of bread-sellers, timber-merchants, butchers, quilt-makers, applied to the court against the oppression of Mikdad Paşa. They complained that they had supplied the private expenditures of him and his retinue with provisions and goods for eight months. They brought their case before the judge and claimed that they were exhausted by his increasing demands.<sup>122</sup>

The commander (*yüzbaşı*) Seyyid Mustafa wrote another petition about the tyranny of Mikdad Paşa. He complained that Mikdad Paşa did not allow him to *register* soldiers from Amasya when he was ordered to recruit 150 soldiers for the defense of Özi. Furthermore, he claimed that Mikdad Paşa seized his livestock, property as well as provisions in his store-house in valued about 10.000 *kuruş*.<sup>123</sup>

All these complaints about Mikdad Ahmet Paşa show his rapid accumulation of wealth during his stay in Amasya during the 1770s and the 1780s. While the other members of the dynasty preferred to live in Bafra and used Amasya as the secondary place for residence, Mikdad Ahmet Paşa gained subsistence in Amasya. He owned several immovable properties and established two religious endowments in Amasya in the 1780s. The increase in his property

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his household (*daire*) when they visited Amasya. The total expenses was equal to 18.385 *kuruş*. It was allocated among the subdistricts of Amasya.

<sup>121</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 62, pp. 35-36.

<sup>122</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 61, p. 53 (1785).

and the coercive means he used in possessing them can easily be followed through the records of the court registers of Amasya. This will be discussed in chapter four.

Under the unending complaints about Mikdad Ahmed, the central government retracted Amasya from him and granted it to Beyhan Sultan as *malikâne* in 1789.<sup>124</sup> It was highly possible that Amasya was governed by a deputy of Beyhan Sultan until the beginning of the nineteenth century.<sup>125</sup> It is interesting to note that Amasya was not assigned to the Çapanoğlus in order to refrain from another conflict between the two dynasties, at least until 1805.

In 1801, Battal Paşa wrote a letter to the central government, asking for granting of Amasya to his son Tayyar Paşa. He argued that since Amasya was like a property of his family and governed by them as a family firm, it should not be given to the Çapanoğlus. He went on to threaten the central government saying that the soldiers employed in the retinue of Tayyar Paşa would otherwise revolt and this would spread to other soldiers.<sup>126</sup> However, the rivalry over Amasya between the two dynasties revived again following the grant of Amasya and Sivas to the Çapanoğlus in return for the establishment of the New Order (*Nizam-ı Cedid*) army.

In sum, the Caniklizâdes had been oppressive rulers of Amasya. They controlled the *sancak* revenues of Amasya from 1768 onwards as the *mutasarrıf*

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<sup>123</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 64, p. 8 (1786-7).

<sup>124</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 2241.

<sup>125</sup> Beyhan Sultan was seen as the *malikâne*-holder of Amasya in 1799. *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 65, p. 6. Tayyar Paşa was later granted the revenues of Amasya in 1800-1. *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 65, p. 14.

<sup>126</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun* 5276 (1801).

of Amasya. After the revenues of Amasya became *malikâne* in 1772, the Canikli dynasty extended their control over the tax-farms within the subprovince of Amasya. That is to say, they started to hold new revenue sources to supplement the war-time and peace-time levies which were not enough to maintain the military force and to provision the campaigns of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792 against the Russians. In addition, the expenses of their household members were provided by the funds allocated among the subdistricts of Amasya.

The Caniklizâdes had a chance to finance their expenses and accumulate wealth by obtaining new revenue sources in Amasya as well as in the neighbouring regions. I will examine below some of these tax-farms held by the Caniklizâdes in the region. The diversity of the *mukata'as* shows how the family constructed their power in Amasya through the establishment of a network in the periphery. Ali Paşa's sons were the administrators of these tax-farms and they also employed deputies to ensure the tax-collection such as stewards, *voyvodas*, etc.

The tax-farms of Merzifon, Mecidözü, Hacı Köy, Milli Kavilü seem to have been managed by the members of the Canikli dynasty. It should be stated that this information is based on the register of *DBŞM 4043*, which is an account between the *kapı kethüdası* and *sarrağ* Ohannes (see part I of this chapter). Although it is difficult to construct an information about the actual value and payments of the tax-farms annually from this account book, it still sheds light on the variety of revenue sources held by the Caniklizâdes. It also indicates that the tax-farms held by the Caniklizâdes as a subcontractor of a *malikâne*-holder was a matter between the *malikâne*-holder and the *mültezim*. This relationship was



mediated by the *kapı kethüdası*, who ensured the transfer of annual payments to the *malikâne*-holder from the Caniklizâdes. The relationship between the actual holder and the subcontractor (de facto tax-collector) was not reflected in registers of tax-farms (*mukata' a defterleri*).

Among these, the tax-farm of Merzifon first appears in the registers as early as 1769 and it was one of the most consistent tax-farms that the Caniklizâdes held from 1769 to 1779. It constitutes an example of a practice known as chain tax-farming in the literature. A well known fact is that most of the life-term tax-farms (*malikâne*) were controlled by higher military and bureaucratic officials, high-level *ulema* and also provincial administrators such as *beylerbeyis*. These upper ranking state officials were mostly absentee tax-farmers and transferred the collection of their tax revenues to subcontractors, *mültezims* who in turn sub-farmed the revenues to lesser local notables. In the case of the tax-farm of Merzifon, the *malikâne*-holders were Mahmud Bey and Silahdar Abdi Bey. They sub-farmed this revenue source to the Caniklizâdes, who just began to distinguish themselves from the other local notables as the *mutasarrıf* of Amasya. Ali Paşa's son (Battal Bey) seems to have carried out the bureaucratic works related to the tax-farm. In addition, Şihmanzâde Ali Ağa was appointed by the Caniklizâdes as the *voyvoda* (another subcontractual position) of the tax-farm of Merzifon. In fact, Ali Ağa was from among the members of the household of Canikli Ali Paşa and served him as *kethüda* (steward).<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> The two share-holders in this *malikâne*, Mahmud and Abdi Bey, sub-farmed the *mukata' a* of Merzifon to the Caniklizâdes for one year. In return, Caniklizâdes paid two kinds of remittances to their *malikâne* owners in a year. First, a lump sum payment called *peşin* was delivered to them. It stayed in fixed value (3000 *kuruş*) for the years of 1773, 1776, 1777. Secondly, *bedel* which can be

Another client of Canikli Ali Paşa, Kavaklı Deli Ali had possessions in Merzifon. He held not only the tax-farm of the tithe of Merzifon but also owned two big estates and raised a significant amount of livestock. At the same time, Ali held the tax-farm of the *tahmis* (coffee-grind) of Amasya. Moreover, the descendents of Ali himself possessed mills, vineyards, farms in villages around Merzifon.<sup>128</sup> This shows how the Caniklizâdes established a network from Amasya to Merzifon and to villages by distributing out the revenues.

Secondly, the tax-farm of Milli and Kavlü (tribe)<sup>129</sup> was controlled by the other son of Ali Paşa, Mikdad Ahmed Bey in 1772. The tribe of Milli Kavlü was living around Mecidözü.<sup>130</sup> Mikdad Bey served as a deputy and subcontractor (*mültezim*) of four share-holders: İbrahim Bey Efendizâde, Bostancıbaşızâdeler, Emin Paşazâde and Halil Ağa.<sup>131</sup>

Thirdly, the Caniklizâdes had the chance to spread their rights of tax-collection by obtaining the tax-farm of Hacı Köy<sup>132</sup> and supplemented their

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considered as the annual payment of a *mukata'a*, and known as *mal* in the literature, was paid (5000 *kuruş*) in three instalments (*taksit*) by the Caniklizâdes in 1773. See *DBŞM 4043*, p. 3, 12, 21, 23, 26, 33, 37, 43, 47.

<sup>128</sup> *DBŞM-MHF 65/26-4*. This inventory list of Ali was registered by the agents of the central treasury when Ali Paşa's wealth was confiscated in 1780. As stated before, Ali Paşa's followers and supporters could not escape from the expropriation of their possessions.

<sup>129</sup> Milli Kavlü was a Kurdish tribe, who lived in Sivas-Çorum-Amasya region and in Diyarbakir. See Cevdet Türkay, *Başbakanlık Arşivi Belgelerine Göre Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatler*, İstanbul: Tercüman Kaynak Eserler Dizisi, p. 1979. Yusuf Halaçoğlu refers to the tribe of Milli, who were tied to the *voyvodalık* of Diyarbakir at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Despite the attempts of the central government to settle Milli tribe in Rakka region, the tribe was mobile between Urfa and Erzurum and engaged in brigandage. *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskan Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997, p. 46, 52, 85, 114.

<sup>130</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 17964*.

<sup>131</sup> The share of them were 1537,5, 1025, 1025, 525 *kuruş* respectively Mikdad Ahmed's total payment to them as *bedel* was tantamount to 4115,5 *kuruş* as a subcontractor. *DBŞM 4043*, p. 23, 26, 44, 47.

<sup>132</sup> "*bedel-i iltizam-ı Hacı Köy*" remained fixed (7126 *kuruş*) between 1772 and 1776. *DBŞM 4043*, p. 23, 25, 36-37, 43-44.

wealth in Amasya. Fourthly, they controlled the tax-farm of Mecidözü through another client, Milli Musa, who was killed during the events of 1779.<sup>133</sup> He owned a big mansion in Amasya and two big estates in the subdistrict of Varay of Amasya. Furthermore, several people from Amasya and Varay were indebted to him.<sup>134</sup> This indicates that not only did the Canikli family become rich by extending their influence in the region as tax-collector, but several of their clients and followers also accumulated wealth by the same financial network.

#### Revenue Sources of Karahisar-ı Şarki, Kastamonu, Tokat and Sivas

As seen above, the Caniklizâdes had a hereditary control over Canik and Amasya at *sancak* level by serving as the *muhasıl* of Canik and *mutasarrıf* of Amasya. In addition, they obtained the right to collect several tax-farms in the vicinity of these two regions either as *mültezim* or life-time and hereditary holders. Another *sancak* that was held by the Caniklizâdes at the level of *sancak* was Karahisar-ı Şarki. Their control over Karahisar-ı Şarki developed from the position of subcontractor of an absentee-holders to a share-holder in the tax-farm. Like the *muhasıllık* of Canik, their power over this *sancak* continued as long as central government did not intervene by confiscation.

From 1769 onwards, the Caniklizâdes appear in Karahisar-ı Şarki as de facto tax collectors of absentee-holders. There seems to be two share-holders who came from among the central elites in 1769; Hasanpaşazâde Molla Bey and

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<sup>133</sup> They held this tax-farm from the 1772 onwards. *DBŞM 4043*, p. 16, 23, 26, 38, 43. See also *DBŞM-MHF 65/26-1*.

*kapıcıbaşı* Seyyid Ahmed Ağa.<sup>135</sup> Two years later, another two persons were added to the *malikâne*-holders, Mehmed Ağa and Mustafa Molla Bey.<sup>136</sup> The Caniklizâdes were seen as the subcontractor of these *malikâne*-holders. In 1772, the son of Ali Paşa, Battal Hüseyin Bey realized a share from the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki in his ownname.<sup>137</sup> This development was significant because it shows us how the mechanism of sub-contraction functioned and how a dynasty enlarged the dominions from a position of subcontractor to a shareholder of one of the highly valued *malikâne* tax-farms. Four years after obtaining a share, Battal Hüseyin became the *voyvoda* (provincial administrator in charge of collecting revenues) of Karahisar-ı Şarki.<sup>138</sup> Until the first break in the history of the family (1779), Karahisar-ı Şarki was under the domination of the Caniklizâdes.<sup>139</sup>

Their control over Karahisar-ı Şarki continued after 1781. First, Battal Hüseyin re-established his half share and then his sons (Tayyar Mahmud Bey and Seyyid Ali Bey) obtained the other half in 1784. In that way, the Caniklizâdes owned the whole tax-farm as *malikâne*. In addition, Battal's sons obtained the tax-farm of Tamzara and its dependents within the sub-province of Karahisar-ı Şarki

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<sup>134</sup> For the confiscation of Milli Musa's property in different parts of Amasya as well as the amount of grain and other provision due to the tax-farm of Mecidözü, see *Cevdet Maliye 17914* (1779).

<sup>135</sup> *DBŞM 4043*, p. 3, 21.

<sup>136</sup> *DBŞM 4043*, p. 37.

<sup>137</sup> *DBŞM 4043*, p. 38. The new was Seyyid Hüseyin Bey and it is very likely that he was the son of Ali Bey, since the lump sum payment was included in the category of the expenditures of Ali Bey, *muhasıl* of Canik. The lump sum payment (*muaccele*) was paid in two instalments (15.000 and 20.000 *kuruş*) This shows us that this tax-farm was one of the profitable and high-valued ones in the region.

<sup>138</sup> Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, p. 166.

<sup>139</sup> *DBŞM 4043*, p. 23, 25, 26, 43-44, 47.

as a life-time tax-farm.<sup>140</sup> When Battal Hüseyin Paşa fled to Russia in 1790, his half-share in the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki passed to his son Hayreddin Paşa.<sup>141</sup>

Like the tax-farm of the *muhassıllık* of Canik, the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki became vacant (*mahlul*) and was first confiscated by the imperial treasury (*darbhane-i amire*) and then their surplus revenue (*faiz*) were reserved to *irad-ı cedit* treasury. The new treasury cancelled the *malikâne* status of the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki and appointed Abdullah Paşazâde Ahmed Bey as the short-term tax-farmer for the year 1793-94.<sup>142</sup>

Upon the pardoning, Battal Hüseyin Paşa reactivated his influence over Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki. The revenue of Karahisar-ı Şarki was once more delegated by the new treasury to Battal and Tayyar Paşas as *malikâne* in 1799-1800.<sup>143</sup> Tayyar Mahmud Paşa inherited the *muhassıllık* of Canik together with the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki (1/2 share) and Tirebolu (1/3 share) when his father died in 1801.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 2241. Tayyar Bey and Seyyid Ali Bey purchased this tax-farm with 5500 *kuruş* down payment in 1784. The annual instalment of the tax-farm was 630 *kuruş*.

<sup>141</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 2241.

<sup>142</sup> *MAD* 4567, p. 25/1-2.

<sup>143</sup> *MAD* 9582, p. 113. They paid 15.000 *kuruş* as a *muaccele*. The annual instalment (*asl-ı bedel-i iltizam-ı mukata'a-i nefis-i Karahisar-ı Şarki ve tevabiha der liva-i Karahisar-ı Şarki ma'a avarız-ı bedel-i liva-i mezbur*) was 45.980 *kuruş*.

<sup>144</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 6146 (1801). “*müteveffa Battal Paşa mahlulünden mezada verilen idare-i muhassıllık-ı Canik mukata'asının tamamı 50.000 kuruş ve idare-i nefis-i Karahisar-ı Şarki nısf hissesi 7500 kuruş ve kura-i Gedük müstahfızan-ı Bedreme nam-ı diğer Tirebolu mukata'asının sülüs hissesi 5000 kuruşa, mukata'at-ı merkumenin muaccelatı cem'an 62.000 kuruşa baliğ olub mukata'at-ı merkumenin muaccelatı olan meblağ-ı mezburu başkaca teslim eylemek şartıyla müteveffa-i müşarun-ileyhin kaffe-i muhallefat ---- 1000 kise akça mukabili oğlu Tayyar Paşa hazretlerine terk olunmak üzere hatt-ı hümayun-ı şevket makrun sarfiyatına sudur olmağla zikr olunan bedel-i muhallefat ve muaccelatın yekünü olan 1125 kise akça irad-ı cedit ta'vizatından olmak mülasebesiyle ba-hatt-ı hümayun muhallefat bedeli olan 1000 kise akçanın sülüsü muharremden dört mah mürurunda ve diğer sülüsü sekiz mah mürurunda ve sülüs-i aheri dahi senesi hitamında üç taksit ile eda olunmak şartıyla müşarun-ileyhüma hazretleri tarafından başka*

Tayyar continued his influence over Karahisar-ı Şarki until he rebelled against the new military corps and was defeated by the Çapanoğlu in 1805. At the time, the tax-farm of Karahisar-ı Şarki was tied to the treasury of Imperial Navy (*hazine-i tersane-i amire*) and delegated to Tayyar's enemy, old grand vizier Yusuf Ziya Paşa as a short-term tax-farm for the years 1805-6.<sup>145</sup> After the pardoning of Tayyar, in 1807, he regained the tax-farm but this was only temporary.

Their domination over Kastamonu began when Canikli Ali Paşa held the sub-province (*sancak*) of Kastamonu as a life-term tax-farm in 1777-79.<sup>146</sup> He appointed one of his clients (*avene*), Kavaklı Ali as *mütesellim* to Kastamonu.<sup>147</sup> The Caniklizâdes had already begun to have an influence over the rice-producing areas around Kastamonu before this date. They controlled the tax-farm of rice of the tax-farm of rice of Kırac (Kastamonu), of Boyabad (Kastamonu) from 1771 onwards. While they held the tax-farms of rice of Kırac<sup>148</sup> directly as a life-time tax-farm, the tax-farm of rice of Boyabad was controlled by the higher members of the military class who were absentee grandees. There were four share-holders in the tax-farm of Boyabad<sup>149</sup> in 1772: Ali Rıza Efendi, Halil Efendi, Yusuf

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*ve mukata'at-ı merkumenin muaccelatı olan 125 kise akçeyi 41 gün mürurunda irad-ı cedid-i hümayun hazinesine teslim eylemek üzere kapı kethüdası İbiş Ağa tarafından başka memhur deyn temessükleri ahz ve irad-ı cedid-i hümayun hazinesinde hıfz olunmağla..”.*

<sup>145</sup> MAD 9582, p. 113. The price of this tax-farm mounted to 54.980 *kuruş*.

<sup>146</sup> DBŞM 4043, p. 23, 25-6.

<sup>147</sup> Cevdet Dahiliye 8278 and Özkaya, Canikli Ali Paşa, p. 506.

<sup>148</sup> “*bedel-i iltizam-ı mukata'a-i çeltük-i enhar-ı Kırac*” amounted 2000 *kuruş* for 1771 and 1772, while the lump sum payment (*peşin*) was paid as 1000 *kuruş* in 1771. DBŞM 4043, p. 13, 37-9, 43-4.

<sup>149</sup> The annual payments (*bedel*) delivered to the share-holders were not the same amount. Each had a different amount of share paid by the Caniklizâdes. While Ali Rıza Efendi was paid 6000 *kuruş* for his share by Caniklizâdes in three instalments in a year (1771, 1772, 1773), only 3750 *kuruş* was referred to as the share of Halil Efendi in 1772. 3755 *kuruş* for Yusuf and 500 *kuruş* for

Efendi<sup>150</sup> and Çelebi Efendi. In 1775, Abdülaziz Efendi was added as the fifth share-holder. Battal Hüseyin Bey appeared as the deputy (*mültezim*) of these central elites. Besides *malikâne*-holders and subcontractor, there was also the superintendant (*emin*) of Boyabad, Ali Ağa.

Later on, the domination over Kastamonu and Boyabad continued under the rule of Battal and Tayyar Paşas. The former appointed his son-in-law as the deputy of Kastamonu in 1800.<sup>151</sup> Tayyar Paşa on the other hand delegated his control over the tax-farm of the *hasha-i* Kastamonu to his father-in-law Salih Ağa.<sup>152</sup> Until his execution in 1808, the domination over the tax-farms in Kastamonu as well as the tax-farm of Boyabad continued.<sup>153</sup>

Another revenue source added to the wealth of the Caniklizâdes at the time of Ali Paşa was the tax revenues of Tokat. He was assigned the right to collect the revenues of the imperial domain (*has*) which were under the jurisdiction of the *voyvodalık* of Tokat to meet his expenses between 1773 and 1775.<sup>154</sup> The revenue from Tokat was referred to as *mukata'a-i* Tokat in the documents. The actual holders of this tax-farm were from among the central elites: Başbakikulu Ağa and

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Çelebi Efendi was paid in the same year. There was also a record of “*faiz-i ashab-ı mukata'a*” (revenue or profit of the tax-farm owners) which was equal to 7500 *kuruş* in 1771. The lump sum payment (*peşin*) amounted to 7500 *kuruş*. *DBŞM* 4043, p. 25, 37-39, 43-44, 47.

<sup>150</sup> Yusuf and Halil Efendis were sons of the *kethüda* of old Grand Vizier. *MAD* 5210.

<sup>151</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun* 3448.

<sup>152</sup> *DBŞM-TRE* 15437.

<sup>153</sup> Mehmet Beşirli, *XIX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Samsun Şehri (1755 numaralı Samsun Şer'iye Siciline Göre)*, Unpublished M. A. thesis, 2, Samsun: Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, 1993, p. 583, 613-4. The tax-farms controlled by Tayyar Paşa were *mukata'a-i hasha-i liva-i Kastamonu ve tevabiha*, *mukata'a-i ihtisab ve avarız-ı Kastamonu*, *mukata'a-i hasha-i çeltük-i enhar-ı Boyabad ve tevabi'i*. These were seized and administered by the *central treasury* (*darbhane-i amire*) following his execution.

<sup>154</sup> Duman argues that Ali Paşa used his duty of enforcing the notable of Tokat for the contribution to the campaign to expand his area of influence in the region. When Ali Paşa gained the governorship of Tokat in 1773, the members of the Katiroğulları dynasty did not hold any

Said Bey were only two of them.<sup>155</sup> The Caniklizâdes, especially Battal Hüseyin, seems to be the subcontractor of this tax-farm.<sup>156</sup> Later on, Tayyar Mahmud obtained the tax-farm of Niksar within the boundary of the *voyvodalık* of Tokat as *malikâne* with a down payment of 5100 *kuruş*.<sup>157</sup>

With a wave of promotions due to the appointment of Ali Paşa as the commander of Kars in 1776 and then of Crimea second time in 1777-78, the family's control spread as far as Sivas and Erzurum in the East. Ali Paşa was made the governor of Erzurum in 1776 and of Sivas in 1777. While the war-time taxes (*seferiye*) of Sivas was granted to him, the peace-time contribution (*hazeriye*) of Erzurum increased two-fold to compensate for his expenditures on the campaign.<sup>158</sup> In addition to the *seferiye* of Sivas, his son, Battal Hüseyin became the subcontractor of Ali Efendi, a high official of the Palace who held the emergency levies of the province of Sivas. Battal Hüseyin was seen as the de facto collector of the taxes, which were combined under the name of “*Sivas eyaleti avarızı ve cebelü bedeliyesi ve menzilciyan avarızı*”. They consisted of: *avarız* (emergency levies) of Erba’a, Niksar, Karakuş, and sub-provinces of Sivas and Amasya for the year 1777; *cebelü bedeliyesi* (payments in lieu of a military

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significant office until the end of the tenure of the Caniklizâdes around 1775. *Notables, Textiles and Copper in Ottoman Tokat 1750-1840*, pp. 50-51.

<sup>155</sup> The tax-farm of Tokat was highly-valued tax-farm if it is taken into account that the profit (*faiz*) paid to the *malikâne*-holders (*ashab-ı mukata’a*) amounted to 32.050 *kuruş* in 1775. *DBŞM 4043*, pp. 38-39, 43.

<sup>156</sup> One part of this tax-farm was assigned to Safiye Sultan as *has* and Battal Hüseyin Bey sent 688,5 *kuruş* to her in four instalments (*taksit*) from the *mal* of Tokad in 1773 and 1774. Moreover, the old *reisülküttab* Recai Mehmet Efendi was assigned salary (*vazife*) of 40 *kuruş* from the annual payment of the tax-farm of Tokat. *DBŞM 4043*, p. 23, 25.

<sup>157</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 2241*.

<sup>158</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun 1321 and 1322*. The peace-time contribution of Erzurum rose to 55.000 *kuruş* from 27.500 for Ali Paşa in 1784.



service) of the sub-provinces of Sivas, Amasya, Canik for 1778; *menzilciyan avarızı* of the sub-districts of Amasya, Ladik, Havza, Merzifon for 1778.<sup>159</sup>

When Tayyar Paşa went to Rumelia to fight against bandits in 1800, the Ottoman state assigned certain revenues to him for the sustainment of his troops. These revenues consisted of a compensation fee paid by *timar* and *zeamet* holders who did not raise soldiers for the campaign in return for their control over their *timar* revenues. Instead of raising soldiers, they paid a certain amount of cash called *bedeliye-i asker*. This system became institutionalized in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. Tayyar Paşa was held responsible to remit the payments in lieu of the participation in the campaign of the *zeamet*- and *timar*-holders of the regions of Canik, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Trabzon, Niksar, Sivas and Kastamonu.<sup>160</sup> However, one of his reports, Tayyar Paşa argued that it was impossible to allocate these expenditures to the population. Because of regular campaign expenses and other services imposed upon them, the tax-payers became exhausted. The deputy

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<sup>159</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 27435.

<sup>160</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 3065 (1802). The amount *bedeliye-i asker* for these regions are as follows:

Trabzon: 89.250 *kuruş*.

Canik: 55.250 *kuruş*.

Karahisar-ı Şarki: 38.250 *kuruş*.

Niksar ma'a Karakuş: 8500 *kuruş*.

Kastamonu: 60.000 *kuruş*.

In addition, the *timar* and *zeamet*-holders should also have paid compensation fee (*seferiye bedeliyesi*) for themselves for not joining into the campaign.

judge (*na'ib*) of Trabzon delivered the demand of the population to be pardoned from these high taxes. The *mütesellim* (deputy) of Tayyar Paşa said that he did not have the power and authority to collect these taxes and added that it would be inevitable for the tax-payers to disperse (*perakende ve perişan*) if they were pushed too much.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CANIKLİZÂDE HOUSEHOLD AND LESSER *AYÂN*

In this part, I will outline the Caniklizâdes' relationship with the lesser *ayans* as well as the household members of the dynasty, who served as *kethüdas* (steward) of Canikli Ali Paşa, Battal Hüseyin Paşa, Mikdad Ahmet Paşa and Tayyar Mahmud Paşa and their role at the local level. The *kethüdas*, as the most significant personnel in the Paşa households throughout the eighteenth century, performed some inner and outer functions. They were the representatives of governors in their administrative works such as tax-collection and soldier recruitment as well as acted as a deputy in the judicial courts in lieu of governors in matters of endowments, purchase and sale of immovables. They utilized the position of *kethüdaship* to rise politically and to accumulate wealth. Like other Paşa households and governors, the Caniklizâdes usually selected their deputy of governorship (*mütesellim*) from among *kethüdas* within the household and these stewards in this way gained an influence and authority over the local inhabitants. Their loyalty and obedience to the leader of the dynasty in the long run resulted in the empowerment in the region where they functioned as deputy, *voyvoda*, soldier-recruiter, etc. The *kethüdas*, in this way, were promoted and entered into the ruling circles as member of the *ehl-i örf*.

In the following pages, first of all, the functions and the political rise of the *kethüdas* of the Canikli dynasty will be examined in detail to highlight the process of how a share in the political power and wealth was obtained in the periphery. One of the *kethüdas* of Canikli Ali Paşa, for example, Abdullah was promoted as the governor of Trabzon and Erzurum with the title of a vizier. Secondly, Hazine-darzâdes will be discussed as an example of how a treasurer of Canikli Ali Paşa turned out to, in time, be a significant local notable family in the region between Samsun and Trabzon and then established a dynasty which played an important role in the absence of the Canikli dynasty and accumulated wealth comparable to the Caniklizâdes. Thirdly, the other local notable family who had contact with Caniklizâdes as the sub-contractor (*mültezim*) such as Şatırzâdes will be given a place as far as the documentation permits.

## I. The *Kethüdas* of the Caniklizâdes

The *kethüdas* of the Caniklizâdes, the leading figures in the household, occupied positions such as the deputy of governorship (*mütesellim*) and even ascended to the rank of a Paşa. The names and positions of the *kethüdas* can be seen in below. As revealed in the table, they maintained the deputy for governorships of Trabzon, Amasya, Erzurum and Tokat. Two of them reached the rank of governor with the title Paşa, Abdullah Paşa (steward of Canikli Ali Paşa) as the governor of Trabzon and Erzurum and Hafız Ali Paşa (steward of Tayyar Mahmud Paşa) as the governor of Sivas. Şihmanzâde (or Şihmanoğlu) El-Hac Ali Ağa was in the

service of Canikli Ali Paşa as the *voyvoda* of Tokat, while El-Hac Abdülkadir Ağa held the deputy governorship of Amasya when Mikdad Ahmet Paşa was the *mutasarrıf*.<sup>1</sup> The *kethüdas* of Battal Hüseyin Paşa were employed as the deputy of Erzurum during the time of his governorship. Lastly, Lütfullah Ağa (*kethüda* of Tayyar Paşa) occupied the position of a *mütesellim* of Trabzon. As is seen below, most of them bore the title “El-Hac” (four out of seven).

**Table 4. Caniklizâdes’ *Kethüdas***

<u>Caniklizâdes</u>	<u><i>Kethüdas</i></u>	<u>Positions of <i>Kethüdas</i></u>
Canikli Ali Paşa	Şıhmanzâde El-Hac Ali Ağa	<i>voyvoda</i> of Tokat
Canikli Ali Paşa	Abdullah Paşa	governor of Trabzon
Battal Paşa	Abdullah Paşa	governor of Trabzon
Battal Paşa	Alaybeyzâde El-Hac İbrahim	deputy of Erzurum
Battal Paşa	El-Hac Abdullah Ağa	deputy of Erzurum
Mikdad Ahmed Paşa	El-Hac Abdülkadir Ağa	deputy of Amasya
Tayyar Paşa	Lütfullah Bey	deputy of Trabzon
Tayyar Paşa	Hafız Ali Paşa	governor of Sivas

Their rise and fall was closely related with the power of the Canikli dynasty. In fact, most of the information about them is found in the confiscation registers and documents ordering the seizure of the wealth of the Canikli dynasty as well as the people employed in their households. As will be seen below, the *kethüdas* of the Caniklizâdes and the other personnel carrying out the inner and outer functions turned out to be influential and leading notables and accumulated wealth, owning

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<sup>1</sup> *Amasya Şer’iyye Sicili* 60, p.57 (1783); *Amasya Şer’iyye Sicili* 56, p. 67 (1777).

estates comparable to the other local notables rising independently from the Caniklizâdes. Searching out their functions and wealth will contribute to our knowledge about the redistribution of revenues among the household cadres of the Caniklizâdes. This provides the range of Canikli dynasty's dominance and authority at the local level. In other words, it shows the construction of power through the mediation of the retinue members. It seems that the Caniklizâdes mostly preferred to employ their own *kethüdas* as deputies for the governorship instead of depending on the leading notables of the governed district. This post also meant a participation in the governing elite of the empire (*ehl-i örf*) as well as a close contact with the tax-payers of the region.

The appointment and the participation into the administrative set up of the empire was not only confined to the Caniklizâdes' *kethüdas*. Battalzâdes (or Battaloğulları) constituted another example of a local notable family which became powerful in Ayntab in the second half of the eighteenth century by appropriating the post of *voyvoda* through first serving as a *kethüda* (steward) of high military elites. Battal Seyyid Hacı Mehmet Ağa (d.1765) participated in the household of the governor of Maraş, Süleyman Paşa as a *kethüda* in 1737-8. He began his rise by capturing the tax-collection rights in Ayntab, such as the war-time emergency levies and the poll tax. Battal Ağa also served as the *kethüda* of the governor of Rakka, Ahmet Paşa, in 1740. His extension of economic power was directly related with his close contact with the governors of the region. Afterwards, he became the *voyvoda* of Süleyman Paşa, governor of Adana who was holding the tax-farms of Kilis and Azaz as *malikâne* and delegated the tax collection to Battal Ağa between 1751 and 1754. More importantly, he turned out

to be the *voyvoda* of Ayntab in 1760. It meant that he became the administrator of Ayntab by holding the tax-farm called *mir liva-i Ayntab*. In sum, Battal Mehmet Ağa was converted into a leading local notable who rose in career as the financial and administrative official of Kilis and Gaziantep. His participation into the household of the governors in the region as *kethüda* was a significant factor in his rise. This provided an access to the official circles of the empire and a share in the tax-collection activities.<sup>2</sup>

Another crucial point about the *kethüdas* and other personnel and agents such as *tatar*, *çukadar*, *reis* employed within the retinue of Paşa households is that their salaries were paid from the local expenditures. In other words, their expenses were covered by the local expenditures, which were allocated among the population of the *vilayet* under the name of *tevzi*. Besides, the expenses of *mübaşirs* or agents sent from the central government for matters such as tax-collection, confiscation, transfer of orders and certificates to the periphery, etc. were added to the *vilayet masrafları* and that meant the extra taxation of the inhabitants.<sup>3</sup>

Below, I will examine the position of the stewards of the Caniklizâde dynasty, the ranks they attained as well as the tax-farms they controlled and the amount of wealth they accumulated. Their career mostly ended with the

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<sup>2</sup> Hüseyin Çınar, “18. Yüzyılda Ayıntab (Antep)’da Bir Yerel Gücün Yükselişi ve Düşüşü: Battalzâdeler (Battaloğulları)”, Unpublished Paper Submitted To The Congress of Turkish History, September 2002.

<sup>3</sup> Generally Şer’iyye *Sicils* informs us about the content of local expenditures and the share of the expenses of governors and their hired personnel. In one example, Canikli El-Hac Ali Paşa’s expenditure for a three-day voyage to Trabzon was equal to 19.020 *kuruş* in 1776. And 1000 *kuruş* of that amount was allocated for the expenses of his *kethüda*. See *Trabzon Şer’iyye Sicili 1933 (2005)*, p. 93/a-1.

confiscation of their estates as their fortune was depended on their patrons. Therefore, the information below reflects their position at some critical moments in the history of the Caniklizâdes.

Şihmanzâde El-Hac Ali Ağa; the *kethüda* of Canikli Ali Paşa

He was appointed as the *voyvoda* of the tax-farm of Merzifon by his patron, Canikli Ali Paşa, in 1775. This tax-farm was controlled by the Canikli dynasty between 1769 and 1779 in the capacity of subcontractor of the *malikâne* holders residing in İstanbul.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, Ali Ağa served as the deputy governor (*mütesellim*) for Trabzon in 1776.<sup>5</sup>

In addition, Ali Ağa utilized the favorable circumstances to establish himself in Tokat as well. When Canikli Ali Paşa held the governorship of Tokat and the revenues tied to the *voyvodalık* of Tokat between 1773 and 1775, Şihmanzâde Ali Ağa began to take roots in Tokat and later on became the administrator (*voyvoda*) of Tokat.<sup>6</sup> He secured the support of some local families and later established partnerships with merchants engaged in trade with Egypt. Moreover, he regulated the trade of copper from the Milas mines to Tokat around 1780.<sup>7</sup>

Apart from his investments in trade and his relations with the merchants of Tokat, Ali Ağa lent money to small notables of Sivas, Erzurum and Amasya and the total amount of debts owed to him was tantamount to 46.728 *kuruş* as

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<sup>4</sup> DBŞM 4043, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1933 (2005), p. 92/a.

<sup>6</sup> DBŞM 4043, p. 12. He held the tax-farm of dyehouse of Tokat as well.



confiscation officials reported to the center in 1780.<sup>8</sup> This implies the range of his function as a creditor and his accumulation of wealth as well as his close relationship with the local people. Furthermore, Şihmanzâde possessed some estates (*çiftlik*s), animals and a grain store in Haymana and its environment. Since he belonged to the household of Canikli Ali Paşa, his estates were also confiscated and seized by the central treasury after Ali Paşa's escape to Russia in 1779. There were several orders sent by the central government to the administrators and judges of Amasya, Sivas, Trabzon, Canik, Karahisar-ı Şarki to inspect and seize the precious goods, cash, estates, grain and animals of Caniklizâdes and their clients, dependents and household members.<sup>9</sup>

Abdullah Bey/Paşa, the *kethüda* of Canikli Ali Paşa.

Abdullah was one of the slaves of Canikli Ali Paşa, who was educated and gained experience within his household. Later he accompanied Battal Hüseyin Paşa in his *Emirü'l Hac* service in 1786-7 as his *kethüda*. When Ali Paşa was declared a rebel by the central government, his household and relatives were brought to İstanbul to prevent disorder in the region. Likewise, Abdullah was sent to the household of Grand Admiral Hasan Paşa where he met with Yusuf Paşa, who later became Grand Vizier. His relationship and closeness with Yusuf Paşa was to be a factor in his appointment as the governor of Trabzon and Erzurum with the title of *mirmiran* in 1790.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Duman, *Notables, Textiles and Copper in Ottoman Tokat 1750-1840*, pp. 50-51.

<sup>8</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 5717 (1780) and *Cevdet Maliye* 7345 (1780).

<sup>9</sup> *MAD 10026 (Ahkam)* is full of orders sent by the government for the confiscation.

<sup>10</sup> Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, p. 167.

Abdullah Ağa was initially made the *mütesellim* of Trabzon by Canikli Ali Paşa in 1783. In this way, he participated in the administrative class of the empire.<sup>11</sup> In the meantime, he held the tax-farm of Tirebolu, which was tied to Trabzon with a 5000 *kuruş* of lump sum payment (*muaccele*) and a 870 *kuruş* annual payment (*mal*).<sup>12</sup> This tax-farm was usually possessed by the *kethüdas* of the members of the Caniklizâde family.

As it is known, after the defeat of Battal Paşa in the campaign of Anapa in 1790 and his escape to Russia, Abdullah was appointed as the governor of Erzurum and Trabzon with the duty of commanding the military force to take Anapa back from the Russians.<sup>13</sup> As mentioned earlier, Abdullah Paşa clashed with Hayreddin Bey, Battal Paşa's son to rule the regions of Canik and Trabzon. He attacked Hayreddin Bey and forced him to leave Canik. Moreover, he delayed the transfer of provisions and soldiers to Anapa, which was lost to the Russians in the end. This was to result in the execution of Abdullah Paşa in 1792.

Although Abdullah performed important functions in the dynasty by serving Canikli Ali Paşa and then Battal Paşa and gained political power, he did not seem to accumulate so much wealth. His property, animals and grains found in the subdistrict of Canik as well as in the port of Samsun and Bafra were sold by the confiscation official Ömer Paşazâde Abdullah Bey in the presense of the local judge in 1792. His female slaves were given 1500 *kuruş*. An additional 6500

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<sup>11</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili* 123, p. 52/b.

<sup>12</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 2241.

<sup>13</sup> See chapter one and 1790 Campaign and the "Rebellion" in Canik.

*kuruş* would be sent to the central treasury. All of the personal goods of Abdullah Paşa were transferred to his wives by the court.<sup>14</sup>

His possessions in Trabzon were also sold by the governor Kuğuzâde Süleyman Paşa and the centrally appointed official Said Bey. The overall value of his inventory was only equal to 2250 *kuruş*.<sup>15</sup>

Miralayzâde El-Hac İbrahim Bey, the *kethüda* of Battal Hüseyin Paşa.

He was also referred to as Alaybeyzâde Seyyid İbrahim Ağa. He served as the steward of Battal Paşa and he was also a relative of him. When Battal Paşa increased his power of negotiation with the central government thanks to the need for soldier-recruitment for the campaign of İskenderiye in 1800, he demanded the rank of *kapıcıbaşı* for his steward.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, Battal Paşa appointed him as the *mütesellim* of Erzurum during his governorship. He dismissed his former steward Abdullah Ağa<sup>17</sup> from the post of deputy of Erzurum since Abdullah was employed for the campaign. Furthermore, İbrahim Bey was a *zeamet*-holder consisting of villages tied to the subdistricts (*nahiye*) of Arım and Satılmış. Afterwards, the

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<sup>14</sup> Beşirli, *XIX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Samsun Şehri*, 1, pp. 134-135.

<sup>15</sup> His other possessions were consisted of 15 mules, 9 horses and bought in return for 1750 *kuruş* by the governor and confiscation official. Şatırzâde Osman Ağa, one of the leading notables of Trabzon, purchased horses in the auction in return for the payment of 150 *kuruş*. *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili* 127 (1941), p. 55.

<sup>16</sup> *Hatt-ı Hümayun* 3448 (1800). In addition, Battal Paşa appointed his son-in-law Hasan Bey as the *mütesellim* of Kastamonu and designated him as a commander (*ser-gerde*) of the soldiers recruited for the campaign. This shows us that the relatives of Battal Paşa were promoted in return for the recruitment of soldiers.

<sup>17</sup> Abdullah Ağa also bore the title of *kapıcıbaşı*. His son, Canikli Ali Ağa, held a half share of the tax-farm of the village of Terme Alanı tied to Sarancık within the subdistrict of Canik with a 100 *kuruş* lump sum payment in 1804-5. See *MAD* 9543, p. 190.

revenues of these villages were assigned to him as a life-time tax-farm in return for the payment of 150 *kuruş muaccele*.<sup>18</sup>

Lütfullah Ağa, the *kethüda* of Tayyar Mahmud Paşa.

He obtained the deputy governorship of Trabzon in 1802 when he was in the service of Tayyar Paşa. This was the highest rank that he attained administratively.<sup>19</sup> However, he possessed several tax-farms or *mukata'a* shares. As early as 1788, Lütfullah Ağa obtained one and a half share in the tax-farm of imperial domain in Amasya (*mukata'a-i hasha-i Amasya*) with the annual instalment (*mal*) of about 918,5 *kuruş*.<sup>20</sup> In addition, he was delegated the tax-farm of Tirebolu as an the administrator by Tayyar Paşa who owned one-third share as a *malikâne* after Battal Paşa's death in 1801-2 with a 5000 *kuruş muaccele*.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, he possessed a portion in the tax-farm of imperial domain of the region of Kastamonu (*mukata'a-i hasha-i liva-i Kastamonu ve tevabiha*) just before the confiscation of his estates in 1808. The lump sum value of this tax-farm was about 1296 *kuruş*. Before him, this tax-farm was held by Tayyar Paşa's father-in-law, Salih Ağa.<sup>22</sup>

After the execution of Tayyar Paşa, the properties and estates of his *kethüda* as well as his clients, supporters were also confiscated by the central

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<sup>18</sup> MAD 9555 and Hatt-ı Hümayun 3448.

<sup>19</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 3065/9. Lütfullah Ağa as *mütesellim* wrote a petition about the pardoning of the population of Trabzon from the extraction of taxes called *asker bedeliyesi* (payments in lieu of military service) which was tantamount to 89.250 *kuruş*. He argued that he did not have the power to gather this tax and if he used force, the inhabitants would disperse.

<sup>20</sup> MAD 10231.

<sup>21</sup> MAD 9582, p. 112 and *Cevdet Maliye* 6146.

<sup>22</sup> DBŞM-TRE 15437.

treasury in 1808. The information about the property of Lütfullah is taken from a report sent by the governor of Erzurum, Yusuf Ziya Paşa. In this report, it was stated that the inventory of Hasan Bey's possessions (the nephew of Tayyar Paşa and the son of Mikdad Ahmet Paşa who was executed because of his support of Tayyar Paşa in his war against *nizam-ı cedid* and Çapanoğlu) in Amasya and other places was determined and sold by Esad Bey, the official sent by the central government for the confiscation with the help of the local judge. In addition, Esad Bey registered the estates of Lütfullah Ağa, Hacı Mustafa (*kethüda* of Hasan Bey), Hacı Ahmet (treasurer of Hasan Bey) as well as two other clients of the Caniklizâdes.<sup>23</sup>

According to this report, Lütfullah had rural, urban and residential properties in Köprü, Merzifon and Havza subdistricts (*kaza*) as well as female and male slaves, rents and debts owed to him. His inventory consisted of three parts. First of all, there was the category of the value of his inventory (*muhallefat bahası*) which was probably the market price of his precious goods. It amounted to 2170 *kuruş* in Köprü and 2715,5 *kuruş* in Merzifon.

Secondly, he owned six female slaves (*cariye*) whose value amounted to 7050 *kuruş* and three male slaves (5300 *kuruş* in total). Thirdly, under the title of property (*emlak*) it was stated that Lütfullah Ağa owned property which was totally priced at 6500 *kuruş*. It consisted of two *menzils* (1100 *kuruş*), a khan together with shops (3000 *kuruş*), a big farm (2000 *kuruş*) and two other shops (400 *kuruş*) in Köprü. He had also immovable property in Merzifon. He possessed

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<sup>23</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye 11502* (1808).

a mansion (5000 *kuruş*) where he was likely to reside. Additionally, he had shares in two different khans, valued 1000 *kuruş* and 2000 *kuruş* respectively. His big farm (*çiftlik*) and rice found within this farm was registered as valued at 750 *kuruş*. In Havza, he owned only a big farm and a land attached to it (2950 *kuruş*). Lastly, his loans and rents from his shops was valued at 1317 *kuruş*.

In sum, Lütfullah Ağa as the *kethüda* of Tayyar Paşa accumulated a significant amount of wealth which was even more than a local notable of middle strata. The total value of his estate (sum of three categories of goods, immovable property and slaves) was equal to 33.952,5 *kuruş*, more than the *ayân* of Köprü and Havza, Kör-İsmailoğlu Hüseyin (20.527 *kuruş*).<sup>24</sup>

#### Hafız Ali Paşa, the *kethüda* of Tayyar Paşa.

Hafız Ali Paşa rose from the household of Tayyar Mahmud Paşa and served as his *kethüda* (steward).<sup>25</sup> In M. Süreyya's account, he was referred to as one of the "men of pen" and served as *küçük ruznamçeci* (second accountant, who kept the record of salaries of the palace servants and minor officials of the Imperial Council) and then *şehremini* (superintendent of the city) in 1807. Afterwards he became the Grand Admiral with the rank of vizierate in 1810 and until his death in 1829 he served as the governor of different districts in the Rumelian and Anatolian parts of the Empire.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Yavuz Cezar, "Bir Âyanın Muhallefatı: Havza ve Köprü Kazaları Âyanı Kör İsmail-Oğlu Hüseyin (Musadere olayı ve terekenin incelenmesi)", *Belleten*, 41/161, 1977, p. 57.

<sup>25</sup> Cezar, "Bir Âyanın Muhallefatı", p. 45. Hafız Ali Paşa was referred as the former *kethüda* of Tayyar Paşa at least before 1808.

<sup>26</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 1, pp. 287-288.

One of the sons of Hafız Ali Paşa was named Ahmed Mikdad. This shows the close relationship between him and the Canikli dynasty. Just as Abdullah Paşa (the *kethüda* of Canikli Ali Paşa and Battal Paşa) attained to the post of the governorship of Trabzon, Hafız Ali Paşa went even further and rose to the rank of Grand Admiral.

## II. The Hazinedarzâdes

The earliest figure in the local notable family of the Hazinedarzâdes was Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Paşa. It is argued that this family descended from the *hazinedar* (treasurer) of Canikli Ali Paşa. That is why they were called the Hazinedarzâdes. M. Emin Yolalıcı has two contradictory views about the *hazinedar* of Canikli Ali Paşa. While in his earlier work he claims that Hazinedarzâde Süleyman was the treasurer of Ali Paşa<sup>27</sup>, later he argued that Süleyman Paşa was the son of Behram Bey, who was the actual treasurer of Ali Paşa.<sup>28</sup> There is another interesting argument about the origin of the Hazinedarzâdes. Ö. Mert suggests that Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Paşa was the son of Mehmet Paşa who was the son of the brother of Ali Paşa. In other words, the Hazinedarzâdes were coming from the line of Süleyman Paşa, who was the

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<sup>27</sup> M. Emin Yolalıcı, *Samsun Eşrafından Hazinedarzâde Es-Seyyid Abdullah Paşa'nın Terekesi*, Samsun: Ondokuzmayıs Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1987, p. 14.

<sup>28</sup> M. Emin Yolalıcı, *XIX. Yüzyılda Canik Sancağı'nın Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998, p. 13.

brother of Canikli Ali Paşa.<sup>29</sup> However, there is no primary or secondary information which supports this view. If this is true, it can be argued that the line of Süleyman (brother of Canikli Ali Paşa) became an influential local notable family only after Canikli Ali Paşa's line was totally disappeared from the political and economic life of the empire in 1808.

On the other hand, Meeker claims that according to an undocumented tradition, Hazinedarzâde Süleyman came from an old family line that had long been associated with the western province of Canik.<sup>30</sup> He gives M. Goloğlu as a reference who describes the Hazinedarzâdes as a well-known and very old family of the coastal region.<sup>31</sup>

Whatever the origins of the Hazinedarzâdes (either descended from Canikli Süleyman Paşa or from the treasurer of Canikli Ali Paşa or came from an old family of the province of Canik), they were substituted by the Ottoman state to fill the power vacuum emerged after the final execution of the members of the Canikli dynasty in 1808.

As early as 1769, Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Bey was referred to as the deputy governor (*mütesellim*) of Canik when Canikli Ali Bey was also at the beginning of his career as a *muhassıl* of Canik. They were ordered to send provisions to Kefe and to provide the hemp and fibre which was urgently needed for the ships of the imperial navy to arrive at Georgia.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Mert, *XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoğulları*, p. 53.

<sup>30</sup> Meeker, *A Nation of Empire, The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity*, p. 215.

<sup>31</sup> Goloğlu, *Trabzon Tarihi, Fetihden Kurtuluşa Kadar*, p. xxix.

<sup>32</sup> *MAD 7596 (Ahkam)*, p. 99/2.



The only reference to the Hazinedaroğlus as part of the household of Canikli Ali Paşa is found in Cevdet Dahiliye collections, which ordered the transfer of the other members of the retinue of Ali Paşa as well as the *harem* of the Hazinedaroğlu after the declaration of him as a rebel in 1779.<sup>33</sup> It is very interesting that no order was sent for the confiscation of Hazinedarzâdes' property when the Caniklizâdes and their retinues' wealth were seized by the central treasury at this date. This may be taken as evidence confirming the view that the Hazinedarzâdes came from an old family line settled in Canik and probably did not belong to the household of Caniklizâdes.

Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa started as early as in 1796 to control the tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik with the title of a *kapıcıbaşı*.<sup>34</sup> As mentioned above, between 1792 and 1799, the remaining members of the Caniklizâdes (Battal and Tayyar Paşa) were in exile in Russia. During that time, after the turbulent years of rebellion in Canik, almost all of the *muhasıls* of Canik were appointed from among the imperial elites who had no local connection. The central government farmed out this tax-farm for a year. The centralizing measures of the government aimed at raising revenues as well as to neutralize the power of local notables. The only exception seems to have been Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa.<sup>35</sup> Between 1799 and 1805, Battal and Tayyar Paşas of the Caniklizâdes reestablished their control in Canik and Trabzon regions following their pardoning by the government. After the rebellion of Tayyar Paşa against New Order (1805)

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<sup>33</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye 15976* (1780).

<sup>34</sup> *MAD 9582*, p. 109 and *DBŞM 6433*. The tax-farm of *muhasıllık* of Canik was farmed out to Süleyman Ağa for one year by the treasury of *irad-ı cedid*.

and his execution in 1808, Yusuf Ziya Paşa (former grand vizier) dominated Canik and Trabzon. Yusuf Ziya Paşa named Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa as his agent in 1810. Subsequently, Süleyman Ağa became the *muhasıl* of Canik in 1811 alone and one year later, he rose to the position of the provincial governor of Trabzon.<sup>36</sup>

In sum, the actual and final empowerment of Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa was only after the normalization of the economic and political life in the region of Canik and Trabzon with the execution of powerful Tayyar Paşa, the last member of the Canikli dynasty. In fact, the central state was decisive for not appointing any member of this family to state posts. For this reason, after 1808, the central state elites were to be appointed for the administration of Canik and Trabzon region. However, Canik notables sent a petition to the center and stated that both the center and the periphery were negatively affected from the centrally appointed administrators from outside. These outsiders (centrally appointed officials) over-exploited the population of Canik and had attacked their houses and goods. Thus, the inhabitants of Canik rebelled under these insecure conditions. Therefore, they could not produce the materials (hemp, timbers and fibre) that were significant for the construction of imperial ships. The notables, who consisted of religious scholars, artisans and merchants, demanded the appointment of Hazinedarzâde Süleyman as the *muhasıl* of Canik who was from

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<sup>35</sup> He served as the *muhasıl* of Canik in 1796, 1800, within the first five months of 1807, then as the deputy of Tayyar Paşa in 1808. See *MAD* 9582, p. 110 and *Cevdet Maliye* 27107.

<sup>36</sup> *MAD* 9582.

among the prominent, trustful and wealthy members of the region. This demand shows the support for Süleyman Ağa by the population of Canik.<sup>37</sup>

Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Paşa was appointed as the governor of Trabzon in 1812 and stayed in this post until his death in 1818.<sup>38</sup> He attempted to reinforce the central power at the expense of its local elites, especially the coalition led by Tuzcuoğlu Memiş Ağa. This was consistent with the aim of “New Order” which tried to curb the military strength of aghas and *ayâns*.<sup>39</sup> However, his attempt to limit the independence of Memiş Ağa resulted in a revolt (1814-17) led by the latter who was supported by the lesser notables and aghas of Rize, Of and Sürmene.<sup>40</sup> The conflict between Süleyman Paşa and Memiş Ağa was partly due to a sizeable debt that the former owed the latter.<sup>41</sup> However, their controversy seemed to be rather a competition between two competing hierarchies of authority and commerce, one centered on Rize and the other centered on Trabzon.<sup>42</sup>

Süleyman Paşa controlled the lands and people in the province of Canik by the mechanisms of state system rather than by taking the support of lesser notables. He possessed large estates (*çiftliks*) cultivated by sharecroppers.<sup>43</sup> He seemed to convert these vast estates worked by tenants into a private property through the establishment of a religious endowment (*wakf*). It seems highly

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<sup>37</sup> *Cevdet Maliye* 434 (1809) There was also reference to the steward of Tayyar Paşa as a *mütegalibe*.

<sup>38</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 5, pp. 1548-9.

<sup>39</sup> Meeker, *A Nation of Empire*, p. 216.

<sup>40</sup> His supporters consisted of local notables such as Kalcıoğlu Osman Bey, Kasapoğlu İbrahim, Hacı Salihoğlu Ali, Abanozoğlu Süleyman, Kel Alioğlu as well as bandits of Of and Sürmene. M. Münir Aktepe, “Tuzcuoğulları İsyanı”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, III, 1951-2, pp. 26-7.

<sup>41</sup> Aktepe, “Tuzcuoğulları İsyanı”, pp. 21-52; Faruk Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, pp. 116-120.

<sup>42</sup> The revolt of Tuzcuoğlu Memiş Ağa was the forerunner of other revolts by his sons, Ahmet Ağa (1818-21) and Tahir Ağa (1832-34). Meeker, *A Nation of Empire*, p. 218-9.

probable that when he controlled some villages within the boundary of the subdistrict of Satılmış in the province of Canik as a life-term tax-farm<sup>44</sup>, he worked for the opening up unused lands into agriculture. The existence of *mezra'as* tied to his *çiftliks* (big farms) proves his attempts to enlarge cultivation. Some of the big estates were cited as his property in a deed of his *wakf*.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, he was able to bring troops and supplies as well as men as a labour-force into the eastern coastal region from the western coastal region of Canik to control the trade route at Trabzon.<sup>46</sup>

After the death of Süleyman Paşa, the new governor of Trabzon, Mehmed Hüsrev Paşa became the guardian of his sons and sent them to İstanbul. The oldest son, Osman, became a page of the Sultan and later returned to Trabzon as a state official as provincial governor (1827-42).<sup>47</sup> The middle son, Abdullah served his older brother, then later succeeded him as the provincial governor (1842-46).<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Meeker, *A Nation of Empire*, p. 215.

<sup>44</sup> In 1807, he was holding the revenues of villages tied to Satılmış as a tax-farm. See *MAD 9543*, p. 190.

<sup>45</sup> Beşirli, *XIX. Yüzyılın Başlarında Samsun Şehri*, II, pp. 384-407. Süleyman Paşa owned two big farms and fifteen *mezra'as* tied to them in the sub-district of Ayvacık and five estates and three *mezra'as* together with thirty-six farm land (*tarla*) in the subdistrict of Arım.

<sup>46</sup> Meeker, *A Nation of Empire*, p. 215.

<sup>47</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 4, p. 1306.

<sup>48</sup> Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, I, p. 81.

### III. The Şatırzâdes

Şatırzâdes (or Şatıroğulları) were among the prominent notables of Trabzon. The first members of the Şatıroğlu family line are claimed to have settled in Trabzon at the time of the incorporation of the region into the Ottoman state. They are reputed to have been granted *timar* by the Sultan Mehmed II in Trabzon.<sup>49</sup> Whatever the case, various members of the family appear as leading individuals in the province by the last quarter of the eighteenth century. While Şatıroğlu Mehmet was appointed as Trabzon chief notable (*baş ayân*) in 1768, İbrahim and Ömer Ağas of the Şatırzâde were associated with the government of Canikli El-Hac Ali Paşa serving as tax collectors in the vicinity of the town of Trabzon in 1777, in the vicinity of Gümüşhane in 1778 and in Trabzon 1782-83.<sup>50</sup> Şatırzâde Osman attained the rank of *kapıcıbaşı* in 1810 after Hazinesdaroğlu Süleyman Paşa had assumed the governorship of Trabzon. A few years later, he appeared as one of the principal supporters of Süleyman Paşa during the revolt of Tuzcuoğlu Memiş Ağa (1814-17).<sup>51</sup>

What was the nature of the relationship between the Caniklizâdes and the Şatırzâdes? How did the Caniklizâdes deal with the Şatırzâdes? The association between them can not be generalized either as a strong alliance or a rivalry. However, they had ties of kinship. The sister of Canikli Ali Paşa, Rukiye Hanım married with Şatıroğlu Osman Ağa, the son of İbrahim Ağa.<sup>52</sup> It was highly

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<sup>49</sup> Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi*, p. 191 and Goloğlu, *Trabzon Tarihi*, pp. 153-4.

<sup>50</sup> Meeker, *A Nation of Empire*, p. 221.

<sup>51</sup> For the role of Şatırzâde Osman Ağa see. Meeker, *A Nation of Empire*, pp. 220-223.

<sup>52</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 7800*.

possible that Ali Paşa attempted to neutralize any opposition to his rule from the Şatırzâdes by establishing such a marriage alliance.

During the governorship of Canikli Ali Paşa in Trabzon (1773-78, 1780-84), contact with the Şatırzâdes was inevitable. When Ali Paşa was the provincial governor, he felt the need to delegate tax-collection rights to the Şatırzâdes, who previously carried out such functions. The Şatırzâdes can be considered as the subcontractor of Ali Paşa. The members of the Şatırzâde family acted as agents (*mütesellim*) of the governor Ali Paşa in matters such as the collection of emergency levies (*avarız*), payments in lieu of provisions (*bedel-i nüzul*) and payments in lieu of military service (*cebelü bedeliyesi*). It seems appropriate to describe the Şatırzâdes as a regional elite of Trabzon, where they differentiated themselves from among the petty notables and aghas and played a vital role between the governors of Trabzon and the population. In other words, the Şatırzâdes were integrated into the administrative and financial set up of the empire as being part of the military class and were authorized to collect tax revenues by the governors of Trabzon like Canikli Ali Paşa. Moreover, as will be seen below, the Şatırzâdes managed three tax-farms that were vital for the commerce of Trabzon independent of the Caniklizâdes. That is to say, the Şatırzâdes were already there before the rule of Canikli Ali Paşa and they were allies in most respects.

First of all, Şatırzâde Ömer Ağa was seen as the *alaybeyi*<sup>53</sup> of Trabzon. Ali Paşa was ordered to gather ‘*mal-ı bedeliye*’ for the year 1775 from the *timar*-holders who did not participate into the campaign and instead of military service were obliged to pay a substitution in cash. He delegated the collection of *cebelü bedeliyesi* from *timar*-holders (*eşkinici*, *züema*, *erbab-ı timar*), the cash equivalent of the military service of prebend holders, to *alaybeyi* Şatırzâde Ömer Ağa. It was assessed as follows: for each 1000 *akça* registered in their imperial documents of grant (*berat*, *tezkiye*, *tahvil*), the prebend-holders had to pay 600 *akça* ‘*miri bedel*’ and 30 *akça* for the salary of the collector. It was stated that for the year 1775, the *timar*-holders’ *bedel* was equal to 8482 *kuruş*.<sup>54</sup> This amount was ordered to be delivered for the expenditures of the two ships belonging to the Imperial Navy under construction in the port of Sinop. This shows us the use of transfer (*havale*) system in the Ottoman finance). One year later, this order was repeated for 1776 to Ali Paşa and judges of the province.<sup>55</sup>

The second responsibility of Şatırzâde Ömer Ağa as the military commander of Trabzon was to inform the central government about the *dirliks* (*timars* and *zeamets*) that became vacant. The court records of Trabzon contain numerous such orders sent by the central government to the administrator in reply to the demand and request of the *alaybeyi* Şatırzâde Ömer to grant the *zeamets* whose holders died and became vacant (*mahlul*) to others. These *dirliks*

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<sup>53</sup> It meant “troop commander”, the deputy officer of the provincial governor responsible for the *timar*-holders of a province. See Gustav Bayerle, *Paşas, Begs, And Efendis: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms In The Ottoman Empire*, İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 1997, p. 5.

<sup>54</sup> *Trabzon Şer’iyye Sicili 1932*, p. 57a/2 and 57b/2 (1775).

<sup>55</sup> *Trabzon Şer’iyye Sicili 1933 (2005)*, p. 64b/2 and 64b/3.

were granted to the new persons by the governor's *tezkire* provided that they would participate in campaigns under the command of the *alaybeyi*.<sup>56</sup>

Şatırzâdes played a vital role in the collection of extra-ordinary taxes (*avarız* and *bedel-i nüzul*) of the Trabzon province. Şatırzâde İbrahim Ağa was seen as the collector of the *avarız* of Trabzon in 1772. It seems that he also established his own network to collect taxes from the sub-districts. For example, he delegated the collection of the *avarız* from the sub-districts of Giresun and Rize to Sinop's commander (*muhafız*) Es-Seyyid Ahmet who returned 903 *kuruş* to him.<sup>57</sup> For the year 1773, the intendant of Gümüşhane, Seyyid Mehmet Ağa, was assigned the job of collecting the *avarız* and *bedel-i nüzul* of Trabzon, who in turn applied to Şatırzâde İbrahim Ağa for the collection.<sup>58</sup> İbrahim Ağa brought the tax revenues amounting to 112 *kuruş* to the court where the representative of the janissary corps took it for the payment of the salaries and provisions of soldiers.<sup>59</sup>

Likewise, the role of the Şatırzâdes as a tax collector continued in the 1780s. Canikli Ali Paşa transferred to the Şatırzâdes the right to collect the poll-tax of Trabzon and Gümüşhane as well as the *avarız* and *nüzul* of Trabzon.<sup>60</sup>

In addition to their functions as the collector of emergency levies and *cebelü bedeliyesi*, the Şatırzâdes had been integrated into the commerce of Trabzon through domination of tax-farms. As far as the documents reveal, they controlled three tax-farms, which were vital for the trade and manufacturing of Trabzon.

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<sup>56</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1932*.

<sup>57</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1932*, p. 9b/2 (1773).

<sup>58</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1932*, p. 50b/4.

<sup>59</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1932*, p. 63a/2.



The first tax-farm dominated by the Şatırzâdes was called *mukata'a-i resm-i* (or *gümrük-i dönüm-i duhan der liva-i Canik ve Trabzon ve Karahisar-ı Şarki*) (the tax-farm of customs of tobacco of Canik and its dependents). Şatırzâde İbrahim Ağa held the half share in this tax-farm as early as 1759<sup>61</sup> and afterwards, his son, Osman Ağa inherited his share in 1780.<sup>62</sup> While this tax-farm seems to have been controlled by the highest elites of İstanbul especially in the first three quarters of the eighteenth century<sup>63</sup>, from the 1760s onwards, Şatırzâdes obtained the half share. It is interesting that the selling price (*muaccele*) of the tax-farm of tobacco of Trabzon did not fluctuated from 1759 to 1780, remaining 2350 *kuruş* for the half share.<sup>64</sup> The annual instalment (*mal*) for the total share was equal to 550 *kuruş* and 250 *kuruş* of that amount was assigned for the salaries and provisions of janissaries.<sup>65</sup>

Secondly, the Şatırzâdes managed the tax-farm of the customs of Trabzon and its dependants (*mukata'a-i gümrük-i iskele-i Trabzon ve tevabiha*) in the 1770s.<sup>66</sup> The administration of the customs of Trabzon reveals a three-sided network. That is to say, it indicates the existence of sub-contracting hierarchy. The

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<sup>60</sup> Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa", p. 489.

<sup>61</sup> *MAD* 9570, p. 107.

<sup>62</sup> *MAD* 9543, p. 189 and *MAD* 9570, p. 108.

<sup>63</sup> For example, between 1745 and 1752, the holder was Yirmisekiz Çelebizâde Mehmet Said Efendi, who was promoted from the rank of deputy grand vizier to the superintendency of imperial register (*emin-i defter-i hakani*). See *MAD* 3393. From the 1769 onwards, the sons of the intendant of the custom of İstanbul (*emin-i gümrük-i İstanbul*), Mehmet Emin Ağa (Feyzullah and Ali Ağa) held the half share of this tax-farm, leaving the other share to Şatırzâde İbrahim Ağa. *DBŞM* 3926, *MAD* 5210, *MAD* 9544, p. 47.

<sup>64</sup> *MAD* 9543, p. 189 and *MAD* 9570, p. 108. The lump sum payment for the tax-farm of the tobacco of Canik alone was equal to 1500 *kuruş* for the half share held by Şatırzâde İbrahim Ağa in 1778 and 1761. See *DBŞM-CBL* 17760 and *DBŞM* 41196.

<sup>65</sup> *MAD* 9544, p. 47 and *KK* 5085, p. 15.

<sup>66</sup> It was one of the lucrative tax-farms of the empire. In 1766, its selling price (*muaccele*) was accounted as 64.000 *kuruş*. See Mehmet Genç, "18. Yüzyıla Ait Osmanlı Mali Verilerinin İktisadi

*malikâne*-holder of this tax-farm was from among the highest echelons of the *ulema* class, *Mevlana* Mahmud.<sup>67</sup> He sub-farmed the tax-farm to Şatırzâde İbrahim Ağa by way of *emanet* on the condition that he would make all the necessary payments tied to the tax-farm such as *vezaif* (salary) and the cash left from these payments to him.<sup>68</sup> Since he performed the tax collection from the customs, İbrahim Ağa was referred to as the intendant (*emin*) of Trabzon customs.<sup>69</sup> In turn, he in turn sub-farmed *ihtisab* of Trabzon, which was tied to the tax-farm of the customs of Trabzon, to Çubukçuzâde Mustafa Ağa for a year in return for the payment of 250 *kuruş*.<sup>70</sup>

Thirdly, the Şatırzâdes kept the right to collect revenues from the tax-farm called *mukata'a-i damga-i bez-i keten der liva-i Trabzon ve tevabiha*. As opposed to their role in the tax-farm of the customs of Trabzon as a subcontractor of the high elite, Şatırzâde Ömer Ağa seemed to be the life-term holder of this commercial tax-farm between 1771-76 and 1780-2 period. 1515 *kuruş* of the annual instalment was assigned to the salaries of janissaries.<sup>71</sup> According to the calculations of M. Genç, the total amount of the annual payment to the central treasury was 5655 *kuruş* in 1780 and the lump sum payment amounted to 7500 *kuruş* in the same year.

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Faaliyetin Göstergesi Olarak Kullanılabilirliği Üzerinde Bir Çalışma” in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, p. 176.

<sup>67</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1933 (2005)*, p. 68b/2. *Mevlana* Mahmud was referred to as from among the *müderresin-i kiram*. The annual payment (*mal*) was 848.000 *akça*, which was equal to 7066 *kuruş*.

<sup>68</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1932*, p. 13b/2.

<sup>69</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1932*, p. 13b/1 (1773).

<sup>70</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1933 (2005)*, p. 93b/1.

<sup>71</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1932*, p. 47b/2, 61a/3 and 63b/2; *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1933 (2005)*, p. 66b/1; *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 123 (2009)*.

Moreover, Şatırzâde Hacı İsmail Ağa engaged in the trade of grain and he was referred to as a merchant who dealt with the trade of cotton in 1771-2.<sup>72</sup>

In sum, Şatırzâdes as the leading notable of Trabzon, controlled three significant tax revenues extracted from the trade and commercial products. The management of these tax-farms seems to have been undertaken independent of the interference of the Caniklizâdes. The Şatırzâdes appear to have carried out these functions due to being part of the administrative and financial structure of the empire. The accumulation of wealth was directly related to holding state posts. They took shares from the tax revenues either as subcontractor of the *malikâne*-holder or directly as the direct *malikâne*-holder itself. As military commander of Trabzon, the Şatırzâdes also had some military functions and as the chief notable (*reisü'l ayân*), had a mediating function between the governor and population of Trabzon.

To conclude, while the Hazine-darzâdes were substituted by the central government to fill the power vacuum left by the Caniklizâdes and turned out to be an imperial elite as governors of Trabzon and Canik, the Şatırzâdes played a significant role as a regional elite in Trabzon who allied themselves with the rule of the Caniklizâdes.

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<sup>72</sup> DBŞM 4043, p. 8, 36. Şatırzâde İsmail Ağa was one of the local notables who had a tie with *sarrağ* Ohannes. He sent *poliçes* (letter of exchange) for the purchase of grain. It was highly possible that he served as an official who bought grain for the central government (*mübaya'acı*) and Ohannes made the payments in advance for him. Later he settled his account with his banker.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### FORMATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF FAMILY WEALTH

#### I. Wealth at Stake (From Fortune to Confiscation)

Like other provincial magnates, the Caniklizâdes too gained wealth through tax-farming, the collection of extraordinary taxes, recruitment of troops, collection of provisions and livestock for the army as well as through moneylending and the establishments of *çiftliks*.<sup>1</sup> Among them, tax collection in particular appeared to be the most important means for the accumulation of wealth. As already seen in Chapter Three above, the Canikli dynasty controlled a variety of tax revenues in Canik, Amasya, Trabzon, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Kastamonu, Tokat, and Sivas. They dominated nearly the entire North-Eastern regions of the Empire by serving as governors and tax-collectors. Their role as tax-farmers tax-collectors seems to appear far more important than their other functions as land-owner or moneylender. That is to say, the administrative and financial responsibilities of the Caniklizâdes in the 1770s and 1780s provided the basic means to enlarge their capital accumulation further in addition to the profits accrued from their tax-collection activities.

The Caniklizâdes' investments consisted of urban and rural estates, moneylending as well as movable properties like cash, gold, silver, and precious

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<sup>1</sup> İnalçık, "Centralization and Decentralization", p. 41.

personal effects. In what follows, I will analyse the manner in which the family used and invested its wealth by examining two estate inventories of the Caniklizâdes, dated 1780 and 1792 respectively.

As is well known, confiscation or *müsadere* was a significant tool for the Ottoman central administration to keep the power and wealth of the local dynasties, as well as other state officials, under control. The Ottoman government often resorted to confiscation in order to prevent local notables from turning into a class of nobility, who would pass family wealth from generation to generation. A cursory look at the existing archival material clearly reveals an increase in the number of the registers of estate inventories or *muhallefat* during the eighteenth century. This was largely due to the fact that the confiscation of estates increasingly became a means of generating new revenues for the central treasury as well as asserting the central government's power over the larger and smaller notables of the Empire.<sup>2</sup>

Although confiscation provided the Ottoman government a significant instrument in challenging the power of local dynasties, the state could not practice it without justification. Only the estate of an official who had fiscal relations with the Ottoman state would be confiscated;<sup>3</sup> the estates of ordinary subjects could not be confiscated at all. This means that the state could only confiscate the wealth of the members of the ruling class, who accumulated capital by means of holding a

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<sup>2</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, p. 135. Also see Yavuz Cezar, "Bir Âyanın Muhallefatı, Havza ve Köprü Kazaları Âyanı Kör İsmail-Oğlu Hüseyin (Müsadere olayı ve terekenin incelenmesi), *Belleten*, XLI/161-164, 1977, p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, p. 58.

state office.<sup>4</sup> The confiscation occurred only when the officials acquired wealth by improper means or deserved a punishment or was in debt to the state. Under such circumstances, the central government, upon the order of the Sultan himself, applied confiscation even during the life-time of an official. As stated above, the application of confiscation appeared to have increased in times of financial crisis during the late eighteenth century; it was mainly due to the escalating campaign expenditures, for example, during the campaign years of 1787-1792. The government, under these conditions, even resorted to the confiscation of the property of merchants and *sarrafs* or other people who were not the member of the *askeri* class but known to have had cash stocks.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, it can be said that the personal wealth of the members of the ruling elite either at the centre or in provinces was a wealth at stake; for these dignitaries and wealthy individuals, the personal fortune could easily turn into a financial tragedy for the family. For a person in this position, therefore, it was his ability to maintain the fine balance between his personal relations with the central government and the course of events at the imperial level that often determined their fate.

However, confiscation did not always mean a total disaster for the person involved. In the eighteenth century, it became an established practice to let the heirs of deceased central or local officials purchase the inheritance for cash value, *bedel-i muhallefat*.<sup>6</sup> This can be seen as a tax on inheritance taken by the central treasury<sup>7</sup> and the amount involved was open to negotiation.<sup>8</sup> The *bedel-i*

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<sup>4</sup> Göçek, "Musâdara", p. 653.

<sup>5</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, p. 110.

<sup>6</sup> Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, p. 161.

<sup>7</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, p. 110, 135.

*muhallefat* gives us a general idea about the total value of the estates of Anatolian local dynasties.

This practice of inheritance of the inventory of central and local officials by the heirs upon the payment of a *bedel* was often applied by the Ottoman state in order to tax the wealth of officials who were thought to have acquired lucre through and during their office. Taking a *bedel* instead of confiscation by a centrally appointed official was preferred also for practical reasons. It was first of all costly for the central government to send a *mübaşir* or agent to confiscate the inheritance since the agent had to spend money to travel, register the property and transfer the most precious items to İstanbul to be kept for the inner treasury, the Sultan's personal treasury. In some cases, the process of confiscation could easily cost more than the total worth of the inheritance.<sup>9</sup>

We see similar procedures also in the case of the Caniklizâdes. For example, upon the death of Canikli Ali Paşa in 1785, his son Battal Hüseyin inherited his wealth in return for the payment of 112.500 *kuruş* to the central treasury.<sup>10</sup> Likewise, following the death of Battal Hüseyin Paşa in 1801, the total value of his estate (*bedel-i muhallefat*) was determined by the central treasury as

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<sup>8</sup> Sakaoğlu, *Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, pp. 150-3. Sakaoğlu gives a detailed account about the process of the negotiation over the payment of *bedel* between the government and Veli Bey who inherited his fathers' estate. In another example, the government asked the inheritors of Ekmekçi Hacı İbrahim, the governor of Tokat in 1793-4, to hand over 50.000 *kuruş* in return for keeping the estates of him. However, his heirs reduced this amount to 20.000 *kuruş* by a negotiation. Duman, *Notables, Textiles and Copper in Ottoman Tokat*, p. 57.

<sup>9</sup> Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, p. 161.

<sup>10</sup> Battal Paşa had to pay a total of 225.000 *kuruş* to inherit the possessions of his father as well as the tax-farms of Canik and Amasya (the lump sum payments, *muaccele* of the tax-farms). However, 50.000 *kuruş* was dropped by the central treasury following the negotiation with him. He had still indebted 40.336 *kuruş* in 1789 and the central treasury pursued this debt through his *kapı kethüdası*. DBŞM-MHF 87/101.

500.000 *kuruş*. In return for this payment in three instalments, his son Tayyar Bey inherited his wealth.<sup>11</sup>

Not only the Caniklizâdes but also the members of other local magnate families often accepted to pay great amounts of money to purchase the estates of the deceased person in their families. In 1781, for example, Çapanoğlu Süleyman Bey paid 1.900.000 *kuruş* in return for the inheritance of his brother Mustafa Bey's estate.<sup>12</sup> The value of the estate of Çapanoğlu Mustafa Bey was about sixteen times that of Canikli Ali Paşa. This was probably due to the fact that Ali Paşa had already lost most of his wealth during the confiscation of 1780 when he was declared a rebel. Similarly, upon the death of Çapanoğlu Süleyman Bey in 1813, his heirs (Celaledin Paşa and other sons) were made to pay 2.000.000 *kuruş* to the central treasury to escape from the confiscation of their father's property.<sup>13</sup>

In another case, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa of Karaosmanoğlus, the well known member of another dynastic family of Western Anatolia who died in 1816, left a great inheritance estimated as 2.500.000 *kuruş*.<sup>14</sup> This amount was five times that of Caniklizâde Battal Paşa's.

Köse Paşa of Divriği, on the other hand, left an estate valued at 82.500 *kuruş*. His wealth was inherited by his son Veli Bey in return for the payment of

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<sup>11</sup> In addition to *bedel-i muhallefat*, he purchased the tax-farms of Canik, Karahisar-ı Şarki and Tirebolu in return for the down payment of 62.500 *kuruş*. *MAD* 9582, p. 112 and *Cevdet Maliye* 6146.

<sup>12</sup> Uzunçarşılı, "Çapan Oğulları", p. 227.

<sup>13</sup> Uzunçarşılı, "Çapan Oğulları", p. 250. It is interesting that the Çapanoğlus client, İlbaşı Ahmet's estate had been valued 1.176.148 *kuruş* in 1813. After his debts and inheritance rights of his household members were subtracted, the state gained 502.358 *kuruş*. Duman, *Notables, Textiles and Copper in Ottoman Tokat 1750-1840*, p. 89, 91.



this amount in 1802.<sup>15</sup> In comparison to the value of the estate of Caniklizâde Battal Paşa, who died one year earlier, it was only one-sixth of the total wealth of Battal Paşa. In short, the Karaosmanoğlus appear to have been the richest among Anatolian dynasties, and he was followed by the Çapanoğlus and, then, the Caniklizâdes. Köse Mustafa Paşa's estate, in comparison, had the lowest value among dynasties.

Although the *bedel-i muhallefat* reveals the total value of the personal wealth of the Caniklizâdes as well as other Anatolian dynasties, it is not a sufficient criterion for a meaningful comparison in this respect. The composition of the wealth of each family can also yield interesting significant insights. In the following, I will analyse the investments of the Caniklizâdes in a variety of fields throughout the region under their control.

As we already know from the previous chapters, the Caniklizâdes two times faced severe punishment, execution and confiscation by the central government during their domination as the most powerful family of their regions. First of all, the central government's decision to execute Canikli Ali Paşa (1779) was taken under vulnerable political conjuncture. The government came to the conclusion that Canikli Ali Paşa misused his power as the Commander-in-chief of Criema in 1777-78. He was accused of collecting illegal taxes, appropriating the revenues assigned to him for the finance of the army during the campaign. He was thought to have accumulated a substantial amount of wealth during his undertaking the provisioning of the army by expropriating cash and provisions to

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<sup>14</sup> Yuzo Nagata, "Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Hüseyin Ağa'ya Ait Bir Tereke Defteri" in *Studies on the*

his personal treasury.<sup>16</sup> Following the war with Çapanoğlu, Ali Paşa showed his nearly autonomous sphere of operation free from the interference of the central authorities. The government eventually decided to seize the property of Ali Paşa as well as the possessions of his relatives, retinue members, deputies and his prominent supporters in the region. Although several orders were sent to the governors of neighbouring regions to execute Ali Paşa, he found a way to escape to the Crimea, saving his life but not his wealth.

The central government took several measures to challenge the local support that Ali Paşa had in Canik and to reestablish central authority over the provinces where Ali Paşa had followers. The government pursued two aims, first to challenge the regional power base of Ali Paşa and then to confiscate the wealth of the Canikli dynasty. His relatives, leading members of his retinue were captured and sent to İstanbul to participate in the process of determining the immovable and immovable property of the family and to cut their contact with the region to prevent further disorder and rebellion of his supporters.<sup>17</sup> His followers (*avene*) were either executed or put into prison or escaped. Their wealth was also

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*Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire*, İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995, p. 23.

<sup>15</sup> Sakaoğlu, *Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, pp. 151-153.

<sup>16</sup> When he served as the *Serasker* of Crimea, he was assigned a wide range of revenue sources to recruit and finance soldiers. He controlled the revenues of Canik, Trabzon, Kastamonu, Sivas, and Erzurum for this purpose. Furthermore, the central government either sent a great amount of cash, 150.000 *kuruş*, for the salaries of the soldiers in 1778 or sent orders for the provisioning of wheat, barley and military equipments from the neighbouring regions. The war-time levies of Trabzon (40.000 *kuruş*) and of Sivas (33.000 *kuruş*) were delivered for the expenses of Ali Paşa. See Chapter Two for the assignment of revenues and offices for Canikli Ali Paşa and his sons during the 1770s. Also see Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, pp. 63-80 for a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of Ali Paşa and the negative attitude of the government towards him at that time. For the accusation of Ali Paşa as a corrupt official see, Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa", pp. 502-503.

<sup>17</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye 15976*, *Cevdet Zaptiye 1208*, and *Ali Emiri I. Abdülhamit 6345*.

seized by the state.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, the inhabitants of Canik were threatened with the payment of 100.000 *kuruş* if they did not provide help in the capturing of Ali Paşa's supporters. So, the confiscation and capturing of Ali Paşa and his followers soon became a matter which necessitated the involvement of military force (provided by Çapanoğlu Mustafa and by the governors of the neighbouring regions, such as Sivas and Trabzon), and an alliance of other local notables as well as the administrative and judicial officials of the other coastal regions of the Black Sea.<sup>19</sup> The government aimed to seize the whole wealth of Ali Paşa and his household members to take back what they had accumulated for their own benefit during the campaign years. This can be considered as a redistribution of the revenues assigned to Ali Paşa for the Crimean campaign and to halt his relatively autonomous power. The close relatives and the *kethüda* of Ali Paşa informed the government about the possessions of the family. Based on this knowledge, Mehmed Ağa, an imperial gate-keeper (*dergah-ı ali kapıcıbaşı*) was appointed as the agent (*mübaşir*) for the resulting confiscation.

Likewise, the series of events between 1790 and 1792, which were referred to earlier, led to the second confiscation of the Canikli dynasty. As a result of the failure of the members of the Caniklizâdes in the 1787-1792 campaign against Russia, the loss of Anapa to the Russians, followed by the

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<sup>18</sup> For example, one of the Ali Paşa's client in Sinop was Tekneoğlu Ahmet, who was appointed by Ali Paşa as the agent (*nazır*) for the construction of an imperial ship (*kalyon*), had escaped because of the fear of execution. When the imperial order arrived, the judge of Sinop grasped Tekneoğlu's property which had valued 10.050 *kuruş*. *Cevdet Dahiliye 15288*.

<sup>19</sup> *MAD 10026* contains hundreds of imperial orders sent to the administrators and judges of Sivas, Bafra, Trabzon, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Kastamonu, Erzurum, Sinop with regards to the precautions to be taken for the arrest of Ali Paşa and the confiscation of his property. See also Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa*, pp. 116- 131.

escape of Battal Paşa to Russia, and a rebellion in Canik due to the rivalry among Hayreddin Paşa and *kethüda* Abdullah Paşa, the reigning Sultan, Selim III, decided to double punish the Canikli dynasty by execution and confiscation. While Battal and Tayyar Paşas once more managed to escape to Russia in 1792, Mikdad Ahmed and Hayreddin Ragıp were executed.<sup>20</sup>

## II. Cash, Luxuries and Immovables

The origin of the sources of wealth of Canikli Ali Paşa and his sons seems to go back to the time of his father, Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa. Although he had not left a significant fortune to his sons, it appears that it was Ahmet Ağa, the founder of the dynasty, who had provided suitable ground for his sons by establishing himself firmly in the region. On this basis, his sons rose as future administrators of Canik. When Ahmet Ağa died in 1748 as the *muhassıl* of Canik, he left 25.000 *kuruş* cash together with forty-two items of personal effects composed of silver and copper goods, but no immovables.<sup>21</sup> He seems to have earned a fortune by acting as a moneylender, constituting a small notable-*agha* type in Canik. The total amount of debt owed to him was 10.615,5 *kuruş*. He tied the lesser notables in the region to himself by giving them credits. His loans were mostly related with the tax-farm of Canik. Moreover, he also loaned money to the inhabitants of the

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<sup>20</sup> See the second chapter for these events.

<sup>21</sup> *DBŞM-MHF* 39/39.

region independent from the tax-collection activities.<sup>22</sup> His deputy (*mütesellim*), Abdurrahman Ağa, who administered the tax-collection in the subdistricts of Canik (Terme, Akçay, Kavak, Bafra, Alaçam, Samsun, Ünye, Ayvacık), owed him 20.000 *kuruş* from the accounts of these regions.<sup>23</sup> The total amount of debt owed to him (30.000 *kuruş*) was nearly two times the estimated annual profit gained from the tax-farm of *muhasıllık* of Canik.<sup>24</sup> Ahmed Ağa combined in himself the identity of a tax-farmer with that of moneylender. However, the existence of petitions of complaint against him due to his over-taxation and oppression of peasants can be considered as his drive for the extension of his fortune. On the other hand, we do not have the inventory of his elder son Süleyman Paşa, who was promoted to the rank of vizier as the governor of Trabzon. It is not possible therefore to say much about his wealth other than referring to an archival record that points to fourteen items with the value of 158 *kuruş* from among his property were sent to the *cebehane* in İstanbul.<sup>25</sup> He had no precious goods to be sent to İstanbul.

As for his son, Ali Paşa, we possess more historical records. Canikli Ali Paşa was successful in expanding the family wealth that he inherited from his father; he also provided the means for his household members to accumulate their own wealth.<sup>26</sup> General examination of the available documentation reveals the fact that the investments of the Caniklizâdes essentially concentrated on the regions of

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<sup>22</sup> DBŞM-MHF 39/42. Ahmet Ağa gave credits to eleven petty notables.

<sup>23</sup> DBŞM-MHF 39/38.

<sup>24</sup> The estimated amount of profit from this tax-farm was about the range between 16.625-19.000 *kuruş* in 1748. See Table 3 in Chapter Three.

<sup>25</sup> DBŞM-MHF 54/40.

<sup>26</sup> For the redistribution of wealth among his *kethüdas*, see previous chapter.

Bafra and Amasya (especially in the subdistricts of Köprü, Merzifon, Havza). Among these were immovable properties of Ali Paşa, such as mansions, houses, shops, *çiftlik*s. The information about his family's lucre is mainly based on the records of confiscation, which provide us the breakdown of their property: the cash, personal effects, debts owed to him, female and male slaves, *çiftlik*s and the crops and livestock. They all were registered by the scribe appointed by the governor of Sivas (İzzet Mehmet Paşa), Çapanoğlu Mustafa Bey, the former *defterdar* of the army of Crimea (Mustafa Ağa), the judge and the prominent people of Bafra.<sup>27</sup>

Table 5 at the end of the chapter gives us a list of the property of Ali Paşa and his son Battal Bey in Bafra.<sup>28</sup> The officials registered the cash found in the storeroom (*mahzen*) of a ruined house's garden. The cash consisted of several kinds of silver and gold coins, *beyaz akçe*, *fındık altın*, etc., in purses,<sup>29</sup> the total value of which amounted to 295.427 *kuruş*. What this reveals is that he preferred to invest the money he had presumably accumulated for himself during the time of his responsibility in collecting provisions for the army, in currency. Compared to Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Hüseyin Ağa, Ali Paşa's cash exceeded the amount of the former only by 155.000 *kuruş*.<sup>30</sup> Canikli Ali Paşa seems to have invested specially in movables like currency, gold and silver jewels and precious cloths and furs,

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<sup>27</sup> DBŞM 4932 is a list of the inventory estate (*muhallefat*) of Canikli Ali Paşa in Bafra.

<sup>28</sup> DBŞM-MHF 65/45 provides an information about the immovable properties of Canikli Ali Paşa and Battal Bey in Bafra including the big estates (*çiftlik*s).

<sup>29</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye 12578*. These different kinds of currencies were found hidden in the old house of Ali Paşa and they were sealed by the local judge together with people from the inhabitants of Bafra. Afterwards, they were registered by the official appointed by the government for the confiscation (Mehmet Ağa), in alliance with the judge, other members of *ulema* and Mustafa Efendi from the bureau of chief finance (*başmuhasebe*).

<sup>30</sup> Nagata, "Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Hüseyin Ağa'ya Ait Bir Tereke Defteri", p. 24.

which were easier to transport or to hide when necessary.<sup>31</sup> Such kind of investment may well be interpreted as a sign of the constant threat of confiscation by the state. However, he was not able to take with him the currencies he accumulated and the precious cloths when he escaped to Russia in 1779. The amount of the currency he accumulated turned out during the confiscation to be fifteen times the estimated annual profit from the tax-farm of the *muhasıllık* of Canik.<sup>32</sup>

Although he accrued a great amount of cash in comparison to other dynastic notables, Canikli Ali Paşa, contrary to his father, had no interest in lending money at interest and credit transactions. Instead he seems to have preferred to keep the currencies as a security against confiscation. For the sake of comparison, it is interesting to note that 21 % of Karaosmanoğlu Hüseyin Ağa's wealth consisted of loans<sup>33</sup> and the value of loans amounted to 44 % of the estate inventory of Köse Mustafa Paşa.<sup>34</sup>

Luxurious goods, on the other hand, seem to have interested Canikli Ali Paşa far more than investment. In his inventory, the precious personal effects consisted of 151 items, each containing more than one piece, which were directly shipped to İstanbul. The cash value of his personal effects, however, were not registered by the officials; therefore it is not possible to determine their proportion within the total lucre of Ali Paşa. The estate inventory of Dağıstani Ali Paşa, who

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<sup>31</sup> For a similar kind of evaluation see Gilles Veinstein, "On the *Çiftlik* Debate" in *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, Albany: State University of New York, 1991, p. 53.

<sup>32</sup> See the table 3 on the third chapter.

<sup>33</sup> Nagata, "Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Hüseyin Ağa'ya Ait Bir Tereke Defteri" p. 26.

<sup>34</sup> Sakaoğlu, *Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, p. 138.

was the governor of the province of Sivas and was executed in 1780 upon his rebellion and oppression of tax-payers, can provide some clues for a comparative analysis. Dağıstani Ali Paşa was known as one of the richest governors of the Empire and left 1120 items of personal and household goods, nearly ten times that of Canikli Ali Paşa.<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, compared to Canikli Ali Paşa, the personal effects of Köse Mustafa Paşa of Divriği were far less both in number and quality.<sup>36</sup>

We can still make an analysis about the variety of the personal and household goods by simply categorising them according to their kinds.<sup>37</sup> Firstly, Ali Paşa accumulated a large amount of silk and woollen staff and textiles (38 items) which constituted 25.1 % of the total personal property. Secondly, precious home furniture, bed cloths, and mostly silver kitchen utensils made up of 21.1 %. Thirdly, fur-coats (22 pieces),<sup>38</sup> robes of honour (11 pieces) and helmets (230

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<sup>35</sup> Saim Savaş, “Sivas Valisi Dağıstani Ali Paşa’nın Muhallefatı, XVIII. Asrın Sonunda Osmanlı Sosyal Hayatına Dair Önemli Bir Belge”, *Belgeler*, XV/19, 1993. 529 items out of 1120 were registered as the governor’s personal effects. Unlike Canikli Ali Paşa’s estate inventory, the remaining 591 items in Dağıstani’s inventory belonged to his wife and thirteen female slaves.

<sup>36</sup> Sakaoglu provides the estate inventory of Köse Mustafa Paşa of Divriği (1802) and the value of personal effects in *kuruş* in his pioneering work. Köse Paşa possessed 92 items of goods (407 pieces) valued at 17.823 *kuruş* and these constituted 17 % of the total value of his properties. See *Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, pp. 133-138.

<sup>37</sup> Woollen, silk staff and clothes → 25.1 %

Home furnishings, kitchen utensils, bed cloths → 21.1 %

Fur-coats, robes of honour, helmets → 16 %

Horse and ornaments of horse → 10.5 %

Musical instruments of a military band → 10.5 %

Armory with gold-inlaid muskets, swords of all kinds, mace, lance → 9.6 %

Personal ornaments → 3.9 %

Flags → 3.3 %.

The percentage is reached by accounting each category of items out of total 151 entries. See *DBŞM 4932* for the complete list of the goods.

<sup>38</sup> Similarly, Dağıstani Ali Paşa accumulated more fur coats (97 items/116 pieces fur coats and stocks for them) than Ali Paşa. However, the overall rate of the quantity of fur coats constituted 16 % of Ali Paşa’s personal goods while that of Dağıstani Ali Paşa was made up only of 8.6 % of his total personal effects. See Savaş, “Dağıstani Ali Paşa’nın Muhallefatı”. Likewise, another governor of Sivas, El-Hac Mehmet Paşa’s inventory (1804) included 28 fur coats. See Fatma



pieces, registered under 4 items), all recorded under 24 items, constituted 16 % of the total. While 10.5 % of goods were made up of ornaments for horse, 9.6 % belonged to armory, with gold-inlaid muskets, swords of all kinds, silver-made cartridge boxes, daggers, maces, lances, etc. The high proportion of these goods in Ali Paşa's inventory clearly demonstrates his political power and social prestige. These were mostly the symbols of higher status with significant meanings attached to them. They were accompanied of course by a number of flags (3.3 %) and musical instruments of a military band (*mehter*) (10.5 %), which could have been possessed only by a high military official or commander. One should also mention in this context a great number of military equipment and tents for the army, which necessitated a large ship for their transportation to İstanbul,<sup>39</sup> this was obviously part of Ali Paşa's personal belongings as the military commander in many campaigns against Russia.

Ali Paşa appears not to have preferred to vest his wealth in urban estates either. His main place of residence was Bafra. From the description provided in the document, it appears that this big mansion or *konak* in Bafra possessed thirty-four large rooms, an outer courtyard, two stables, kitchen, another two rooms, a bath, a room for cloths (*camekan*) and an orchard. It was also referred to as a palace. His other immovable properties consisted of a bath near his mansion, ten *çiftlik*s in Bafra and a great amount of livestock in the hands of the villagers of Canik. I will deal with the *çiftlik*s in the following section.

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Müge Göçek, "Ottoman Provincial Transformation in the Distribution of Power: The Tribulations of the Governor of Sivas in 1804 (A. H. 1219)" in *Aspects of Ottoman History*, Papers from CIEPO IX, eds. A. Singer and A. Cohen, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Press, 1994.

Another interesting point relating to Ali Paşa's estate inventory is the absence of his debt to the state, unlike Dağıstani Ali Paşa and Köse Mustafa Paşa. Along with many others, these Ottoman governors died with a great amount of a debt to the state. While the debt of Dağıstani Ali Paşa would easily be substituted by his confiscated precious personal effects, the debt of Köse Paşa was inherited by his son only after long negotiations with the central government. The absence of debt to the central government may be considered as a sign, at least, of Ali Paşa's regular payments for the tax-farms he held.

His son Battal Bey appears to have also lived in Bafra. He owned a house with five rooms used by his *harem*, a bath with a room for his clothes as well as real estate producing rent. This included a dyehouse, a bakery, a zyntum (*boza*) shop, a caravanserai (*han*) with two shops attached to it and a shop with two rooms above, which were reserved for his treasurer, Mıgırdıç.<sup>40</sup> In addition to these immovables in Bafra, Battal Bey possessed a house with three rooms near the Kızılırmak river with an orchard, a grain store and two stables in the same place.

Battal Bey's second residence was in the town Köprü (or Gedegra) in the Amasya province.<sup>41</sup> (See Table 6 for his property in Köprü). There, he owned another mansion with a vineyard, seven shops, a share in a caravanserai (*han*), a

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<sup>39</sup> The correspondance among the officials reveals that there was a need for a large ship, which had a capacity to transport 256.000 kg. (10.000 *kile*). *Cevdet Dahiliye 15323*.

<sup>40</sup> Mıgırdıç was the trusted men of Battal Bey and at the same time served as his personal treasurer. The government ordered the local officials to arrest him since he would inform about the currencies, coins and other means of wealth that they might have hidden. Mıgırdıç later continued as the treasurer of the Canikli family and became a moneylender (*sarrağ*) in Bafra. He was again watched for the inspection of the lucre of the family by the government during the second confiscation in 1792. See *MAD 9720*, p. 54.

<sup>41</sup> See Table 6 for the properties of Battal Bey in Köprü and *DBŞM-MHF 65/26*, p. 3.

grain-house with a piece of land attached, a mill and another plot of land as well as a number of personal effects in his mansion.<sup>42</sup> The total value of his possession in Köprü was estimated by the deputy judge (*naib*) of Gedegra as 7343,5 *kuruş*. This was the auction price of his immovables and personal effects paid by the inhabitants of the district. It included also the price of the crops stored, which were registered as the tithe or *öşr* of the tax-farm of Köprü belonging to Battal Bey and his treasurer. It is interesting to note that Battal Bey did not accrue cash and no debt owed to him. Probably, he purchased these immovables during his office as the deputy governor (*mütesellim*) of Amasya.

As opposed to his brother and his father, Mikdad Ahmet Paşa's primary residence was in Amasya and he lived in a big mansion<sup>43</sup> (see Table 7 for the list of his property). He was deeply involved in commerce and money transactions in Amasya. Although he seems to have acted as a moneylender, the range of his loans were not so great in comparison to the small *ayân* of Havza and Vezirköprü (near Amasya), Kör-İsmailoğlu Hüseyin. While the total amount of debt owed to Mikdad Ahmet Paşa was some 22.580 *kuruş*, the small notable of Havza and Vezirköprü had an asset amounted to 38.391 *kuruş*.<sup>44</sup> In fact, the inventory of Kör-İsmailoğlu Hüseyin reveals that he died with a debt of 25.000 *kuruş* to Tayyar Mahmut Paşa (the cousin of Mikdad Ahmet Paşa) who was the deputy of a

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<sup>42</sup> His personal effects (11 items) consisted of cushions, pillows, bedcloths and copper-made kitchen utensils as well as six fur coats. *DBŞM-MHF* 65/26.

<sup>43</sup> The property of Mikdad Ahmet Paşa was separately registered by the government officials. See *Cevdet Maliye 17964* for the possessions of Mikdad Paşa.

<sup>44</sup> Moreover, Kör İsmailoğlu Hüseyin also indebted to Tayyar Paşa's wife (3000 *kuruş*) and Hafız Ali Paşa (6000 *kuruş*), the former *kethüda* of Tayyar Paşa, the governor of Sivas. See Cezar, "Bir Âyanın Muhallefatı", p. 57.

Grand Vizier at that time. So, the amount of the credit is not a sufficient criterion for a comparison. The total wealth of the *ayân* of Havza and Vezirköprü was 20.000 *kuruş*, which was equal to only one-fifth of Mikdad Ahmet Paşa's accumulated cash (103.464 *kuruş*) in the inventory. Mikdad Paşa's credits were not only related with the commercial transactions but also the tax-farming operations. His debtors consisted of several people; three non-muslims, a few small notables and the villagers and inhabitants of Amasya.<sup>45</sup>

In addition, he seems to have engaged in the trade of livestock. A great number of sheep (1000), goats (300) and buffalos (80) were registered as his property and it was stated that he brought these animals from Erzurum to Amasya. Mikdad Ahmet Paşa also acquired many urban estates in Amasya during his governorship; among these were shops (30), dye houses (2, and a half share), vineyards (5), a construction site, and an incomplete mill. As stated above, he possessed a great amount of cash (in gold coins) valued at 103.464 *kuruş* found in a secret place of his mansion. Furthermore, his son Hasan and daughter Safiye accumulated 25.000 *kuruş* in total. Later on, he seems to have transformed these shops generating rent into a pious endowment. This, I will analyse later in this chapter.

Like Ali Paşa, Battal Hüseyin and Hayreddin Paşas invested much of their wealth in luxury and precious personal goods. Battal Hüseyin's personal effects

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<sup>45</sup> Mikdad Ahmed Paşa's moneylending activity was a very minor operation in comparison to Müridoğlu Hacı Mehmed's, a wealthy *ayan* of Edremit, who left a fortune of about 691.529 *kuruş*. 48.2 % of his total wealth, that is 333.884 *kuruş*, consisted of loans connected with both tax-collection and commerce. Suraiye Faroqhi, "Wealth and Power in the Land of Olives", p. 93.

consisted of 284 entries.<sup>46</sup> 57 % of his goods (162 items) was made up of horse ornaments such as *gaşıye*, *raht*, *raşme*, *rikab*, *kesme*, etc. This is followed by furniture, kitchen utensils and beddings, the total of which constituted some 16.1 % of his personal effects. While his precious arms ornamented with gold and silver constituted 13.3 %, woollen and silk staff and clothes made up of 10.2 %. Like his father, such a consumption pattern reveals quite a significant amount of investment in personal goods showing the social power and an attempt to distinguish Battal Paşa and his household members from the ordinary subjects.

Battal's son Hayreddin Paşa followed the same pattern; he also accumulated a great amount of personal effects (103 items). He seems to have invested more in precious textiles and clothes (32 %), and secondarily in home furniture including bed cloths (29.1 %) and kitchen utensils (21.3 %). As opposed to his father, Hayreddin Paşa had fewer ornamented guns (10 %) and ornamented horse cloths and objects (7.8 %).<sup>47</sup>

The precious personal effects of Battal and Hayreddin Paşas were also sent to İstanbul after the registration. They were auctioned by the state in the internal treasury of the Sultan. These goods were purchased by the prominent elites of

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<sup>46</sup> Horse ornaments → 57 %

Woollen, silk staff and clothes → 10.2 %

Home furnishings, kitchen utensils, bed cloths → 16.1 %

Armory with gold-inlaid muskets, swords of all kinds, maces, lances → 13.3 %

Other → 3.4 %

See *MAD 9720*, pp. 193-194 for the list of Battal Paşa's personal goods. (1792).

<sup>47</sup> Precious textiles and cloths → 32 %

Home furniture and bed cloths → 29.1 %

kitchen utensils → 21.3 %

Armory with gold-inlaid muskets, swords of all kinds, maces, lances → 10 %

Horse ornaments → 7.8 %

See *MAD 9720*, p. 195 for the lists of Hayreddin Paşa's personal effects.

palace and bureaucracy. The total value of Battal Paşa's goods amounted to a great sum of money, 54.335 *kuruş* and while that of Hayreddin's estates was only 9370 *kuruş*.<sup>48</sup> In sum, the total value of Battal and Hayreddin Paşa's personal effects constituted 42 % of the overall wealth of the Caniklizâdes in 1792.

While Battal seems to have acquired wealth in his home region of Bafra, Hayreddin's property was located mainly in the subdistricts of Ünye and Çarşamba. Both of them accumulated a great amount of currency, made up of different kinds of gold, valued at 32.710 *kuruş*.<sup>49</sup> This amount of cash constituted the 22 % of the total lucre of the family. They owned eleven female and three male slaves employed for domestic purposes. These slaves were also sent to İstanbul.

Battal Hüseyin and his son Hayreddin also appear to have engaged in moneylending in the region. They loaned 22.900 *kuruş* to eight different notables and prominent people in the Canik region. Their moneylending seems to be related with commercial purposes, not tax-farming operations. The value of their loans constituted 15 % of the total fortune of the family.

Lastly, the value of the immovable property such as three houses, seven shops, and a bath constituted only 2 % of the sum of the family's lucre. Mikdad Ahmed Paşa's properties were only 4 % of the total wealth, since he converted most of his wealth into a pious endowment in the 1780s.

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<sup>48</sup> *DBŞM-MHF 12986*.

<sup>49</sup> It was claimed that Hayreddin Paşa seized 400 purses of gold from Battal Paşa's house after his father escaped to the Crimea. A great amount of gold was found in Hayreddin's house in Ünye

### III. Estates (*Çiftliks*)

Canikli Ali Paşa and his son Battal Bey possessed ten *çiftliks* in Bafra and thirteen in Amasya. While all estates in Bafra were registered as the property of Ali Paşa,<sup>50</sup> the *çiftliks* in Amasya were owned collectively in shares by Ali Paşa, Battal Bey and two clients of Ali Paşa (Milli Musa and Kavaklı Ali).<sup>51</sup>

The names of *çiftliks* in Bafra and Amasya, together with the amount of crops produced (mainly wheat, barley and corn)<sup>52</sup> and the number of livestock (ox, buffalo, sheep, goat and horse) raised in these estates are given in Tables 6 and 7.<sup>53</sup> Unfortunately, neither the cash value nor the sizes of these farms were recorded. Furthermore, the absence of any information about the *çiftlik* buildings, tools for farming and the labour force employed in these lands make it difficult to comment on the nature of these estates. However, it is stated in the documents that the estates in Bafra were mostly administered by agents (*kethüda* and *hadame*). While the *çiftlik* of Karacakum was run by seven agents, each of the remaining farms was run by one *kethüda*. This seems to be related to the amount of livestock in each one. The Karacakum *çiftlik* had the highest number of oxen and horses.

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such as 1200 pieces *zer-i mahbub*, 300 pieces *findık altını*, and 4700 pieces *yaldüz altın*. *MAD* 9720, p. 194.

<sup>50</sup> *DBŞM* 4932 and *DBŞM-MHF* 65/45.

<sup>51</sup> *DBŞM-MHF* 65/38, *DBŞM-MHF* 65/32, *DBŞM-MHF* 65/26.

<sup>52</sup> The amount of cereal was registered in *kile-i İstanbul*. 1 *İstanbul kilesi* = 25.215 kg. See İnalçık, "Weights and Measures", p. 990.

<sup>53</sup> Livestock is divided into three categories: oxen and buffalos constitute one category and is composed of *camus ineği*, *camus öküzü*, *malak*, *kara sığır ineği*, *karasığır öküzü*, *düğesi*, etc. The second category of sheep and goat is made up of *agnam* and *keçi*. The horse category includes *kısrak*, *bargir*, *tay*, *esb*, *katır*. The confiscation official registered first the name of a livestock and then the number in pieces. For practical purposes, I divided them into three.

Apparently, *çiftlik*s in Bafra specialised in the cultivation of wheat, barley and, to a lesser extent, corn along with a great amount of livestock raising. Most of them combined agriculture with cattle raising, except three *çiftlik*s. In the estates in Gölavuş, Kanlıcak and Geleriç there was no cultivation at all. As İnalçık has pointed out, cattle and sheep breeding was always an important occupation in the large *çiftlik*s, unlike the ordinary peasant farms.<sup>54</sup>

In comparison to Karaosmanzâde's estates in Manisa, the amount of wheat produced in Canikli Ali Paşa's *çiftlik*s in Bafra was over three times that of the former. While 2728 *kile-i İstanbul* of wheat was produced in the farms of Bafra, it was only 780 *kile* in Karaosmanoğlu's farms.<sup>55</sup> Similarly, the amount of barley in Ali Paşa's estates was two times that of the latter's.<sup>56</sup>

If we compare the extent of livestock raising in the *çiftlik*s of Ali Paşa with that of Karaosmanzâde Hüseyin Ağa's estates,<sup>57</sup> the Caniklizâde's concentration on cattle raising becomes apparent. While the total number of oxen and buffalos amounted to 750 in the Ali Paşa's *çiftlik*s, it was only 171 in the Karaosmanzâde's estat, nearly only one-fourth of the former. Similarly, Canikli Ali Paşa's *çiftlik*s contained more horses (647)<sup>58</sup> than Karaosmanzâde's (214). In the same way, in the twelve *çiftlik*s of Hacı Mehmed Ağa, *mütesellim* of Teke, there were 670 oxen

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<sup>54</sup> Halil İnalçık, "The Emergence of Big Farms, *çiftlik*s: State, Landlords, and Tenants" in *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman, Collection Turcica, III*, Louvain: Peeters, 1984, p. 118.

<sup>55</sup> İnalçık, "The Emergence of Big Farms", p. 126, Table 1.

<sup>56</sup> The amount of barley in Karaosmanzâde's and Ali Paşa's estates was equal to 1224 *kile* and 2244 *İstanbul kilesi* respectively.

<sup>57</sup> İnalçık, "The Emergence of Big Farms", p. 126, Table 1.

<sup>58</sup> As İnalçık states, Karaosmanzâde had to maintain a security force as a *mütesellim* of Saruhan. This necessitated an occupation in horse breeding. This was also true for Ali Paşa, as the *muhasıl* of Canik. İnalçık, "The Emergence of Big Farms", p. 118.



and cows, 14 horses, 97 goats.<sup>59</sup> Ali Paşa's *çiftlik*s in Bafra on the other hand had 210 sheep and goats.

Along with the livestock registered in the Canikli Ali Paşa's estates in Bafra, he possessed also a great number of cattle and horses outside the farms; these were probably rented by the villagers of Canik.<sup>60</sup> It is likely that the tenants paid yearly rents and offered some amount of dairy products to the Caniklizâdes. Canikli Ali Paşa's estates in Amasya were listed separately.<sup>61</sup> While he owned the *çiftlik* of Susavucu, the *çiftlik* of Tatarkalesi belonged to his son Battal Bey. As seen in Table 9, seven villages (Aydoğdu, Hacı Kurt, Dere, Tahna, Karageçmiş, Kületek and Emir) within the *kaza* of Havza were recorded as the farms owned by Ali Paşa and his son. It was also stated by the official responsible for the confiscation that Ali Paşa and Battal Bey had a few fields within the villages of *kaza* of Havza.<sup>62</sup> These farms were cultivated by nearby villagers as sharecroppers. It is highly possible that the sharecroppers paid their rent in kind. As such, Canikli's *çiftlik*s in Havza resembled the second type of estates of

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<sup>59</sup> İnalçık, "The Emergence of Big Farms", p. 126.

<sup>60</sup> It was stated that "*fırari-i müşarun-ileyhin malı olmak üzere Canik sancağında vâki kura ahalilerinde olan agnam ve keçi ve hayvanat-ı saire*". See DBŞM-MHF 65/45. The amount of livestock were registered as follows:

sheep and goat: 5311

mare (*kısrak*): 214

buffalo: 337

<sup>61</sup> DBŞM-MHF 65/38, DBŞM-MHF 65/32, DBŞM-MHF 65/26.

<sup>62</sup> The confiscation official reported that "...Tatarkalesiyle Susavucu nam çiftliklerinden ma'adası ortakçı olub her bir karyede ikişer üçer kıt'a tarlaları olmağla ol tarlaların sahipleri dahi bizim tarlalarımızı fuzuli tagallüben zabt etti deyü iddia ederler". DBŞM-MHF 65/32. It was stated that although the *çiftlik*s were auctioned locally, the villagers did not have a capacity to purchase. Likewise, the personal effects of Battal Bey in Köprü could not be sold since the inhabitants did not have the courage to purchase them even if they had the capacity to do so. They feared that Battal Bey would return.

Karaosmanzâde Hüseyin Ağa, and as İnalçık distinguished,<sup>63</sup> were characterised by the fields rented to peasants or *reaya* in kind or in cash.

While Ali Paşa possessed a two-third share in the *çiftlik* of Kayalı in the *kaza* of Köprü, one of his clients Milli Musa had one *çiftlik* in the *kaza* of Varay in Amasya.<sup>64</sup> His other client Kavaklı Ali owned two farms in Merzifon. Since the farms belonged to the clients, they were also listed under the confiscated property of the Caniklizâdes (see Table 9).

Two-third of the *çiftlik* of Kayalı, which was held by Ali Paşa, was purchased by Gürcüzâde Mehmet Paşa's son, the inhabitant of Köprü, who had already held one third of the farm. The bidder promised to pay 2250 *kuruş* for the two-third share of the *çiftlik*, including the crops and livestock stationed on the farm. This enables us to estimate the money value of the land. If we subtract the value of livestock<sup>65</sup> and crops<sup>66</sup> (1209 *kuruş*), the remaining (1041 *kuruş*) was the

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<sup>63</sup> He distinguished three kinds of arrangements as far as the Karaosmanzâde's *çiftlik*s are concerned: 1) all produce goes to the landlord, with the workers paid mostly in cash. 2) a mixed kind, with farms of the first type and fields rented to peasants, the rent being in kind or in cash in the form of a lump sum. 3) all fields of the *çiftlik* rented to tenants. İnalçık, "The Emergence of Big Farms", pp. 117-118.

<sup>64</sup> Milli Musa's *çiftlik* (Terziköyü) was sold to the former owner, *mütesellim* of Amasya, Abdullah Bey in return for 750 *kuruş*. The total value of the livestock and cereals in the estate is estimated as 473 *kuruş*. So, the price of the land alone is equal to 277 *kuruş*.

<sup>65</sup> The calculation of the value of livestock is based on *DBŞM-MHF* 65/38. The prices of the livestock were stated as follows:

1) A pair of buffalo (*manda, malak*) : 30 *kuruş*.  
2) A pair of oxen (*kara sığır, dana, buzağı*) : 13 *kuruş*.  
3) A sheep (*ganem*) : 85 *para* = 2.12 *kuruş*.

To calculate the price of oxen and buffalos in the farm, I took the mean of 30 and 13 *kuruş*, because it is difficult to differentiate the first category from the second. The register itself did not categorise these two types when recording its number. Therefore, I used 10.7 *kuruş* as the value of one ox and buffalo. This is also true for the Table 10, which shows the estimated value of livestock in the *çiftlik*s of Amasya and Bafra.

<sup>66</sup> The calculation of the value of crops is based on *DBŞM-MHF* 65/26. (Battal Bey held tax-farm of the tithe of Köprü. The cereal stored in Köprü was sold by the confiscation official in the local market. Therefore, the price of wheat and barley was recorded.) The prices of cereals were registered as follows:

1) Wheat (*kile-i İstanbul*) : 30 *para*.

purchase price of the two-third of the farm-land. So, the total value of the whole farm can be estimated as 1561,5 *kuruş*. This gives an idea about the value of land in Köprü in 1780. One should bear in mind however that we do not know the size of the farm.

As opposed to the *çiftlik*s in Bafra, which primarily specialised in cattle raising in addition to the agricultural activity, the livestock raising and horse breeding was largely a secondary occupation in the *çiftlik*s of Amasya except for Kayalı, Bayat and to some extent Tatarkalesi, Susavucu and Kolay. Caniklizâde's *çiftlik*s in Bafra and Amasya had a diverse production pattern, where commodities such as wheat, barley, corn were cultivated for consumption, not for the outside markets. Therefore, we do not see a market-oriented production devoted to export crops such as cotton and tobacco in these farms. It is still worth asking whether some parts of the crops were produced for the local market. However, it seems plausible that the Caniklizâdes' engagement in the establishment of *çiftlik*s and their arrangements for livestock raising were closely related with the purpose of the self-subsistence and consumption of the members of their personal retinues. Since Ali Paşa and his sons served as governors of Canik, Trabzon and Amasya, they had to maintain substantial households.<sup>67</sup> The case below can provide some insights into the financial cost of provisions for the household. Canikli Ali Paşa's expenditure for his household members, for a three-day stay in Trabzon in 1776

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2) Barley (*kile-i İstanbul*) : 20 *para*.

3) *Senir* (*kile-i İstanbul*): 12 *para*.

<sup>67</sup> Göçek, "Ottoman Provincial Transformation", p. 36, Note 15. She argues that the size of a governor's household ranged from a hundred to several thousand members. In the seventeenth century, the size of a high level administrators' retinue was between 300 and 1000 members, not including the military attachments.

amounted to 10.500 *kuruş* only for cereals.<sup>68</sup> With this money, 14.000 *kile* of wheat could be bought in the market. The total annual produce of the *çiftlik*s in Amasya and Bafra (wheat, barley, corn) was equal to 13.084 *kile*, less than the required crops for a three-day provisioning of his retinue. Therefore, Caniklizâde's estates were probably established for the sustenance and consumption of the household. Nourishing and sustaining the retinue members seems to have been the main purpose in the management of farms, not the production for the local market.

As pointed out earlier, Ali Paşa and Battal Bey owned substantial livestock outside of the *çiftlik*s in Bafra, which were managed by villagers. Similarly, they possessed sheep, oxen, and goats, which were recorded as inventory stock or *demirbaş*. As can be seen in Table 8 and 9, the number of the livestock outside of the *çiftlik*s in Bafra was 5862 animals, while it was less in Amasya (3113 animals). The livestock in Amasya was rented annually to the fifteen Turcomans by the Caniklizâdes.<sup>69</sup> The yearly rent for a sheep and ox was 10 and 60 *para* respectively. Therefore, the annual revenue from the livestock of 3113 animals amounted to a little sum of money, only 762,5 *kuruş*. In contrast, Karaosmanzâde Hüseyin Ağa had 15.544 sheep and goats stationed in the cattle ranches or dairy

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<sup>68</sup> *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1933 (2005)*, p. 93a/1. The total amount of expenditure (including the three-day cereals, travel expenses and the salaries) for Ali Paşa's visit to Trabzon with his entourage was equal to 19.020 *kuruş* in 1776. This was allocated among the population of Trabzon. Similarly, his expenditure for a visit to Amasya for 57 days amounted to 18.385 *kuruş* in 1775. This was also distributed among the inhabitants of the *kazas* of Amasya. *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili 54*, pp. 82-83.

<sup>69</sup> *DBŞM-MHF 65/38* and *DBŞM-MHF 65/32*. Turcomans were referred to as sharecroppers. It is indicated that cattle were rented by Canikli Ali Paşa and Battal Bey for twenty years. It is also pointed out that most of the animals were lost due to diseases.

farms whose annual revenue was as high as 25.841 *kuruş*.<sup>70</sup> The gross price of cattle belonging to Karaosmanzâde Hüseyin is estimated by Nagata as 228.888 *kuruş*.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, the total value of the Caniklizâde's rented livestock is calculated as only 6.825 *kuruş* in 1780.

Were the *çiftliks* in Bafra and Amasya profitable for the Caniklizâdes? What was the place of total value of livestock and cereals in the overall wealth of the family? As can be followed from Table 10<sup>72</sup>, while the revenue from crops appeared to be higher in the farms of Amasya (3759,9 *kuruş*) than Bafra (3168 *kuruş*), the annual profit from the cattle raising in Bafra (23.363 *kuruş*) seems to have been over two times that of the revenue deriving from the farms in Amasya (10.965 *kuruş*).

In sum, the estimated annual value of the cattle and crops from the *çiftliks* in Bafra and Amasya, including the revenues from the rented livestock, was 41.256 *kuruş*. If we take into account that the market price of a sheep was 85 *para* (2.2 *kuruş*), the Caniklizâde's profit from agricultural activity and livestock

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<sup>70</sup> However, the yearly rent for a sheep was 30 *para* in Karaosmanzâde's cattle ranches and the tenants gave some products in kind to him. Nagata. "Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Hüseyin Ağa'ya Ait Bir Tereke Defteri", p. 25.

<sup>71</sup> Nagata. "Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Hüseyin Ağa'ya Ait Bir Tereke Defteri", p. 25. However, the difference between prices of livestock in 1780 and 1816 were great. The price of a buffalo in Amasya was 15 *kuruş* in 1780 and 200 *kuruş* in the estates of Karaosmanzâde in 1816. Yuzo Nagata, *Some Documents On The Big Farms (Çiftliks) of the Notables In Western Anatolia*, Tokyo: Institute For The Study of Languages And Cultures Of Asia and Africa, 1976, p. 38, Note 58.

<sup>72</sup> The data in Table 10 is an estimation of the cash value of the cereals and livestock possessed by Canikli Ali Paşa and his son Battal Bey in their *çiftliks* in two regions, including the livestock rented villagers. As stated earlier, the official responsible for the confiscation recorded only the amount of crops and cattle found in the *çiftliks*, not their price. My estimation of the total value of them is based on a register, which provides the prices for cereals and livestock in 1780. See footnote 60 and 61.

raising was considerably high and cannot be underestimated.<sup>73</sup> We cannot determine however the proportion of the annual revenue of the farms within the total wealth of Canikli Ali Paşa since his estate inventory (*muhallefât*) did not comprise the cash value of his other properties. From the above calculations it is, on the other hand, possible to point out that the total amount of the cash that Ali Paşa possessed during the confiscation was almost seven times of the total value of the crops produced and animals raised in his *çiftlik*s. Furthermore, his estimated annual profit of the tax-farm of *muhassıllık* of Canik amounted to a range between 19.800 and 24.200 *kuruş* in 1780.<sup>74</sup> This meant nearly the half the revenue deriving from the *çiftlik*s. It should not be forgotten, however, that this was not the only tax farm that the Caniklizâdes held in the region.

To conclude, the Caniklizâde's wealth consisted of movable and immovable properties. Canikli Ali Paşa invested primarily in movables like currency, precious personal effects and engaged in the establishment of *çiftlik*s. His elder son Battal Hüseyin, on the other hand, acquired immovables such as shops, houses, dye houses, and caravanserais in addition to a number of *çiftlik*s. Ali Paşa's other son, Mikdad Ahmed Paşa, appears to have been different from his father and brother. He rather possessed urban estates such as shops, vineyards, dye houses in his residential centre, Amasya, where he also engaged in the trade of cattle and moneylending activities. As opposed to Ali Paşa and Battal Bey, he

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<sup>73</sup> While the Caniklizâdes could purchase 18.752 sheep with their profit from the farms in 1780, Karaosmanzâde Hüseyin could buy 15.869 sheep (the price for a sheep in 1816 was 15 *kuruş*) with the estimated value of his estates, which amounted to nearly 238.039 *kuruş*. Yuzo Nagata, "The Role of Ayans in Regional Development During the Pre-Tanzimat Period in Turkey: A Case Study of the Karaosmanoğlu Family" in his *Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 128.

seems to have personally integrated into the local economy of Amasya as the owner of shops, the moneylender and later on as the waqf-founder. Moreover, as will be seen below, he established five *çiftlik*s in the subdistricts of Amasya in the 1780s. This is what the first confiscation records and other complementary archival material tell us about the estates of the Caniklizâdes.

As will be remembered from Chapter Two above, one year after the confiscation the Ottoman government pardoned Canikli Ali Paşa and his sons in 1781. They soon recovered their control over Canik, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Amasya and Trabzon as administrator and the tax collector. After Ali Paşa's death in 1785, his son Battal Hüseyin became Paşa as the inheritor of his father's wealth and offices. The fate of the family, however, turned around once more in 1792. In this year, Mikdad Ahmet Paşa and Hayreddin Paşa (son of Battal Paşa) were executed, and Battal Paşa and his other son Tayyar Bey escaped to Russia. The property of the family was again confiscated and another estate inventory was prepared by the officials. This inventory enables us to observe the situation in 1792, thus making it possible to compare it with the situation of twelve years earlier.

The first point to mention in this regard is that, by 1792, the Caniklizâdes seem to have partially recovered their control over their previous *çiftlik*s.<sup>75</sup> In Bafra, we see only four *çiftlik*s (Karacakum, Karaköy, Gölavuş, Engiz) out of ten remained in the hands of the family, whereas in Amasya, the Caniklizâdes lost most of their farms, except for the two, Tatarkalesi and Susavucu. As can be followed from Table 11 and 12, the total value of the cereal and livestock in the

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<sup>74</sup> See Table 3 in the third chapter.

*çiftlik*s of Bafra and Amasya amounted to 22.750 *kuruş* in 1792. This is almost half the price of crops and livestock in 1780 (41.256 *kuruş*) The total revenue deriving from the agricultural activity and cattle raising appears to have also declined nearly 50 %. This seems to have resulted from the fact that they lost most of their farms; additionally, most of the livestock were consumed by the officials responsible for the confiscation, who had to stay in Bafra for months.<sup>76</sup> While the total number of the livestock in the four *çiftlik*s in Bafra in 1780 was 1200 animals, by 1792 it declined to 916. Apparently, the agricultural production also decreased due to the loss of the livestock. As can be seen in Table 12, the total production of wheat, barley and corn decreased from 5048 in 1780 to 331,5 *kile-i İstanbul* in 1792.

Although the family lost most of the farms they possessed before, Mikdad Ahmed Paşa acquired five new *çiftlik*s in the vicinity of Amasya (in the *kazas* of Amasya, Havza and Gelkiras).<sup>77</sup> As can be followed from Table 13, while three of these *çiftlik*s specialized in livestock raising, two of them produced cereals such as wheat, barley and beans. Mikdad Ahmed Paşa also rented his farms to sharecropper tenants who cultivated the land and probably paid their rents in kind.

As outlined in Table 14, the total value of movable and immovable properties of the three members of the Caniklizâdes amounted to 151.915 *kuruş*,

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<sup>75</sup> Battal and Hayreddin Paşa's combined estate inventory was registered in *MAD* 9720, pp. 54-55, 192-197. See also *Cevdet Maliye* 7401.

<sup>76</sup> *DBŞM* 4932. It was stated that most of the livestock and crops stored in the *çiftlik*s were seized by the Çapanoğlu Mustafa, Mehmed Ağa and others during the confiscation of 1780.

<sup>77</sup> *DBŞM-MHF* 95/171 is a record of Mikdad Paşa's property in Amasya.



which only includes the value of the property sold in the auction.<sup>78</sup> It contained the personal effects of Battal and Hayreddin Paşas, currency, the cereals and livestock of *çiftlik*s, loans, three houses stationed in Çarşamba, Bafra and Kavak, a bath and seven shops located in Kavak, and furniture. These properties belonged to Battal and Hayreddin Paşas. In addition, this total included Mikdad Ahmed Paşa's immovables (seven shops, eight vineyards, two female slaves) and movables such as the precious personal goods in Amasya. One should consider the above-mentioned total wealth of the Caniklizâdes as an estimation of the actual wealth, not the exact amount, since this total does not comprise the other immovable property that remained unsold, such as seven ships and shares in three ships, a garden, two baths, a great amount of livestock and the farm lands of the above mentioned six *çiftlik*s.

The *çiftlik*s made up some 15 % of the aggregate fortune of the family in 1792. This percentage includes only the price of crops and livestock produced and raised in the *çiftlik*s in Bafra and Amasya, which belonged to Battal Paşa and his son. With the inclusion of the five new *çiftlik*s of Mikdad Ahmed Paşa, the value of which are not given in the register, into this account, one would have reached a much higher amount.

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<sup>78</sup> The confiscation register (*MAD 9720*) recorded only the prices of the property auctioned. We do not know the price of other immovables such as seven ships and three shares in different ships, garden located in Bafra, four *çiftlik*s in Bafra, two *çiftlik*s in Amasya, as well as 378 animals and 463 *kile* crops, which were not, or could not be sold during the confiscation.

#### IV. Pious Endowments (Waqf)

It is interesting to note that, unlike some other dynastic notables of the eighteenth century, the Caniklizâdes appeared not to be seriously involved in charitable engagements in the region they established themselves. Apart from a fountain in Bafra, we see no serious effort on their part to invest at least some part of the family wealth in developing the infrastructure in the region, such as roads and bridges. Neither did they seem to be interested in building library, *imaret*, etc., the institutions, which did not have cash value for the family. It has already been seen, on the other hand, that they were very much keen on investing their money in areas through which they could regenerate their personal fortune, the areas such as shops, baths, khans, etc., not to mention the significant amount of precious goods and cash they used and kept in their homes.

In this regard, Mikdad Ahmed Paşa and Tayyar Paşa, representing the third and fourth generation in the family respectively, were the only exception to a certain extent. Mikdad Ahmed transformed large portion of his immovable urban property, which he acquired during his rule in Amasya in the 1770s and 1780s into pious endowments; "to a certain extent" because, it seems that he did this simply in order to escape confiscation rather than by pious concerns.<sup>79</sup> He established his waqf in 1785; in the following year it was officially ratified and

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<sup>79</sup> Mikdad Ahmed Paşa purchased several immovables, when he served as the *mutasarrıf* of Amasya. For example, he purchased a share of the khan ("iki kapılı han") with thirty shops as early as 1783 in return for 2900 *kuruş* (*Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 61, p. 33). Similarly, he bought a butcher shop in return for 350 *kuruş* in 1785 (*Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 61, p. 48/1). He purchased a dye house and two shops from two non-Muslims as early as 1775 (*Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 54, p. 159b). He made all of these waqf.

registered as such (*tescil*).<sup>80</sup> When we look at his immovables endowed, it was exactly the property confiscated in 1780.<sup>81</sup> Apparently, upon the pardoning of his father and the return of the family members back to their places with old titles and offices in 1781, he soon recovered his property seized by the central state. He then continued his rule in Amasya region up until his execution in 1792, following the second confiscation.

Mikdad Ahmed endowed several of his immovable properties mainly in the Amasya region. His waqf was composed of eighty-one shops, which served a significant function in the everyday life of the city: barbers, bakers, shoemakers, and others rented these shops; some of them functioned as coffeehouses. Moreover, three dye houses, a khan in Ladik, a share in a khan called “iki kapılı han” with thirty shops, a garden and a mill were among the properties endowed.<sup>82</sup> He appointed Şeyhzâde Abdullah Efendi as the administrator (*mütevelli*) of the waqf, who was to collect the rents (*icare*) and revenues (*galle*) deriving from the endowed property mentioned above. In the endowment charter (*vakfiye*), it was stated that the revenue was to be spent for the maintenance of the fountain (*çeşme*) and if an additional profit occurred, it would be possessed by the waqf administrator as his own. Since the waqf was a family endowment, the donation act made it a rule that after Ahmed Mikdad's death, his elder son (Hasan Bey) was to take in charge of its administration. After his death, his sons were to inherit this

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<sup>80</sup> Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi, *Anadolu Muhasebesi Defteri (A. Başlar)* 578, (1195/1785), pp. 189-193.

<sup>81</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 17964*. As stated earlier, his thirty shops were confiscated by the state in 1780. The physical description of these shops was the same as the ones in the charter of the waqf.

office and only after one-fifth of the waqf's revenue was to be spent for the maintenance and repair of the immovable property endowed and the remaining revenue was to be distributed among the family members. If the family line ended, the oldest relative within the larger family was to be the administrator. In this case, only one-fifth of the revenue from the property was to be assigned to the administrator and what remained was to be sent to the two Holy cities for the people in need.

Mikdad Ahmed Paşa established another religious endowment in 1787.<sup>83</sup> This time he further endowed eleven shops, half shares in two shops, a bath (in Sivas), a *menzilhane-i amme* (in Merzifon), a *menzilhane* (in Amasya). The donation act contains the same conditions of the former.

In 1792, Mikdad Ahmed Paşa was executed in Filibe where he was in exile. As noted earlier, this time only his wealth outside the endowed property was confiscated. Following his execution, the administration of his waqf passed on to his son Hasan Bey in accordance with the related provision of the donation act. Hasan Bey was the follower and supporter of his cousin Tayyar Paşa, who rebelled in 1805 against the establishment of New Order. When Tayyar Paşa was declared as a “traitor” (*hain*) and escaped to Russia, Hasan Bey was also executed

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<sup>82</sup> The endowed property of Mikdad Paşa was also registered by the state during the inspection of his wealth by the officials responsible for the confiscation. They made a distinction among his endowed property and his *mülk*. *DBŞM-MHF* 95/171.

<sup>83</sup> Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi, *Anadolu Muhasebesi Defteri (A. Başlar)* 578, p. 196. The date of registration (*tescil*) was 1787.

in the same year. After his execution, the wealth of Hasan Bey as well as the members of his retinue were seized by the state.<sup>84</sup>

His execution resulted in a struggle over the property endowed by Mikdad Ahmed Paşa between Hasan Bey's heirs on the one hand and the central government and the Çapanoğlus on the other. The waqf that Hasan Bey inherited from his father was declared "illegal" (*gayri sahih*) on the ground that the property he possessed in Amasya was illegally endowed and the legal status of the waqf was annulled by a Sultanic decree.<sup>85</sup> The property endowed by Mikdad Ahmed Paşa seem to have been confiscated by the state without a serious investigation. In theory, confiscation of endowed property was, in fact, against Islamic law.<sup>86</sup> This quick and sudden confiscation was due, it seems, to the severity of the measures taken by the state after Tayyar Paşa's rebellion against New Order and his struggle with Çapanoğlus over the issue of the establishment of new army in the region. Tayyar Paşa's opposition to the Sultan resulted in serious internal disorder and war between the two dynasties. Therefore, the central government was determined to end the domination of the Caniklizâdes in the region and their precarious role in the internal affairs of the Empire in general. Under these circumstances, Selim III ordered strictly that no members of the Caniklizâde

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<sup>84</sup> *Cevdet Dahiliye 11502*. Esad Bey was appointed as the *mübaşir* for the recording and confiscation of Hasan Bey's property.

<sup>85</sup> *Cevdet Maliye 3409* (1806) It reads as follows: "... Mikdad Paşazâde Hasan Bey'in medine-i Amasya'da mutasarrıf olduğu bazı akar ve emlakı bila-esas vakf etmiş olduğu mesmu' olduğundan vakfiyeti ba-hatt-ı hümayun ref' ve..."

<sup>86</sup> The waqf had a charter character. Once registered by a judge and confirmed by the Sultan, no one can change and annul the conditions of the wakf. Halil İnalcık, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire", *Journal of Economic History*, 19, p. 132.

family was to be granted even a *timar*.<sup>87</sup> Therefore, the confiscation of the endowed property seems to be a part of the apparent decisiveness of the central government to erase the Caniklizâdes from the imperial politics.

Hasan Bey's property, without distinction between freehold and endowed, was sold in 1806 to Beyhan Sultan, the sister of Selim II,<sup>88</sup> in return for the payment of a lump sum (*muaccele*) and a document of ownership (*mülkname*) issued in her name.<sup>89</sup> She attempted to endow these properties to her wakf. However, upon hearing that they did not produce much revenue, she transferred them (*ferağ ve kasr-ı yed*) to Çapanoğlu Süleyman Bey, the *mutasarrıf* of Bozok with the same amount of payment in the same year.<sup>90</sup>

Later, however, during his short office of the deputy grand vizierate (*Sadaret kaymakamlığı*), Tayyar Paşa seized the property in question by force (*cebren*). Following Tayyar Paşa's fall from power and his execution in 1808, the property was once more given to Çapanoğlu Süleyman with a renewed *mülkname*.<sup>91</sup>

The story of the struggle over this endowed property was summarized in a decree, which clarified the transfer of Mikdad Ahmed Paşa's waqf to Beyhan Sultan and from her to Çapanoğlu Süleyman Bey. It was argued that the latter

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<sup>87</sup> Several orders were sent to the governors of the region stating that Tayyar Paşa, who rebelled against the state, should be executed and no state office or a rank was to be assigned to any member of the "dynasty of Fatsalı Ahmed Paşa". An imperial order sent to the Yusuf Ziya Paşa, the governor of Trabzon, reads as follows : "...bundan böyle Fatsalı Ahmed Paşa hanedanına vezaret ve emaret ve külli ensab ve ferd-i âlilerine bir timar tevcihi dahi emr-i muhal olub.." See *Trabzon Şer'iyye Sicili 1949 (135)*, 1806, p. 36, 47.

<sup>88</sup> For Beyhan Sultan, see M. Çağatay Uluçay, *Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992, pp. 102-104

<sup>89</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili 67*, p. 17/1.

<sup>90</sup> For the document of ownership given to Süleyman Bey, see *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili 67*, p. 109.

<sup>91</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili 67*, p. 109.

acted against religious law and the consent of the Sultan since he appropriated the property and annulled the status of the waqf with the document of ownership. Later, it was understood that Süleyman Bey extracted illegally the rent and revenue from the pious foundation, which was in fact assigned to the population of the two Holy cities. As a result, his *mülkname* was annulled by an imperial order, a copy of which was also sent to the judge of Amasya to confirm the legal status of the waqf.<sup>92</sup>

Soon after, İskender Bey, (Mikdad Ahmed Paşa's grandson and Hasan Bey's son), from *müderrisin-i kiram* (religious scholar) was appointed as the administrator of the waqf in accordance with the donation act of 1785.

Tayyar Paşa was another member of the family who established waqfs. In 1800, he founded a waqf in Çarşamba, a small town in the province of Canik. He endowed a large khan consisting of seventy-eight rooms and two baths for his waqf. The revenues of the endowed property were assigned to supply the expenses of a religious school (*Mahmudiye medresesi*) and a mosque.<sup>93</sup>

His other endowment was founded in Bafra on the former waqf land of Taceddin, who had constructed a bath a hundred years previously. Tayyar Paşa took possession of this waqf land and constructed a mosque on it. Later on, he converted it into an endowment in 1801. The revenues of this foundation were reserved for the expenses of the preachers of the mosque.<sup>94</sup> According to Miller, following Tayyar Paşa's reaction to the New Order and the insurrection of 1805-6

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<sup>92</sup> *Amasya Şer'iyye Sicili* 67, p. 46/2.

<sup>93</sup> Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi, *Anadolu Muhasebesi Defteri (A. Başlar)* 579, pp. 124-126.

<sup>94</sup> Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi, *Anadolu Muhasebesi Defteri (A. Başlar)* 579, pp. 149-150.

in the region, the central government ordered the destruction of buildings constructed by Tayyar Paşa, including the mosque.<sup>95</sup>

He also founded a religious school (*Tayyar Paşa Medresesi*) in Amasya in 1803.<sup>96</sup> As opposed to Mikdad Paşa, who established endowments mostly to prevent his property from confiscation, Tayyar Paşa's waqfs seems to have been symbolic, i.e. founded for his fame. His waqf activities concentrated on the period between when he returned from Russia upon pardoning and before his reaction to the centralizing measures of the government which led to the Caniklizâdes' final fall.

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<sup>95</sup> Miller, *Mustafa Pacha Bayraktar*, p. 111.

<sup>96</sup> Abdizâde Hüseyin Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, 1, Ankara: Amasya Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 1986, p. 242. He argues that Tayyar Paşa established an endowment in addition to the religious school. However, no archival source is find to support this argument.



**Table 5. Property List of Canikli Ali Paşa and Battal Bey in Bafra (c. 1780)**

Canikli Ali Paşa	Piece & <i>kuruş</i>
Mansion	1
Personal effects	151 items
Cash	295.427 <i>kuruş</i>
Bath near mansion, with 16	
İtems of personal effects	1
<i>Çiftlik</i>	10
<hr/>	
Battal Bey	
House for harem	1
Bath with a place for cloths ( <i>camekan</i> )	1
Dye house	1
Shops	5
<i>Bekar odası</i> (rooms to let)	2 (bab)
Khan	1
House with three rooms, near Kızılırmak	1
Orchard, near Kızılırmak	1
Grain-store, near Kızılırmak	1
Stable, near Kızılırmak	2

Sources: *DBŞM 4932, DBŞM-MHF 65/45.*

**Table 6. Battal Bey's Property in Köprü (c. 1780)**

Property	Piece	Value in <i>kuruş</i>
Mansion with a vineyard	1	3.500
Shop	7	800
share in a khan	1	400
grain-house with a land	2	200
mill	1	200
land for a mill	1	150
personal effects	11	622
personal effect of his treasurer	6	191
cereals from the tax-farm of the tithe of Köprü		1.280,5
<b>Total</b>		<b>7.343,5</b>

Source: *DBŞM-MHF 65/26-3*

**Table 7. Mikdad Ahmed Paşa's Property in Amasya (c. 1780)**

Property	Piece & in <i>kuruş</i>
Mansion	1
Shop	30
dye-house	2 and a half share
vineyard	5
land	1
mill (uncompleted)	1
personal effects	17 items
debts owed to him	22.580 <i>kuruş</i>
cash	103.464 <i>kuruş</i>
sheep and goats	1300
ox and buffalo	80
Milli Musa's personal effects	25 items
Mansion	1
Cash	1800
debts owed to him	1625 <i>kuruş</i>
<i>çiftlik</i> in the sub-district of Varay	2

Source: *Cevdet Maliye 17964*

**Table 8. Caniklizâdes' *Çiftlik*s in Bafra: Cereals and Livestock (c. 1780)**

<i>Çiftlik</i> s	Cereals (in <i>kile-i İstanbul</i> )					Livestock (number of animals)			
	wheat	barley	corn	<i>kaplica</i>	Total	oxen & buffalo	sheep & goat	horse & mule	Total
Karacakum		1.200			<b>1.200</b>	241		603	<b>844</b>
Karaköy	340	220	320		<b>880</b>	98	40		<b>138</b>
Gölavuş						37			<b>37</b>
Şehriban	84	144			<b>228</b>	19	70	21	<b>110</b>
Atabey	48				<b>48</b>	93			<b>93</b>
Engiz	2.176	320	472		<b>2.968</b>	171		10	<b>181</b>
Uzunkuz	80	200		40	<b>320</b>	15	100	3	<b>118</b>
Kaydalapa		160			<b>160</b>	29			<b>29</b>
Kanlıcak						26		7	<b>33</b>
Geleriç						21		3	<b>24</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.728</b>	<b>2.244</b>	<b>792</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>5.804</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>647</b>	<b>1.607</b>
Other livestock rented to villagers						337	5.311	214	<b>5.862</b>
<b>Total</b>						<b>1.087</b>	<b>5.521</b>	<b>8.61</b>	<b>7.469</b>
Grain stored in Bafra		3.000			<b>3.000</b>				

*DBŞM-MHF 4932, DBŞM-MHF 65/45*

**Table 9. Caniklizâdes' *Çiftlik*s in Amasya: Cereals and Livestock (c. 1780)**

<i>Çiftlik</i> s	Cereals (in <i>kile-i İstanbul</i> )				Livestock (number of animals)			
	wheat	barley	<i>senir</i>	<b>Total</b>	ox & buffalo	sheep & goat	horse & mule	<b>Total</b>
Susavucu	240	460	310	<b>1.010</b>	66			<b>66</b>
Tatarkalesi	400	950	230	<b>1.580</b>	95			<b>95</b>
Kayalı (2/3 share)	160	130	180	<b>470</b>	8	400		<b>408</b>
*Village of Aydoğdu, <i>kaza</i> of Havza	120	160	175	<b>455</b>				
*Village of Hacıkurt, <i>kaza</i> of Havza	115	118	166	<b>399</b>				
*Village of Dere, <i>kaza</i> of Havza	210	125	360	<b>695</b>				
*Village of Tahna, <i>kaza</i> of Havza	76	116	165	<b>357</b>				
*Village of Karageçmiş, <i>kaza</i> of Havza	25	55	150	<b>230</b>				
*Village of Kületek and Emir, <i>kaza</i> of Havza	43	31	154	<b>228</b>				
*Village of Susuz, <i>kaza</i> of Havza	35	23	118	<b>176</b>				
Terziköy, <i>kaza</i> of Varay (Milli Musa)	300	160		<b>460</b>	18			<b>18</b>
Bayat, <i>kaza</i> of Merzifon (Kavaklı Deli Ali)	210	140	95	<b>445</b>	8	260		<b>268</b>
Kolay, <i>kaza</i> of Merzifon (Kavaklı Deli Ali)	380	310	85	<b>775</b>	40		15	<b>55</b>
<b>Total of <i>Çiftlik</i>s</b>	<b>2314</b>	<b>2778</b>	<b>2188</b>	<b>7.280</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>910</b>
Livestock rented to 15 villagers					53	3050	10	<b>3.113</b>
<b>Total</b>					<b>288</b>	<b>3.710</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>4.023</b>

\*Sharecropping villages

Sources: *DBŞM-MHF 65/38*, *DBŞM-MHF 65/26*

**Table 10. Estimated Total Value of Cereals and Livestock in the *Çiftlik*s of Amasya and Bafra (c. 1780)**

Region	Cereals (in <i>kuruş</i> )				Livestock (in <i>kuruş</i> )			
	wheat	barley	<i>senir</i>	<b>Total</b>	oxen & buffalo	sheep & goat	<b>Total</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
Amasya	1.735,5	1.389	635,4	<b>3.759,9</b>	3.081,6	7.883,7	<b>10.965,3</b>	<b>14.725,2</b>
Bafra	2.046	1122		<b>3.168</b>	11.630,9	11.732,1	<b>23.363</b>	<b>26.531</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.781,5</b>	<b>2.511</b>	<b>635,4</b>	<b>6.927,9</b>	<b>14.712,5</b>	<b>19.615,8</b>	<b>34.328,3</b>	<b>41.256</b>

**Table 11. Value of Cereals and Livestock in the *Çiftlik*s of Amasya and Bafra (c. 1792)**

Çiftlik	Cereals (in <i>kuruş</i> )				Livestock (in <i>kuruş</i> )							<b>Total</b>
	wheat	barley	corn& oat	<b>Total</b>	buffalo	sheep	oxen	horse	mule	donkey	<b>Total</b>	
<b>Bafra</b>												
Karacakum												
Karaköy	491,5	151,5	78,5	<b>721,5</b>	6.875	700	1.428	2.860	960	15	<b>12.838</b>	<b>13.560</b>
Gölavuş												
Engiz												
<b>Amasya</b>												
Tatarkalesi												<b>1.803,5</b>
Susavucu												<b>1.452,5</b>
rented												<b>5.935,5</b>
livestock												
<b>Total (Bafra &amp; Amasya)</b>												<b>22.751</b>

**Table 12. Crops Produced in the *Çiftlik*s of Bafra in 1780 and 1792 (in *kile*)**  
(Karacakum, Karaköy, Gölavuş, Engiz)

Year	wheat	Barley	corn	Total
1780	2516	1740	792	<b>5048</b>
1792	140,5	101	90	<b>331,5</b>

**Table 13. Mikdad Ahmed Paşa's *Çiftlik*s in Amasya: Cereals and Livestock (c. 1792)**

<i>Çiftlik</i> s	Cereals (in <i>kile-i İstanbul</i> )				Livestock (number of animals)			
	wheat	barley	beans	Total	oxen & buffalo	sheep & goat	horse & mule	Total
<i>Çiftlik</i> , village of Güllü					24		18	<b>42</b>
<i>Çiftlik</i> , <i>kaza</i> of Gelkiras					65	650	85	<b>800</b>
Bağlica, <i>nahiye</i> of Amasya	16	16	2	<b>34</b>	27			<b>27</b>
Kızanlı					15		2	<b>17</b>
Abdülcelil	68	36	320	<b>428</b>	8			<b>8</b>
seed in the hands of two sharecroppers	50	40	56	<b>146</b>				
seed in the hands of seven sharecroppers in the village	78	108	120	<b>306</b>				
<b>Total</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>498</b>	<b>914</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>650</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>894</b>

Source: DBŞM-MHF95/171-6

**Table 14. Total Value of Caniklizâdes' Wealth (c. 1792)**

Property	Value in <i>kuruş</i>
Personal effects of Battal Hüseyin Paşa	54.335
Personal effects of Hayreddin Paşa	9.370
Cash	32.710
Loans	22.900
Cereals and livestock of <i>çiftlik</i> s of Bafra	13.560
Cereals and livestock of <i>çiftlik</i> s of Amasya	9.191,00
7 shops (Mikdad Ahmed Paşa)	750
8 vineyards (Mikdad Ahmed Paşa)	3.707
personal effects of Mikdad Ahmed Paşa	1.043
2 female slaves of Mikdad Ahmed Paşa	1.250
House furnishings	1.000
mansion (Bafra)	600
house, 7 shops, a bath (Kavak)	800
<b>Total</b>	<b>151.915</b>

Sources: *MAD 9720, Cevdet Maliye 7401*



## CONCLUSION

To recapitulate the main findings of this study, first of all, the particular standing of the Caniklizâdes in the imperial politics resulted from the peculiar conditions such as the increasing military needs of the Ottoman government during the 1768-1774 and 1787-1792 Russian-Ottoman wars. In other words, wars provided suitable ground for the Caniklizâdes to rise to power. This was accompanied also by the territorial extension of their power over the North-Central and Eastern Anatolia. There was a close relationship between the increase in their posts, offices, revenues and the increasing urgent needs of the state for soldiers, and provisions in the campaigns against Russia and Iran. The evolution of the family of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa first into a dynasty and then into an imperial elite can best be understood within the context of the exchange of services of the Caniklizâdes and the assignment by the central government of state posts and lucrative revenues. The Caniklizâdes' role in the administrative set up of the empire as military commanders and their capacity to levy troops and provisions enabled them to rise politically and economically. This result confirms our current knowledge about the rise of local magnates.

Secondly, frequent wars and campaigns and the Caniklizâdes' role in the defence of the North-Eastern frontiers of the empire as military commanders and their easy access to the Black Sea provided them with wide mobility. Due to the Caniklizâdes' great responsibilities in the Russian-Ottoman wars, not only as

contributors of military forces, provisions, animals, grain and other supplies to the war front, but also as the Commander-in-chief (*Serasker*), they seemed to have developed a much more independent character and political attitude against the central government compared to other Anatolian dynasties such as the Karaosmanoğlus and the Çapanoğlus of their neighboring region. Their relatively autonomous action is well illustrated by the rebellion of Canikli Ali Paşa in 1779 and that of his grandson, Tayyar Paşa in 1805. It would be interesting to compare them with the local magnates of the Balkans such as the Pasvandoğlus on the western frontier of the Empire. However, the continuity of the Caniklizâdes' privileges, i. e. state posts and control over revenue sources was very much dependent on their military success and compliance with the orders of the central government. Any failure in these services resulted in confiscation and execution by the central government as was the case in 1779 and 1792, following two military disasters and loss of territory to Russia.

The Caniklizâdes owed their status to the military and administrative posts they held, which then became vital for the extension of their economic power, and the consolidation and diversification of their revenue sources with additional tax-farms. With regards to the tax-collection, the Caniklizâdes controlled a variety of revenues in the North-Eastern provinces of the Empire. The collection of taxes from the sub-province of Canik appeared to provide the initial ground for the members of the family to enlarge their dominion over the neighbouring regions. They had almost a hereditary control over the revenues of Canik, Amasya, Trabzon, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Kastamonu and Sivas both as *malikane*-holder and subcontractor. They also delegated some of the tax-revenues to their retinue

members such as the *kethüdas* and to lesser notables such as the Şatırzâdes and the Hazinedarzâdes.

Tax-collection seems to be the most important means for the accumulation of wealth for the Caniklizâdes like other Anatolian local magnates. Their role as tax-collectors in the administrative set-up of the Empire appears to be far more important than their role as land-owner, moneylender and waqf-founder.

Caniklizâdes' interest in land seems to represent only a small portion of their fortune and investments. Their *çiftlik*s in Bafra and Amasya had a diversified production pattern, where crops such as wheat, barley, and corn were cultivated for local consumption. It is highly probable that the Caniklizâdes' engagement in the establishment of *çiftlik*s and livestock raising was closely related with the purpose of feeding the retinue members rather than producing for the market, as opposed to most of the *çiftlik*s in the Balkans and Western Anatolia. Like many *çiftlik*s in Ottoman Anatolia, share-cropping was the dominant form of organization of labour force in their farms.

The frequent wars and their participation into the campaigns seems to have prevented the Caniklizâdes from engaging in the promotion and development of their regions. Moreover, the insignificance of the Caniklizâdes' investments in Canik, Trabzon and Amasya, in comparison to the other local dynasties of Anatolia such as the Çapanoğlus, the Karaosmanzâdes, also resulted from the absence of their long-term vision and their disinclination to work for the well-being of the population. Instead, the profits earned from the tax-collection seemed to have been reinvested for acquiring new offices and also for the up-keep of their personal retinue. In contrast to the Caniklizâdes, the Hazinedarzâdes appear to

have had a more profound and close relationship with the local population, with long-term vision and their endowments consisted of several types of immovable properties as well as public construction activities such as the establishments of mosques, religious schools (*medreses*) and libraries in the region between Samsun and Trabzon. On the other hand, up to the third generation, we do not see any member of the Caniklizâdes who established waqfs. Mikdad Ahmed Paşa, as the representative of the third generation of the family, endowed most of his property. His waqf, however, was more of a manifestation of his aim to protect his property against confiscation than a contribution to the development of public life.

Further research in the archives and travel accounts might further contribute to our present knowledge about the role of the Caniklizâdes in the region and complement some aspects this study has not been able to shed much light on. Among these are the Caniklizâdes' exile years in Russia, the trade in the Black Sea, their naval power, and the relationship with the tax-payers. This study does not provide much information about the formation of the military power of the Caniklizâdes either. The quantity and the quality of their military retinue, the recruitment, provisioning and financement of the military force are among other important aspects awaiting further study.

As the last representative of the Caniklizâdes, Tayyar Paşa was one of the powerful figures of the opponents of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* and his rebellion against the central government deserves a special attention. While the other Anatolian dynasties (Karaosmanoğlus and Çapanoğlus) gave support to the establishment of new corps and a new treasury in 1792, Tayyar Paşa declared his independence and autonomy, rebelling against the Sultan. His contact with the Russians as well as

the Rumelian notables and his role in the reactionary government of Mustafa IV also awaiting future studies.

Canikli Ali Paşa was not only a military commander but also one of the intellectuals of his time. In the 1770s, he wrote a *risâle*, which can be considered as one of the last examples of the old style *nasihatnâme* tradition, in which he analyzed the existing military, administrative and social problems of the Empire and criticized the abuses of tax-collectors. Moreover, he sent significant reports about the current politics in Azerbaijan during his commandership of Kars, based on his knowledge about the situation in the Eastern frontier of the Empire. His two grandsons, Tayyar Mahmud Paşa and Hayreddin Ragıb Paşa wrote *divan*, in which they tried to reveal what might be called intellectual virtues, despite the difficult life they were living. It goes without saying that it is far beyond the scope of the present study.

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DBŞM-MHF: Başmuhasebe, Muhallefat

DBŞM-MLK: Başmuhasebe, Malikane

DBŞM-TRE: Başmuhasebe, Tersane-i Amire

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
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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I. Family Tree of The Caniklizâdes



APPENDIX II. *Kapı Kethüdas* in İstanbul and Their Patrons (1775-1810)

<i>KETHÜDAS</i>	THEIR PATRONS (Central and Local elites)
Hasan Ağa (Kapıcıbaşı, Gümüşhane Emni)	Köse Mustafa Paşa (1787)
Mehmed Emin Efendi (Hacegan-ı Divan-ı Hümayun)	1. Sadrazam-ı Esbak Hasan Paşa 2. Mısır Valisi İsmail Paşa (1790)
Hafız Mehmed Efendi	Mısır Valisi İsmail Paşa (1790)
Ahmed Esseyyid (Hassa Silahşörü)	Battal Hüseyin Paşa (1789)
Vani Esseyyid Ahmed Ağa	Hayreddin Bey
İbiş Ağa	Battal Paşa
İbiş Ağa (Dergah-ı Ali Kapıcıbaşı)	Tayyar Mahmud Paşa (1801)
Ömer Ağa	Tayyar Mahmud Paşa
Mustafa Bey	Cabbarzâde (1789)
Memiş Ağa	Salih Paşa (Bosna Eyaleti, 1789)
Süleyman Bey	Sadr-ı Sabık Müteveffa Hasan Paşa (1789)
İbiş Ağa	Rışvanzâde Ömer Paşa ve biraderzâdesi Hacı Ali Bey
Haşim Ali	Kırşehirli Sancağı Mutasarrıfı Ömer Paşa (1751)
Küçük Ali Efendi (Mektubi Serhalifesi)	Mirmiran Ali Paşa (1804)
Çelebi Mehmed Efendi	Livadiyeli Müteveffa Vezir Hasan Paşa (1785)
Hazinedar İbrahim Efendi	Canikli Ali Paşa (1781)
Ayandan Ahmed	Çerkez Hasan Paşa, Trabzon valisi (1779)
Abdülislam (Çavuşan-ı Dergah-ı Ali)	Yeğenzâde, Kayseri Sancağı mutasarrıfı (1775)
Za'im Mehmed Ağa	Rakka Valisi Mehmed Paşa ve babası (1781-1782)
Süfyan Ağa	Vüzera-i Azam Hazeratı (1802)
Taygur Efendi	Canik muhassılı Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa (1810)
El-Hac Abdurrahman	Kaptan- ı Derya Gazi Hasan Paşa (1784)



### APPENDIX III. Tax-farms Held by the Caniklizâdes (1737-1808)

1. Mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik
2. Mukata'a-i Samsun ve tevabiha
3. Mukata'a-i hashha-i rüsumat-ı toprakbasdı der kaza-i Bafra ve Terme ve Çarşamba ve Ünye ve Samsun gayr-ı ez gümrük ve tevabiha der livai Canik
4. Maktu'a-i bedeliye-i sancak-ı Trabzon
5. Kalem-i Trabzon ve tevabiha keferi ve yahudi cizyeleri
6. Mukata'a-i kura-i Gedik? timarha-i müstahfızan-ı kale-i Bedreme der livai Trabzon (Tirebolu mukata'ası)
7. Mukata'a-i hashha-i livai Kastamonu
8. Mukata'a-i Tamzara ve tevabiha der livai Karahisar-ı Şarki
9. Mukata'a-i nefsi Karahisar-ı Şarki ve tevabiha der livai Karahisar-ı Şarki
10. Mukata'a-i bedel-i sancak-ı Amasya
11. Mukata'a-i çeltük-i enhar-ı Boyabad ve tevabiha der livai Kastamonu
12. Sivas eyaleti avarız ve cebelü bedeliyesi ve menzilciyan avarız
13. Mukata'a-i adet-i agnam-ı livai Sivas ve tevabiha
14. Mukata'a-i nefsi Niksar der livai Sivas
15. Mukata'a-i Merzifon
16. Mukata'a-i zeamet-i Kebir
17. Mukata'a-i çeltük-i enhar-ı Kırşehir
18. Mukata'a-i çeltük-i enhar-ı Bafra ve bennak-ı Köprü
19. Mukata'a-i Hacı Köy
20. Mukata'a-i tahmis-i Amasya
21. Mukata'a-i Gedegra
22. Mukata'a-i Milli ve Kavilü
23. Mukata'a-i adet-i agnam-ı Sivas, Tokad, Amasya
24. Mukata'a-i boyahane-i Tokad
25. Mukata'a-i Mecidözü
26. Mukata'a-i cizye-i Amasya
27. Mukata'a-i cizye-i Merzifon
28. Mukata'a-i avarız-ı Kastamonu.
29. Mukata'a-i Zara
30. Mukata'a-i zeamet-i Havza

APPENDIX IV. Share-Holders and Down-Payments (*Muaccele*) of the Tax-farm of the *Muhassıllık* of Canik (1741-1826)

Year	Malikane	Share-Holders	<i>Muaccele</i> Payment in Shares	Total <i>Muaccele</i>	Estimated Annual Profit	<i>Faiz</i> (Surplus)
1741- 1742	muhassıllık-ı Canik	1. Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa 1/2 2. Üçüncüzâde Ömer Paşa and his brother Osman Bey 1/2				
1748	muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	1. Süleyman Ağa 1/2 ( son of Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa), 2. Ali Ağa 1/4 (son of Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa), 3. Ali Ağa 1/4 (brother-in-law of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa)	47.500 (4/4)	47.500	16.625-19.000	
1755	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	1. Süleyman Ağa 1/2 ( son of Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa), 2. Ali Ağa 1/4 (son of Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa), 3. Ali Ağa 1/4 (brother-in-law of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa)	47.000 (4/4)	47.500	14.250-16.625	
1757	mukata'at-ı muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı liva-i mezbur	1. Süleyman Ağa 1/2 ( son of Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa), 2. Ali Ağa 1/4 (son of Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa), 3. Ali Ağa 1/4 (brother-in-law of Fatsalı Ahmed Ağa)	17.366,5 (1/4)	69.466	20.839-24.313	
1763- 1764	muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	1. Süleyman Ağa 1/2 ( son of Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa), 2. Ali Ağa 1/2 (son of Fatsalı Ahmet Ağa), 3. Ali Ağa 1/4 (died)	32.500 (1/4)	130.000	32.500-39.000	
1765- 1766	muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	1. Süleyman Paşa (retraction of 1/2 share) 2. Ali Bey 4/4	25.000 (1/2)	50.000	12.500-15.000	
1776	muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	1. Ali Paşa 3/4 2. Battal Hüseyin Bey ¼ (son of Ali Paşa)	27.500 (1/4)	110.000	19.800-24.200	
1778	muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	1. Ali Paşa 1/2 2. Battal Hüseyin Bey ½	34.625 (1/2)	69.250	12.465-15.235	
1780	muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	Gazi Hasan Paşa (Grand Admiral)	110.000 (4/4)	110.000	19.800-24.200	
1780	muhassıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	1. Ali Paşa 1/2 2. Battal Hüseyin Bey 1/4 3. Sadullah Bey (son-in-law of Ali Paşa) ¼				

1785	muhasıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	1. Ali Paşa (died) 2. Battal Hüseyin 3/4 3. Sadullah Bey 1/4	55.000 (1/2))	110.000	16.500-22.000	
1785	muhasıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	1. Battal Hüseyin 3/4 2. Sadullah Bey (died) 3. Hayreddin Bey 1/4 (son of Battal Paşa)	35.000(1/4), 27.500(1/4)	110.000- 140.000	21.000-28.000	
1791	muhasıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik	1. Battal Hüseyin (retraction of 3/4 share) 2. Seyyid Hayreddin Bey 4/4.	90.000 (3/4)	120.000	18.000-24.000	
1792	muhasıllık-ı Canik	Osman Ağa				40.000
1793	bedel-i iltizam-ı maktu'a-ı muhasıllık-ı Canik ma'a avarız-ı liva-i mezbur ve gayrihu	Hafız Mehmed Emin Ağa, Silahşoran-ı Hassa				40.000
1795	mukata'a-i muhasıllık-i Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik (tied to treasury of New Order)	Ahmed Efendi, divan-ı hümayun ser-çavuşan-ı esbak				40.000
1796	mukata'a-i muhasıllık-i Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik (tied to treasury of New Order)	Süleyman Ağa, ser-bevvabin-i dergah-ı ali				40.000
1797	mukata'a-i muhasıllık-i Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik (tied to treasury of New Order)	vezir-i mükerrem El-Hac Yusuf Ziya Paşa				42.500
1798	mukata'a-i muhasıllık-i Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik (tied to treasury of New Order)	Mustafa Ağa, ser-bevvabin-i dergah-ı ali				42.500
1799	mukata'a-i muhasıllık-i Canik ma'a avarız-ı Canik (tied to treasury of New Order)	Battal Hüseyin Paşa	50.000 (4/4)			42.500
1801	idare-i muhasıllık-i Canik	Tayyar Mahmut Paşa (son of Battal Paşa)	50.000 (4/4)			
1805	mukata'a-i muhasıllık-ı Canik (tied to the treasury of Imperial Navy)	Hazret-i El-Hac Yusuf Ziya Paşa, sadr-ı sabık				
1806	mukata'a-i muhasıllık-ı Canik (tied to the treasury of Imperial Navy)	Ali Ağa, silahşoran-ı hassa				
1806	mukata'a-i muhasıllık-ı Canik, ma'a cibayet-i cizye ve avarız-ı liva-i Canik (tied to the treasury of Imperial Navy)	vezir-i mükerrem sadr-ı sabık El-Hac Yusuf Ziya Paşa				

1807	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik (ber vech-i malikâne)	Tayyar Paşa				
1808	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik (ber vech-i malikâne)	Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey and his sons				
1809	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	El-Hac Yusuf Ziya Paşa				
1810	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa				
1811	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Ağa				
1812-1817	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	Hazinedarzâde Süleyman Paşa				
1818-1819	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	Mehmed Hüsrev Paşa				
1820	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	İbrahim Paşa				
1821	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	El-Hac Salih Paşa				
1823	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	Hafız Ali Paşa				
1824-1826	mukata'a-i muhassıllık-ı Canik	El-Hac Hüseyin Paşa				

**Sources:** DBŞM-MLK 14115, DBŞM-MLK 14129, MAD 9570, DBŞM 41196, CM 7647, MAD 9582, DBŞM 6192, CM 6146, DBŞM-TRE 15437.

